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Exxon Valdez

 

Exxon Valdez

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This article is about the oil tanker. For the spill, see Exxon Valdez oil spill.
The Exxon Valdez
Exxon Valdez, 1989
Career  
Name: Oriental Nicety
Owner: Hong Kong Bloom Shipping Ltd. (2008-present)
SeaRiver Maritime (1989-2008)
Exxon (1986-1989)
Port of registry:  United States (1986-2005)
 Marshall Islands (2005-2008)
 Panama (2008-present)
Ordered: 1 August 1984
Builder: National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
San Diego, California
Laid down: 24 July 1985
Launched: 14 October 1986
In service: 11 December 1986-20 March 2012
Renamed: Exxon Valdez (1986-1989)
Exxon Mediterranean
(1990-1993)
Sea River Mediterranean (1993-2005)
S/R Mediterranean (1993-2005)
Mediterranean (2005-2008)
Dong Fang Ocean (2008-2011)
Oriental Nicety (2011-present)
Refit: 30 June 1989
Identification: Call sign: 3EPL6
IMO number: 8414520
MMSI number: 356270000
Fate: Sold for scrap
Notes: [1][2]
General characteristics
Class and type: VLCC Oil tanker
Type: ABS: A1, Ore Carrier, AMS, ACCU, GRAB 25
Tonnage: 209,836 DWT
Displacement: 211,469 tons (214,862 metric tons)
Length: 300 m (980 ft)
Beam: 51 m (167 ft)
Draught: 20 m (66 ft)
Deck clearance: 7.183 to 7.442 m (23.57 to 24.42 ft)
Installed power: 31,650 bhp (23,601 kW) at 79 rpm
Propulsion: Eight-cylinder, reversible, slow-speed Sulzer marine diesel engine.
Speed: 16.25 knots (30.10 km/h; 18.70 mph)
Capacity: 1.48 million barrels (235,000 m³) of crude oil
Crew: 21
Notes: [3]

Oriental Nicety, formerly Exxon Valdez (often pronounced val-deez), Exxon Mediterranean, SeaRiver Mediterranean, S/R Mediterranean, Mediterranean, and Dong Fang Ocean is an oil tanker that gained notoriety after running aground in Prince William Sound spilling hundreds of thousands of barrels of crude oil in Alaska. On March 24, 1989, while owned by the former Exxon Shipping Company, and captained by Joseph Hazelwood bound for Long Beach, California, the vessel ran aground on the Bligh Reef resulting in the second largest oil spill in United States history.[4] The size of the spill is estimated at 40,900 to 120,000 m3 (10,800,000 to 32,000,000 US gal), or 257,000 to 750,000 barrels.[5][6] In 1989, Exxon Valdez oil spill was listed as the 54th largest spill in history.

Contents

 [hide

[edit] Carrier

The tanker is 301 meters long, 50 meters wide, 26 meters depth (987 ft, 166 ft, 88 ft), weighing 30,000 tons empty and powered by a 23.60 MW (31,650 shp) diesel engine. The ship can transport up to 235,000 m³ (1.48 million barrels / 200,000 t) at a sustained speed of 30 km/h (16.25 knots). Its hull design is of the single-hull type. It was built by National Steel and Shipbuilding Company in San Diego, California. A relatively new tanker at the time of the spill, she was delivered to Exxon in December 1986.

[edit] Incident and accidents

[edit] Prince William Sound oil spill

At the time of the spill Exxon Valdez was employed to transport crude oil from the Alyeska consortium‘s pipeline terminal in Valdez, Alaska, to the lower 48 states of the United States. At the time it ran aground, the vessel was carrying about 201,000 m³ (53.1 million gallons) of oil. After the spill, the vessel was towed to San Diego, arriving on June 10, 1989, and repairs were started on June 30, 1989. Approximately 1,600 tons of steel were removed and replaced that July, totaling US$30 million of repairs to the tanker. Its single-hull design remained unaltered.

[edit] Return to service

After repairs, Exxon Valdez was renamed Exxon Mediterranean, then SeaRiver Mediterranean in the early 1990s, when Exxon transferred their shipping business to a new subsidiary company, River Maritime Inc. The name was later shortened to S/R Mediterranean, then to simply Mediterranean in 2005. Although Exxon tried briefly to return the ship to its North American fleet, it was prohibited by law from returning to Prince William Sound.[7] It then served in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.[8] In 2002, the ship was again removed from service.[9] In 2005, it began operating under the Marshall Islands flag of convenience.[10] Since then, European Union regulations have also prevented vessels with single-hull designs such as the Valdez from entering European ports.[11] In early 2008, SeaRiver Maritime, an ExxonMobil subsidiary, sold Mediterranean to the Hong Kong-based shipping company, Hong Kong Bloom Shipping Ltd., which renamed the ship once again Dong Fang Ocean, under Panama registry. During 2008, she was refitted and converted from an oil tanker to an ore carrier.

[edit] Litigation

Litigation was filed on behalf of 38,000 litigants. In 1994, a jury awarded plaintiffs US$287 million in compensatory damages and US$5 billion in punitive damages. Exxon appealed and the Ninth Circuit court reduced the punitive damages to US$2.5 billion. Exxon then appealed the punitive damages to the Supreme Court which capped the damages to US$507.5 million in June, 2008. On August 27, 2008, Exxon Mobil agreed to pay 75% of the US$507.5 million damages ruling to settle the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill off Alaska.[12] In June 2009, a federal ruling ordered Exxon to pay an additional US$480 million in interest on their delayed punitive damage awards.[13]

As of 2010 there are approximately 98 cubic metres (26,000 US gal) of Valdez crude oil still in Alaska’s sand and soil.[14]

[edit] Collision with MV Aali

On November 29, 2010, Dong Fang Ocean collided in the South China Sea with the Malta-flagged cargo ship, Aali. Both vessels were severely damaged in the incident, and Aali was towed to Weihai and Dong Fang Ocean was towed to Longyan Port in Shandong.[15]

[edit] Retirement

In March 2012, Dong Fang Ocean was purchased by Global Marketing Systems, Inc. for scrap at an estimated US$16 million and sailed under her own power to a ship breaker in Singapore. She changed hands again among scrap merchants (a common occurrence) and was eventually routed to Alang, India, under the ownership of Priya Blue Industries and at some point renamed Oriental Nicety.[16] As of May 2012 a court order has prevented the ship from being beached, as it was successfully argued that the vessel is in breach of the Basel Convention.[17]

On 30 July 2012, the Supreme Court of India granted permission for the owners of Oritental Nicety to beach her at Gujarat coast where she is to be dismantled.[18]

[edit] References

  1. ^ “Dong Fang Ocean”. Auke Visser’s Historical Tankers. http://www.aukevisser.nl/supertankers/bulkers/id425.htm. Retrieved 3 July 2010. 
  2. ^ “Dong Fang Ocean – Type of ship: Cargo Ship – Callsign: 3EPL6”. VesselTracker. 2010. http://www.vesseltracker.com/en/Ships/Dong-Fang-Ocean-8414520.html. Retrieved 2010-04-08. 
  3. ^ “ABS Record: Dong Fang Ocean. American Bureau of Shipping. 2010. http://www.eagle.org/safenet/record/record_vesseldetailsprinparticular?Classno=8603137. Retrieved 29 June 2010. 
  4. ^ “Frequently Asked Questions About the Spill”. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/history/faq.cfm. Retrieved 2008-09-21. 
  5. ^ Bluemink, Elizabeth (Thursday, 10 June 2010). “Size of Exxon spill remains disputed”. Anchorage Daily News. http://www.adn.com/2010/06/05/1309722/size-of-exxon-spill-remains-disputed.html. Retrieved 29 June 2010. 
  6. ^ Riki Ott (Friday, 18 June 2010) (audio/transcript). How Much Oil Really Spilled From the Exxon Valdez?. Interview with Brooke Gladstone. On The Media. National Public Radio. http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/06/18/01. Retrieved 29 June 2010. 
  7. ^ Musgrave, Ruth S. (1998). Federal Wildlife Laws Handbook with Related Laws. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-86587-557-9
  8. ^ Robert Little (Thursday, October 17, 2002). “The former Exxon Valdez faces retirement”. The Baltimore Sun. http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20021017&slug=newexxon17. Retrieved 29 June 2010. 
  9. ^ David Kravets (Friday, 01 November 2002). “9th Circuit bars Exxon Valdez from operating”. The Berkeley Daily Planet. http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2002-11-01/article/15814?headline=9th-Circuit-bars-Exxon-Valdez-from-operating. Retrieved 29 June 2010. 
  10. ^ “Headlines 2005q1”. Coltoncompany.com. 2005-03-22. http://www.coltoncompany.com/newsandcomment/headlines/headlines2005q1.htm. Retrieved 2010-04-08. 
  11. ^ “Only Double Hull Tankers Now Into EU Ports” By Tanker World, May 3, 2007
  12. ^ Wakabayashi, Daisuke (2008-08-27). “Exxon agrees to pay out 75 percent of Valdez damages”. Thomson Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKN2641081120080827. Retrieved 2008-09-20. 
  13. ^ Carol J. Williams (June 16 2009). “Exxon must pay US$480 million in interest over Valdez oil tanker spill”. The Los Angeles Times. http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-exxon-valdez16-2009jun16,0,7865562.story. Retrieved 7 July 2010. 
  14. ^ Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 14 / Friday, January 22, 2010 / Notices
  15. ^ Tim Schwabedissen, Christoph M. Wahner (29 November 2010]). “Daily Vessel Casualty, Piracy & News Report”. The Law Offices of Countryman & McDaniel. http://www.cargolaw.com/presentations_casualties.php. Retrieved 10 December 2010. 
  16. ^ Staff writers (9 May 2012). “India bars Alaska oil spill tanker Exxon Valdez”. BBS News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-18003202. Retrieved 31 July 2012. 
  17. ^ David Black (Thursday, May 10, 2012). “New setback for troubled ship as India bars beaching”. The National. http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/new-setback-for-troubled-ship-as-india-bars-beaching. Retrieved 19 June 2012. 
  18. ^ Staff writers (31 July 2012). “SC gives green signal for beaching of US ship”. The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/news/article3703952.ece. Retrieved 31 July 2012. 

[edit] External links

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August 3, 2012 Posted by | reparations and compensation, Sanctions, Timeline | , , , , , | Leave a comment

Piracy in Somalia

 
 

 

Piracy in Somalia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from Somali pirates)

Jump to: navigation, search

 

Map of areas under threat by Somali pirates.

Pirates holding the crew of the Chinese fishing vessel Tian Yu No. 8, guarding the crew on the bow.

[show]

Piracy in Somalia
 

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a threat to international shipping since the second phase of the Somali Civil War in the early 21st century.[1] Since 2005, many international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Programme, have expressed concern over the rise in acts of piracy.[2][3] Piracy has impeded the delivery of shipments and increased shipping expenses, costing an estimated $6.6 to $6.9 billion a year in global trade per Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP).[4] According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a veritable industry of profiteers has also risen around the piracy. Insurance companies, in particular, have profited from the pirate attacks, as insurance premiums have increased significantly.[5]

A United Nations report and several news sources have suggested that piracy off the coast of Somalia is caused in part by illegal fishing.[6][7] According to the DIW and the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, the dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign vessels has also severely constrained the ability of local fishermen to earn a living and forced many to turn to piracy instead.[5][8] 70 percent of the local coastal communities “strongly support the piracy as a form of national defense of the country’s territorial waters”, and the pirates believe they are protecting their fishing grounds and exacting justice and compensation for the marine resources stolen.[9][10][11] Some reports have suggested that, in the absence of an effective national coast guard following the outbreak of the civil war and the subsequent disintegration of the Armed Forces, local fishermen formed organized groups in order to protect their waters. This motivation is reflected in the names taken on by some of the pirate networks, such as the National Volunteer Coast Guard.[12] However, as piracy has become substantially more lucrative in recent years, other reports have speculated that financial gain is now the primary motive for the pirates.[13][14][15]

Combined Task Force 150, a multinational coalition task force, took on the role of fighting piracy off of the coast of Somalia by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden.[16] The increasing threat posed by piracy has also caused concern in India since most of its shipping trade routes pass through the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy responded to these concerns by deploying a warship in the region on 23 October 2008. In September 2008, Russia announced that it too would join international efforts to combat piracy.[17] Some reports have also accused certain government officials in Somalia of complicity with the pirates,[18] with authorities from the Galmudug administration in the north-central Hobyo district reportedly attempting to use pirate gangs as a bulwark against Islamist insurgents from the nation’s southern conflict zones.[19] However, according to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, both the former and current administrations of the autonomous Puntland region in northeastern Somalia appear to be more actively involved in combating piracy.[18] The latter measures include on-land raids on pirate hideouts,[20] and the construction of a new naval base in conjunction with Saracen International, a UK-based security company.[21] By the first half of 2010, these increased policing efforts by Somali government authorities on land and international naval vessels at sea reportedly contributed to a drop in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 86 a year prior to 33, forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas such as the Somali Basin and the wider Indian Ocean.[20][22][23] By the end of 2011, pirates managed to seize only four ships off of the coast of Somalia; 18 fewer than the 26 they had captured in each of the two previous years. They also attempted unsuccessful attacks on 52 other vessels, 16 fewer than the year prior.[24] As of 30 July 2012, the pirates were holding approximately 7 large ships with an estimated 185 hostages.[25]

According to another source, there were 151 attacks on ships in 2011, compared to 127 in 2010 – but only 25 successful hijacks compared to 47 in 2010. 10 vessels and 159 hostages were being held at February 2012. In 2011, pirates earned $146m, an average of $4.87m per ship. An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 pirates operated; by February 2012 1,000 have been captured and were going through legal processes in 21 countries.[26] According to the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), intensified naval operations had by February 2012 led to a further drop in successful pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean, with the pirates’ movements in the region at large also significantly constrained.[27] 25 military vessels from the EU and Nato countries, the USA, China, Russia, India and Japan patrolled approximately 8.3m km2 (3.2m sq miles) of ocean, an area about the size of Western Europe.[26] On 16 July 2012 the European Union launched a new operation, EUCAP Nestor. An analysis by the Brussels-based Global Governance Institute urges the EU to commit onshore to prevent piracy.[28]

Contents

 [hide

[edit] History

In the early 1980s, prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia, the Somali Ministry of Fisheries and the Coastal Development Agency (CDA) launched a development program focusing on the establishment of agricultural and fishery cooperatives for artisinal fishermen. It also received significant foreign investment funds for various fishery development projects, as the Somali fishing industry was considered to have a lot of potential owing to its unexploited marine stocks. The government at this time permitted foreign fishing through official licensing or joint venture agreements, forming two such partnerships in the Iraqi-Somali Siadco and Italian-Somali Somital ventures.[29]

Somalia’s coral reefs, ecological parks and protected areas.

After the collapse of the central government in the ensuing civil war, the Somali Navy disbanded. With Somali territorial waters undefended, foreign fishing trawlers began illegally fishing on the Somali seaboard and ships from big companies started dumping waste off the coast of Somalia. This led to the erosion of the fish stock. Local fishermen subsequently started to band together to protect their resources.[30][5][8] After seeing the profitability of ransom payments, some financiers and former militiamen later began to fund pirate activities, splitting the profits evenly with the pirates.[31] In most of the hijackings, the pirates have not harmed their prisoners.[32]

Combined Task Force 150, a multinational coalition task force, subsequently took on the role of fighting piracy off of the coast of Somalia by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden.[16] However, many foreign naval vessels chasing pirates were forced to break off when the pirates entered Somali territorial waters.[33][34] To address this, in June 2008, following a letter from the Somalian Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the President of the UN Security Council requesting assistance for the TFG’s efforts to tackle acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a declaration authorizing nations that have the consent of the Transitional Federal Government to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates.[35] On the advice of lawyers, the Royal Navy and other international naval forces have often released suspected pirates that they have captured because, although the men are frequently armed, they have not been caught engaging in acts of piracy and have thus not technically committed a crime.[36]

Due to improved anti-piracy measures the success of piracy acts on sea decreased dramatically by the end of 2011 with only four vessels hijacked in the last quarter versus 17 in the last quarter of the preceding year.[37] In response, pirates resorted to increased hostage taking on land.[37] The government of the autonomous Puntland region has also made progress in combating piracy, evident in recent interventions by its maritime police force (PMPF).[38]

In part to further curtail piracy activity, the London Somalia Conference was also convened in February 2012.

[edit] Summary of recent events

Somali pirates have attacked hundreds of vessels in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean region, though most attacks do not result in a successful hijacking. In 2008, there were 111 attacks which included 42 successful hijackings.[39] However, this is only a fraction of the up to 30,000 merchant vessels which pass through that area.[40] The rate of attacks in January and February 2009 was about 10 times higher than during the same period in 2008 and “there have been almost daily attacks in March”,[39] with 79 attacks,[41] 21 successful, by mid April. Most of these attacks occur in the Gulf of Aden but the Somali pirates have been increasing their range and have started attacking ships as far south as off the coast of Kenya in the Indian Ocean.[42][43] Below are some notable pirate events which have garnered significant media coverage since 2007.

On 28 May 2007, a Chinese sailor was killed by the pirates because the ship’s owners failed to meet their ransom demand.[44]

The sinking of Ekawat Nava 5 on November 18, 2008 by the Indian Navy warship INS Tabar.

On 5 October 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1838[45] calling on nations with vessels in the area to apply military force to repress the acts of piracy.[46] At the 101st council of the International Maritime Organization, India called for a United Nations peacekeeping force under unified command to tackle piracy off Somalia.[47] (There has been a general and complete arms embargo against Somalia since 1992.)

In November 2008, Somali pirates began hijacking ships well outside the Gulf of Aden, perhaps targeting ships headed for the port of Mombasa, Kenya.[48] The frequency and sophistication of the attacks also increased around this time, as did the size of vessels being targeted. Large cargo ships, oil and chemical tankers on international voyages became the new targets of choice for the Somali hijackers. This is in stark contrast to the pirate attacks which were once frequent in the Strait of Malacca, another strategically important waterway for international trade, which were according to maritime security expert Catherine Zara Raymond, generally directed against “smaller, more vulnerable vessels carrying trade across the Straits or employed in the coastal trade on either side of the Straits.”[49]

On 19 November 2008, the Indian Navy warship INS Tabar sank a suspected pirate mothership.[50] Later, it was claimed to be a Thai trawler being hijacked by pirates.[51] The Indian Navy later defended its actions by stating that they were fired upon first.[52]

On 21 November 2008, BBC News reported that the Indian Navy had received United Nations approval to enter Somali waters to combat piracy.[53]

On 8 April 2009, four Somali pirates seized the Maersk Alabama 240 nautical miles (440 km; 280 mi) southeast of the Somalia port city of Eyl.[54] The ship was carrying 17,000 metric tons of cargo, of which 5,000 metric tons were relief supplies bound for Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya.[55][56] On 12 April 2009, United States Navy SEAL snipers killed the three pirates that were holding Captain Richard Phillips hostage aboard a lifeboat from the Maersk Alabama after determining that Captain Phillips’ life was in immediate danger.[57][58][59] A fourth pirate, Abdul Wali Muse, surrendered and was taken into custody.[60][61] On May 18, a federal grand jury in New York returned a ten-count indictment against him.[62]

On 20 April 2009, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented on the capture and release of 7 Somali pirates by Dutch Naval forces who were on a NATO mission.[63] After an attack on the Handytankers Magic, a petroleum tanker, the Dutch frigate De Zeven Provinciën tracked the pirates back to a pirate “mother ship” and captured them.[63][64] They confiscated the pirates’ weapons and freed 20 Yemeni fishermen whom the pirates had kidnapped and who had been forced to sail the pirate “mother ship”.[63][64] Since the Dutch Naval Forces were part of a NATO exercise, but not on an EU mission, they lacked legal jurisdiction to keep the pirates so they released them.[63] Clinton stated that this action “sends the wrong signal” and that additional coordination was needed among nations.[63]

On 23 April 2009, international donors pledged over $250 million for Somalia, including $134 million to increase the African Union peacekeeping mission from 4,350 troops to 8,000 troops and $34 million for Somali security forces.[65][66] Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon told delegates at a donors’ conference sponsored by the U.N. that “Piracy is a symptom of anarchy and insecurity on the ground”, and that “More security on the ground will make less piracy on the seas.”[65][66] Somali President Sharif Ahmed pledged at the conference that he would fight piracy and to loud applause said that “It is our duty to pursue these criminals not only on the high seas, but also on terra firma”.[65][66] The Somali government has not gone after pirates because pirate leaders currently have more power than the government.[65][66] It has been estimated by piracy experts that in 2008 the pirates gained about $80 million through ransom payments.[65][66]

On 2 May 2009, Somali pirates captured the MV Ariana with its 24 Ukrainian crew.[67] The ship was released on 10 December 2009 after a ransom of almost $3,000,000 was paid.[68]

Armed pirates in the Indian Ocean near Somalia. After the picture was taken, the vessel’s crew members opened fire on U.S. Navy ships and the ship’s crew members returned fire. One suspected pirate was killed and 12 were taken into custody (see engaged pirate vessels).

On 8 November 2009, Somali pirates threatened that a kidnapped British couple, the Chandlers, would be “punished” if a German warship did not release seven pirates.[69] Omer, one of the pirates holding the British couple, claimed the seven men were fishermen, but a European Union Naval Force spokesman stated they were captured as they fired AK-47 assault rifles at a French fishing vessel.[69] The Chandlers were released on 14 November 2010 after 388 days of captivity.[70] At least two ransom payments, reportedly over GBP 500 000, had been made.[71]

In April 2010, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) alluded to possible covert and overt action against the pirates. CIA officials had been publicly warning of this potential threat for months. In a Harpers Magazine article, a CIA official said, “We need to deal with this problem from the beach side, in concert with the ocean side, but we don’t have an embassy in Somalia and limited, ineffective intelligence operations. We need to work in Somalia and in Lebanon, where a lot of the ransom money has changed hands. But our operations in Lebanon are a joke, and we have no presence at all in Somalia.”[72]

In early May 2010, Russian special forces retook a Russian oil tanker that had been hijacked by 11 pirates. One died in the assault, and a week later Russian military officials reported that the remainder were freed due to weaknesses in international law but died before reaching the Somali coast. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had announced the day the ship was retaken that “We’ll have to do what our forefathers did when they met the pirates” until a suitable way of prosecuting them was available.[73]

On 11 May 2010 Somali pirates seized a Bulgarian-flagged ship in the Gulf of Aden. The Panega, with 15 Bulgarian crew members aboard, was en route from the Red Sea to India or Pakistan. This was the first such hijacking of a Bulgarian-flagged ship. On 12 May 2010, Athens announced that Somali pirates have seized a Greek vessel in the Gulf of Aden with at least 24 people on board, including two Greek citizens and some Filipinos. The vessel, sailing under the Liberian flag, was transporting iron from Ukraine to China.

On 14 January 2011, while speaking to reporters, Commodore Michiel Hijmans of the Royal Netherlands Navy stated that the use of hijacked vessels in more recent hijackings had led to increased range of pirating activities, as well as difficulty to actively thwart future events due to the use of kidnapped sailors as human shields.[74]

On 15 January 2011 thirteen Somali pirates seized the Samho Jewelry, a Maltese-flagged chemical carrier operated by Samho Shipping, 650 km southeast of Muscat. The Republic of Korea Navy destroyer Choi Young shadowed the Samho Jewlry for several days. In the early morning of 21 January 2011, 25 ROK Navy SEALs on small boats launched from the Choi Young boarded the Samho Jewelry while the Choi Youngs Westland Super Lynx provided covering fire. Eight pirates were killed and five captured in the operation; the crew of 21 was freed with the Captain suffering a gunshot wound to the stomach.[75]

On 28 January 2011, an Indian Coast Guard aircraft while responding to a distress call from the CMA CGM Verdi, located two skiffs attempting a piracy attack near Lakshadweep. Seeing the aircraft, the skiffs immediately aborted their piracy attempt and dashed towards the mother vessel, MV Prantalay 14 – a hijacked Thai trawler, which hurriedly hoisted the two skiffs on board and moved westward. The Indian Navy deployed the INS Cankarso which located and engaged the mothership 100 nautical miles north of the Minicoy island. 10 pirates were killed while 15 were apprehended and 20 Thai and Burmese fishermen being held aboard the ship as hostages were rescued.[76]

Within a week of its previous success, the Indian Navy captured another hijacked Thai trawler, MV Prantalay 11 and captured 28 pirates aboard in an operation undertaken by the INS Tir purusuant to receiving information that a Greek merchant ship had been attacked by pirates on board high-speed boats, although it had managed to avoid capture. When INS Tir ordered the pirate ship to stop and be boarded for inspection, it was fired upon. The INS Tir returned fire in which 3 pirates were injured and caused the pirates to raise a white flag indicating their surrender. The INS Tir subsequently joined by CGS Samar of the Indian Coast Guard. Officials from the Indian Navy reported that a total of 52 men were apprehended, but that 24 are suspected to be Thai fishermen who were hostages of the 28 African pirates.[77]

In late February 2011, piracy targeting smaller yachts and collecting ransom made headlines when four Americans were killed aboard their vessel, the Quest, by their captors, while a military ship shadowed them.[78] A federal court in Norfolk, Virginia, sentenced three members of the gang that seized the yacht to life imprisonment.[79] On 24 February 2011 a Danish family on a yacht were captured by pirates.[80]

In March 2011, the Indian Navy intercepted a pirate mother vessel 600 nautical miles west of the Indian coast in the Arabian Sea on Monday and rescued 13 hostages. Sixty-one pirates have also been caught in the operation carried out by Navy’s INS Kalpeni.[81]

In late March 2011, Indian Navy seized 16 Somali pirates after a three-hour-long battle in the Arabian Sea, The navy also rescued 16 crew members of a hijacked Iranian ship west of the Lakshadweep Islands. The crew included 12 Iranians and four Pakistanis.[82]

On Jan. 5 2012, an SH-60S Seahawk from the guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd, part of the USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group, detected a suspected pirate skiff alongside the Iranian-flagged fishing boat, Al Molai. The master of the Al Molai sent a distress call about the same time reporting pirates were holding him captive. A visit, board, search and seizure team from the Kidd boarded the dhow, a traditional Arabian sailing vessel, and detained 15 suspected pirates who had been holding a 13-member Iranian crew hostage for several weeks. The Al Molai had been pirated and used as a “mother ship” for pirate operations throughout the Persian Gulf, members of the Iranian vessel’s crew reported. [83]

[edit] Pirates

[edit] Profile

A collage of pirates armed with AKM assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and semi-automatic pistols.

Most of the pirates are youngsters and come from different parts of Somalia.[84] As of 2012, they primarily operate from the Galmudug region in the central section of the country.[85][86] In previous years, they largely operated from the northeastern Puntland province, until the regional administration launched a major anti-piracy campaign and established a maritime police force (PMPF).[85]

According to a 2008 BBC report, the pirates can be divided into three main categories:

  • Local fishermen, considered the brains of the pirates’ operations due to their skill and knowledge of the sea. Many think that foreign boats have no right to cruise next to the shore and destroy their boats.
  • Ex-militiamen, who previously fought for the local clan warlords, or ex-military from the former Barre government used as the muscle.
  • Technical experts, who operate equipment such as GPS devices.[87]

The closest Somali term for ‘pirate’ is burcad badeed, which means “ocean robber”. However, the pirates themselves prefer to be called badaadinta badah or “saviours of the sea” (often translated as “coastguard”).[88]

[edit] Methodology

A captured pirate skiff.

The methods used in a typical pirate attack have been analyzed.[89] They show that while attacks can be expected at any time, most occur during the day, often in the early hours. They may involve two or more skiffs that can reach speeds of up to 25 knots. With the help of motherships that include captured fishing and merchant vessels the operating range of the skiffs has been increased far into the Indian Ocean. An attacked vessel is approached from quarter or stern; RPGs and small arms are used to intimidate the operator to slow down and allow boarding. Light ladders are brought along to climb aboard. Pirates then will try and get control of the bridge to take operational control of the vessel.[89] According to Sky News, pirates also often jettison their equipment in the sea before being arrested, as this lowers the likelihood of a successful prosecution.[27]

[edit] Weaponry and funding

The pirates get most of their weapons from Yemen, but a significant amount comes from Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. Weapons dealers in the capital receive a deposit from a hawala dealer on behalf of the pirates and the weapons are then driven to Puntland where the pirates pay the balance.[87] Various photographs of pirates in situ indicate that their weapons are predominantly AKMs, RPG-7s, AK47s, and semi-automatic pistols such as the TT-30.[90][91] Additionally, given the particular origin of their weaponry, they are likely to have hand grenades such as the RGD-5 or F1.

The funding of piracy operations is now structured in a stock exchange, with investors buying and selling shares in upcoming attacks in a bourse in Harardhere.[92] Pirates say ransom money is paid in large denomination US dollar bills. It is delivered to them in burlap sacks which are either dropped from helicopters or cased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also been delivered to pirates via parachute, as happened in January 2009 when an orange container with $3 million cash inside was dropped onto the deck of the supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of ship and crew.[93] To authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency-counting machines, the same technology used at foreign exchange bureaus worldwide. According to one pirate, these machines are, in turn, purchased from business connections in Dubai, Djibouti, and other areas.[94] Hostages seized by the pirates usually have to wait 45 days or more for the ships’ owners to pay the ransom and secure their release.[95]

In 2008, there were also allegations that the pirates received assistance from some members of the Somali diaspora. Somali expatriates, including some members of the Somali community in Canada, reputedly offered funds, equipment and information.[96]

According to the head of the U.N.’s counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, the Al-Shabaab group in 2011 increasingly sought to cooperate with the pirate gangs in the face of dwindling funds and resources for their own activities.[97] Steed, however, acknowledged that he had no definite proof of operational ties between the pirates and the Islamist militants. Detained pirates also indicated to UNODC officials that some measure of cooperation with Al-Shabaab militants was necessary, as they have increasingly launched maritime raids from areas in southern Somalia controlled by the insurgent outfit. Al-Shabaab members have also extorted the pirates, demanding protection money from them and forcing seized pirate gang leaders in Harardhere to hand over 20% of future ransom proceeds.[98] There have also been ties with al-Qaeda receiving funding from pirate operations. A maritime intelligence source told CBS News that it was “‘inconceivable’ to Western intelligence agencies that al Qaeda would not be getting some financial reward from the successful hijackings.” They go on to express concern about this funding link being able to keep the group satisfied as piracy gains more publicity and higher ransoms.[99]

[edit] Effects and perceptions

[edit] Costs

Both positive and negative effects of piracy have been reported.[4] In 2009, pirate income derived from ransoms was estimated at around 39 million euros (about $58 million),[100] rising to $238 million in 2010.[101] The average ransom had risen to $5.4 million in 2010, up from around $150 thousand in 2005.[102] However, by 2011, pirate ransom income dropped to $160 million, a downward trend which has been attributed to intensified counter-piracy efforts.[4]

Besides the actual cost of paying ransoms, various attempts have been made at gauging indirect costs stemming from the piracy; especially those reportedly incurred over the course of anti-piracy initiatives.[4][103]

During the height of the piracy phenomenon in 2008, local residents complained that the presence of so many armed men made them feel insecure and that their free spending ways caused wild fluctuations in the local exchange rate. Others faulted them for excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages and khat.[87]

A 2010 report suggested that piracy off the coast of Somalia lead to a decrease of revenue for Egypt as fewer ships use the Suez canal (estimated loss of about $642 million), impeded trade with neighboring countries, and negatively impacted tourism and fishing in the Seychelles.[101][104] According to Sky News, around 50% of the world’s containers passed through the Horn of Africa coastline as of 2012. The European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) has a yearly budget of over 8 million Euros earmarked for patrolling the 3.2 million square miles.[27]

A 2011 report by Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) suggested that the indirect costs of piracy were much higher and estimated to be between $6.6 to $6.9 billion, as they also included insurance, naval support, legal proceedings, re-routing of slower ships, and individual protective steps taken by ship-owners.[4][101][105][106]

Another report from 2011 published by the consultancy firm Geopolicity Inc. investigated the causes and consequences of international piracy, with a particular focus on such activity off the coast of Somalia. The paper asserted that what began as an attempt in the mid-1990s by Somali fishermen to protect their territorial waters has extended far beyond their seaboard and grown into an emerging market in its own right. Due to potentially substantial financial rewards, the report hypothesized that the number of new pirates could swell by 400 persons annually, that pirate ransom income could in turn rise to $400 million per year by 2015, and that piracy costs as a whole could increase to $15 billion over the same period.[107]

According to a 2012 investigative piece by the Somalia Report, the OBP paper and other similar reports that attempt to calibrate the global cost of piracy produce inaccurate estimates based on a variety of factors. Most saliently, instead of comparing the actual costs of piracy with the considerable benefits derived from the phenomenon by the maritime industry and local parties capitalizing on capacity-building initiatives, the OBP paper conflated the alleged piracy costs with the large premiums made by insurance companies and lumped them together with governmental and societal costs. The report also exaggerated the impact that piracy has had on the shipping sector, an industry which has grown steadily in size from 25,000 billion tonnes/miles to 35,000 billion tonnes/miles since the rise of Indian Ocean piracy in 2005. Moreover, the global costs of piracy reportedly represent a small fraction of total maritime shipping expenses and are significantly lower than more routine costs, such as those brought on by port theft, bad weather conditions or fuel-related issues. In the United States alone, the National Cargo Security Council estimated that between $10-$15 billion were stolen from ports in 2003, a figure several times higher than the projected global cost of piracy. Additionally, while the OBP paper alleged that pirate activity has had a significantly negative impact on regional economies, particularly the Kenyan tourism industry, tourist-derived revenue in Kenya rose by 32% in 2011. According to the Somalia Report investigation, the OBP paper also did not factor into its calculations the overall decline in successful pirate attacks beginning in the second half of 2011, a downward trend largely brought about by the increasing use of armed guards.[4]

[edit] Benefits

Some benefits from the piracy have also been noted. In the earlier years of the phenomenon in 2008, it was reported that many local residents in pirate hubs such as Harardhere appreciated the rejuvenating effect that the pirates’ on-shore spending and re-stocking had on their small towns, a presence which often provided jobs and opportunity when there were comparatively fewer. Entire hamlets were in the process reportedly transformed into boomtowns, with local shop owners and other residents using their gains to purchase items such as generators for uninterrupted electricity.[94] However, the election of a new administration in 2009 in the northeastern Puntland region saw a sharp decrease in pirate operations, as the provincial authorities launched a comprehensive anti-piracy campaign and established an official maritime police force (PMPF). Since 2010, pirates have mainly operated from the Galmudug region to the south. According to the Somalia Report, the significant infrastructural development evident in Puntland’s urban centers has also mainly come from a combination of government development programs, internal investment by local residents returning to their home regions following the civil war in the south, and especially remittance funds sent by the sizable Somali diaspora. The latter contributions have been estimated at around $1.3-$2 billion a year, exponentially dwarfing pirate ransom proceeds, which total only a few million dollars annually and are difficult to track in terms of spending.[108]

Additionally, impoverished fishermen in Kenya’s Malindi area in the southeastern African Great Lakes region have reported their largest catches in forty years, catching hundreds of kilos of fish and earning fifty times the average daily wage as a result. They attribute the recent abundance and variety of marine stock to the pirates scaring away predatory foreign fishing trawlers, which have for decades deprived local dhows of a livelihood. According to marine biologists, indicators are that the local fishery is recovering because of the lack of commercial scale fishing.[109]

Piracy off the coast of Somalia also appears to have a positive impact on the problem of overfishing in Somali waters by foreign vessels. A comparison has been made with the situation in Tanzania further to the south, which is also affected by predatory fishing by foreign ships and generally lacks the means to effectively protect and regulate its territorial waters. There, catches have dropped to dramatically low levels, whereas in Somalia they have risen back to more acceptable levels since the beginning of the piracy.[110]

[edit] Casualties

Piracy off of the coast of Somalia has reportedly produced some casualties. According to many interviewed maritime security firms, ship owner groups, lawyers and insurance companies, fear of pirate attacks has increased the likelihood of violent encounters at sea, as untrained or overeager vessel guards have resorted to shooting indiscriminately without first properly assessing the actual threat level. In the process, they have killed both pirates and sometimes innocent fishermen as well as jeopardized the reputation of private maritime security firms with their reckless gun use. Since many of the new maritime security companies that have emerged often also enlist the services of off-duty policemen and former soldiers that saw combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, worries of a “Blackwater out in the Indian Ocean” have only intensified.[111]

Of the 4,185 seafarers whose ships had been attacked by the pirates and the 1,090 who were held hostage in 2010, a third were reportedly abused. Some captives have also indicated that they were used as human shields for pirate attacks while being held hostage.[112]

According to Reuters, of the 3,500 captured during a four-year period, 62 died. The causes of death included suicide and malnutrition,[113] with 25 of the deaths attributed to murder according to Intercargo.[111] In some cases, the captives have also reported being tortured.[114] Many seafarers are also left traumatized after release.[113]

[edit] Profiteers

According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a veritable industry of profiteers has also risen around the piracy. Insurance companies, in particular, have profited from the pirate attacks, as insurance premiums have increased significantly. DIW reports that, in order to keep premiums high, insurance firms have not demanded that ship owners take security precautions that would make hijackings more difficult. For their part, shipping companies often do not comply with naval guidelines on how best to prevent pirate attacks in order to cut down on costs. Ship crews have also been reluctant to repel the pirates on account of their low wages and inequitable work contracts. In addition, security contractors and the German arms industry have profited from the phenomenon.[5]

[edit] Sovereignty and environmental protection

The former UN envoy for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has stated that “because there is no (effective) government, there is … much irregular fishing from European and Asian countries,”[115] and that the UN has what he described as “reliable information” that European and Asian companies are dumping toxic and nuclear waste off the Somali coastline.[116] However, he stresses that “no government has endorsed this act, and that private companies and individuals acting alone are responsible.”[116] In addition, Ould-Abdallah told the press that he approached several international NGOs, such as Global Witness, to trace the illicit fishing and waste-dumping. He added that he believes the toxic waste dumping is “a disaster off the Somali coast, a disaster (for) the Somali environment, the Somali population”, and that what he terms “this illegal fishing, illegal dumping of waste” helps fuel the civil war in Somalia since the illegal foreign fishermen pay off corrupt local officials or warlords for protection or to secure counterfeit licenses.[115] Ould-Abdallah noted that piracy will not prevent waste dumping:

I am convinced there is dumping of solid waste, chemicals and probably nuclear (waste)…. There is no government (control) and there are few people with high moral ground[…] The intentions of these pirates are not concerned with protecting their environment. What is ultimately needed is a functioning, effective government that will get its act together and take control of its affairs.
—Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN envoy for Somalia[116]

Somali pirates which captured MV Faina, a Ukrainian ship carrying tanks and military hardware, accused European firms of dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast and declared that the $8m ransom for the return of the ship will go towards cleaning up the waste. The ransom demand is a means of “reacting to the toxic waste that has been continually dumped on the shores of our country for nearly 20 years”, Januna Ali Jama, a spokesman for the pirates said. “The Somali coastline has been destroyed, and we believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas.”[116]

These issues have generally not been reported in international media when reporting on piracy.[117][118] According to Muammar al-Gaddafi, “It is a response to greedy Western nations, who invade and exploit Somalia’s water resources illegally. It is not a piracy, it is self defence.”[119]

Pirate leader Sugule Ali said their motive was “to stop illegal fishing and dumping in our waters … We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits [to be] those who illegally fish and dump in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas.” Also, the independent Somali news-site WardherNews found that 70 percent “strongly supported the piracy as a form of national defence of the country’s territorial waters”.[120]

[edit] Waste dumping

Following the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, there have emerged allegations that after the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in late 1991, Somalia’s long, remote shoreline was used as a dump site for the disposal of toxic waste. The huge waves which battered northern Somalia after the tsunami are believed to have stirred up tonnes of nuclear and toxic waste that was illegally dumped in Somali waters by several European firms — front companies created by the Italian mafia.[121] The European Green Party followed up these revelations by presenting before the press and the European Parliament in Strasbourg copies of contracts signed by two European companies—the Italian Swiss firm, Achair Partners, and an Italian waste broker, Progresso—and representatives of the warlords then in power, to accept 10 million tonnes of toxic waste in exchange for $80 million (then about £60 million). According to a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assessment mission, there are far higher than normal cases of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal hemorrhages and unusual skin infections among many inhabitants of the areas around the northeastern towns of Hobbio and Benadir on the Indian Ocean coast—diseases consistent with radiation sickness. UNEP continues that the current situation along the Somali coastline poses a very serious environmental hazard not only in Somalia but also in the eastern Africa sub-region.[121][122]

In 1992, reports ran in the European press of “unnamed European firms” contracting with local warlords to dump toxic waste both in Somalia and off Somalia’s shores. The United Nations Environment Program was called in to investigate, and the Italian parliament issued a report later in the decade. Several European “firms” — really front companies created by the Italian mafia — contracted with local Somali warlords to ship hundreds of thousands of tons of toxic industrial waste from Europe to Somalia.
—Troy S. Thomas, Warlords rising: confronting violent non-state actors[123]

Under Article 9(1)(d) of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, it is illegal for “any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes: that results in deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of this Convention and of general principles of international law”.[124]

According to Nick Nuttall of the United Nations Environmental Programme, “Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there”, and “European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of the waste, costing as little as $2.50 a tonne, where waste disposal costs in Europe are something like $1000 a tonne.”[116][125]

[edit] Illegal fishing

At the same time, foreign trawlers began illegally fishing Somalia’s seas, with an estimated $300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster being taken each year, depleting stocks previously available to local fishermen. Through interception with speedboats, Somali fishermen tried to either dissuade the dumpers and trawlers or levy a “tax” on them as compensation, as Segule Ali’s previously mentioned quote notes. Peter Lehr, a Somalia piracy expert at the University of St. Andrews says “It’s almost like a resource swap, Somalis collect up to $100 million a year from pirate ransoms off their coasts and the Europeans and Asians poach around $300 million a year in fish from Somali waters.[126][127] The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) issued a report in 2005 stating that, between 2003 and 2004, Somalia lost about $100 million in revenue due to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country’s exclusive economic zone by foreign trawlers.[6]

According to Roger Middleton of Chatham House, “The problem of overfishing and illegal fishing in Somali waters is a very serious one, and does affect the livelihoods of people inside Somalia […] the dumping of toxic waste on Somalia’s shores is a very serious issue, which will continue to affect people in Somalia long after the war has ended, and piracy is resolved.”[128] To lure fish to their traps, foreign trawlers reportedly also use fishing equipment under prohibition such as nets with very small mesh sizes and sophisticated underwater lighting systems.[115]

Under Article 56(1)(b)(iii) of the Law of the Sea Convention:

“In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment”.

Article 57 of the Convention in turn outlines the limit of that jurisdiction:

“The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”.[129]

[edit] Anti-piracy measures

[edit] Self-defense

The third volume of the handbook: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area (known as BMP3) is the current authoritative guide for merchant ships on self-defense against pirates. The guide is issued and updated by a consortium of interested international shipping and trading organizations including the EU, NATO and the International Maritime Bureau.[89] It is distributed primarily by the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) – the planning and coordination authority for EU naval forces (EUNAVFOR). BMP3 encourages vessels to register their voyages through the region with MSCHOA as this registration is a key component of the operation of the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) (the navy patrolled route through the Gulf of Aden). BMP3 also contains a chapter entitled “Self-Protective Measures” which lays out a list of steps a merchant vessel can take on its own to make itself less of a target to pirates and make it better able to repel an attack if one occurs. This list includes doing thing like ringing the deck of the ship with razor wire, rigging fire-hoses to spray sea-water over the side of the ship (to hinder boardings), having a distinctive pirate alarm, hardening the bridge against gunfire and creating a “citadel” where the crew can retreat in the event pirates get on board. Other unofficial self-defense measures that can be found on merchant vessels include the setting up of mannequins posing as armed guards or firing flares at the pirates.[130]

Though it varies by country, generally peacetime law in the 20th and 21st centuries has not allowed merchant vessels to carry weapons. As a response to the rise in modern piracy, however, the U.S. Government changed its rules so that it is now possible for US flagged vessels to embark a team of armed private security guards. Other countries and organisations have similarly followed suit.[131] This has given birth to a new breed of private security companies who provide training and protection for crew members and cargo and have proved effective in countering pirate attacks.[132][133] The USCG leaves it to ship owners’ discretion to determine if those guards will be armed.[134][135] Seychelles has become a central location for international anti-piracy operations, hosting the Anti-Piracy Operation Center for the Indian Ocean. In 2008, VSOS became the first authorized armed maritime security company to operate in the Indian Ocean region.[136]

With safety trials complete in the late 2000s, laser dazzlers have been developed for defensive purposes on super-yachts.[137] They can be effective up to 2.5 miles with the effects going from mild disorientation to flash blindness at closer range.

In February 2012, Italian Marines based on the tanker Enrica Rexie allegedly fired on an Indian fishing trawler off Kerala, killing two of her eleven crew. The Marines allegedly mistook the fishing vessel as a pirate vessel. The incident sparked a diplomatic row between India and Italy. Enrica Rexie was ordered into Kochi where her crew were questioned by officers of the Indian Police.[138]

[edit] Military presence

The military response to pirate attacks has brought about a rare show of unity by countries that are either openly hostile to each other, or at least wary of cooperation, military or otherwise. Currently there are three international naval task forces in the region, with numerous national vessels and task forces entering and leaving the region, engaging in counter-piracy operations for various lengths of time. The three international task forces which comprise the bulk of counter-piracy operations are Combined Task Force 150 (whose overarching mission is Operation Enduring Freedom), Combined Task Force 151 (which was set up in 2009 specifically to run counter-piracy operations)[139] and the EU naval task force operating under Operation Atalanta. All counter-piracy operations are coordinated through a monthly planning conference called Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE).[140] Originally having representatives only from NATO, the EU, and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) HQ in Bahrain, it now regularly attracts representatives from over 20 countries.

Part of Operation Atalanta, the Maestrale class frigate ITS Maestrale (F570) prepares to take on fuel alongside the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA-1) during an underway replenishment in the Indian Ocean.

As part of the international effort, Europe plays a significant role in combating piracy off of the coast of the Horn of Africa. The European Union under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) launched EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta (in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)). This operation is working to protect humanitarian aid and reduce the disruption to the shipping routes and the de-stabilising of the maritime environment in the region. To date, 26 countries have brought some kind of contribution to the operation. 13 EU Member States have provided an operational contribution to EU NAVFOR, either with ships, with maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, or with Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) team. This includes France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom (also hosting the EU NAVFOR Operational headquarters), Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta and Estonia. 9 other EU Member States have participated in the effort providing military staff to work at the EU NAVFOR Operational Headquarters (Northwood Headquarters – UK) or onboard units. These are Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ireland and Finland. Finally, 4 non-EU Member States, Norway (who has also provided an operational contribution with a warship regularly deploying), Croatia, Ukraine and Montenegro, have so far also brought their contribution to EU NAVFOR.

At any one time, the European force size fluctuates according to the monsoon seasons, which determine the level of piracy. It typically consists of 5 to 10 Surface Combatants (Naval ships), 1 to 2 Auxiliary ships and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. Including land-based personnel, Operation Atalanta consists of a total of around 2,000 military personnel. EU NAVFOR operates in a zone comprising the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the western part of the Indian Ocean including the Seychelles, which represents an area of 2,000,000 square nautical miles.

Additionally, there are, and have been, several naval deployments by non-multinational task forces in the past. Some notable ones include:

On 29 May 2009, Australia pledged its support, re-directing Australian Warship, HMAS Warramunga from duties in the Persian Gulf to assist in the fighting of Piracy.[141]

On 26 December 2008, China dispatched two warships Haikou (171), Wuhan (169) and the supply ship Weishanhu (887) to the Gulf of Aden. A team of 16 Chinese Special Forces members from its Marine Corps armed with attack helicopters were on board.[142][143] Subsequent to their initial deployment, China has maintained a three-ship flotilla of two warships and one supply ship in the Gulf of Aden by assigning ships to the area on a three-month basis.

Members of the U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement and the visit, board, search, and seizure team embarked aboard USS Princeton (CG-59) engage in a mock assault operation in the Red Sea.

The U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy both support the actions of the Combined Task Force 151 in their anti-piracy missions in the area.[144]

To protect Indian ships and Indian citizens employed in seafaring duties, Indian Navy commenced anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden from 23 Oct 08. A total of 21[145] IN ships have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since Oct 08. In addition to escorting Indian flagged ships, ships of other countries have also been escorted. Merchant ships are currently being escorted along the entire length of the (490 nm long and 20 nm wide) Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) that has been promulgated for use by all merchant vessels. A total of 1181 ships (144 Indian flagged and 1037 foreign flagged from different countries) have been escorted by IN ships in the Gulf of Aden since Oct 08. During its deployments for anti-piracy operations, the Indian Naval ships have prevented 15 piracy attempts on merchant vessels.

In response to the increased activity of the INS Tabar, India sought to augment its naval force in the Gulf of Aden by deploying the larger INS Mysore to patrol the area. Somalia also added India to its list of states, including the U.S. and France, who are permitted to enter its territorial waters, extending up to 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) from the coastline, in an effort to check piracy.[146] An Indian naval official confirmed receipt of a letter acceding to India’s prerogative to check such piracy. “We had put up a request before the Somali government to play a greater role in suppressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden in view of the United Nations resolution. The TFG government gave its nod recently.”[147] India also expressed consideration to deploy up to four more warships in the region.[148][149] On 14 March 2011, the Indian navy reportedly had seized 61 pirates and rescued 13 crew from the vessel, which had been used as a mother ship from where pirates launched attacks around the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, a Bangladeshi ship hijacked by pirates last year was freed after a ransom was paid.[150]

Norway announced on 27 February 2009, that it would send the frigate HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen to the coast of Somalia to fight piracy. Royal Norwegian Navy Fridtjof Nansen joined EU NAVFOR’s international naval force in August.[151]

Russia also chose to send more warships to combat piracy near Somalia following the announcement from the International Maritime Bureau terming the menace as having gone “out of control.”[152]

Anti-piracy boarding, December 2011

Due to their proximity to Somalia, the coast guard of Seychelles has become increasingly involved in counter-piracy in the region. On 30 March 2010, a Seychelles Coast Guard Trinkat class patrol vessel rescued 27 hostages and sank two pirate vessels.

Other non-NATO and non-EU countries have, at one time or another, contributed to counter-piracy operations. Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Iran have all sent ships to the region, sometimes joining with the existing CTFs, sometimes operating independently.[153]

Royal Australian Air Force Lockheed P-3 Orion surveillance plane patrol the ocean between the southern coast of Oman and the Horn of Africa. The anti-piracy flights are operated from UAE.[154] The Spanish Air Force also deployed P-3s to assist the international effort against piracy in Somalia. On 29 October 2008, a Spanish P-3 aircraft patrolling the coast of Somalia reacted to a distress call from an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden. In order to deter the pirates, the aircraft flew over the pirates three times as they attempted to board the tanker, dropping a smoke bomb on each pass. After the third pass, the attacking pirate boats broke off their attack.[155] Later, on 29 March 2009, the same P-3 pursued the assailants of the German navy tanker Spessart (A1442), resulting in the capture of the pirates.[156] In April 2011, the Portuguese Air Force also contributed to Operation Ocean Shield by sending a P-3C[157] which had early success when on its fifth mission detected a pirate whaler with two attack skiffs.[158]

A maritime conference was also held in Mombasa to discuss the rising concern of regional piracy with a view to give regional and world governments recommendations to deal with the menace. The International Transport Workers Federation (ITWF) organised the regional African maritime unions’ conference, the first of its kind in Africa. Godfrey Matata Onyango, executive secretary of the Northern Corridor Transit Coordination Authority said that “We cannot ignore to discuss the piracy menace because it poses a huge challenge to the maritime industry and if not controlled, it threats to chop off the regional internal trade. The cost of shipping will definitely rise as a result of the increased war insurance premium due to the high risk off the Gulf of Aden.”[citation needed][159][dead link] In 2008 Pakistan offered the services of the Pakistan Navy to the United Nations in order to help combat the piracy in Somalia “provided a clear mandate was given.”[160]

[edit] Current fleet of vessels in operation

This article’s factual accuracy may be compromised due to out-of-date information. Please help improve the article by updating it. There may be additional information on the talk page. (October 2010)

Vessels, aircraft and personnel whose primary mission is to conduct anti-piracy activities come from different countries and are assigned to the following missions: Operation Ocean Shield (NATO and partner states), Atalanta (EU and partner states), Combined Task Force 151, independent missions of Japan, India, Russia, PR China, South Korea, Iran, Malaysia[clarification needed]. Additionally resources dedicated for the War on Terror missions of Combined Task Force 150 and Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa also operate against the pirates.

Country Mission Sailors Ships Cost [Mil of USD per annum] Start End
Australia Royal Australian Navy[161][162] CTF 150 ~250 1 frigate (as part of Operation Slipper duties)  ?  ?  ?
Belgium Belgian Navy[163] Atalanta 170 1 Frigate Louise-Marie  ? Sep 1, 2009
Oct 20, 2010
Dec 16, 2009
Jan 20, 2011
Bulgaria Bulgarian Navy[164][165][166] Operation Ocean Shield 130 Wielingen class frigate 41 Drazki  ?  ?  ?
Canada Royal Canadian Navy Operation Ocean Shield
[citation needed]
240 HMCS Fredericton  ? November 2009 May 4, 2010
China Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy[167]   ~800
including PLA marines
1st Flotilla/TF 169: Wuhan (Type 052B/DDG-169), Haikou (Type 052C/DDG-171), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887);
2nd Flotilla/TF 167: Shenzhen (Type 051B/DDG-167), Huangshan (Type 054A/FFG-570), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887);
3rd Flotilla/TF 529: Zhoushan (Type 054A/FFG-529), Xuzhou (Type 054A/FFG-530), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886);
4th Flotilla/TF 525: Ma’anshan (Type 054/FFG-525), Wenzhou (Type 054/FFG-526), Chaohu (Type 054A/FFG-568), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886);
5th Flotilla/TF 168: Guangzhou (Type 052B/DDG-168), Chaohu (Type 054A/FFG-568), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887);
6th Flotilla/TF 998: Kunlun Shan (Type 071/LPD-998), Lanzhou (Type 052C/DDG-170), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887);
7th Flotilla/TF 529: Zhoushan (Type 054A/FFG-529), Xuzhou (Type 054A/FFG-530), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886);
8th Flotilla/TF 526: Ma’anshan (Type 054/FFG-525), Wenzhou (Type 054/FFG-526), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886);
9th Flotilla/TF 169: Wuhan (Type 052B/DDG-169), Yulin (Type 054A/FFG-569), Qinghaihu (Nancang Class/885);
10th Flotilla/TF 171: Haikou (Type 052C/DDG-171), Yuncheng (Type 054A/FFG-571), Qinghaihu (Nancang Class/885);
11th Flotilla/TF 113: Qingdao (Type 052/DDG-113), Yantai (Type 054A/FFG-538), Weishanhu (Qiandaohu Class/887);
12th Flotilla/TF 548: Yiyang (Type 054A/FFG-548), Changzhou (Type 054A/FFG-549), Qiandaohu (Qiandaohu Class/886)
 ? 1st Flotilla/TF 169: January 6, 2009;
2nd Flotilla/TF 167: April 16, 2009;
3rd Flotilla/TF 529: August 1, 2009;
4th Flotilla/TF 525: November 27, 2009;
5th Flotilla/TF 168: March 18, 2010(Chaohu December 21, 2009);
6th Flotilla/TF 998: July 20, 2010;
7th Flotilla/TF 529: November 20, 2010;
8th Flotilla/TF 526: March 16, 2011;
9th Flotilla/TF 169: July 21, 2011;
10th Flotilla/TF 171: November 15, 2011;
11th Flotilla/TF 113: March 17, 2012;
12th Flotilla/TF 548: July 18, 2012
1st Flotilla/TF 169: April 16, 2009;
2nd Flotilla/TF 167: August 1, 2009;
3rd Flotilla/TF 529: November 27, 2009;
4th Flotilla/TF 525: March 18, 2010;
5th Flotilla/TF 168: July 20, 2010;
6th Flotilla/TF 998: November 20, 2010;
7th Flotilla/TF 529: November 11, 2010;
8th Flotilla/TF 526: July 21, 2011;
9th Flotilla/TF 169: November 15, 2011;
10th Flotilla/TF 171: March 17, 2012;
11th Flotilla/TF 113: July 18, 2012
France French Navy Operation Ocean Shield or Atalanta
[citation needed]
 ? Germinal, Floréal, La Fayette, avisos, Améthyste  ?  ?  ?
Germany German Navy Atalanta ca. 300[168] 1 (Frigate Lübeck (F214))[169] 60 (45 Mio. EUR) December 8, 2008[168] December 1, 2012[170]
Greece Greek Navy[171] Operation Ocean Shield 176-196 4  ?  ?  ?
India Indian Navy[172]   540 Frigate INS Tabar (F44)[146]
Destroyer INS Mysore (D60)
Frigate INS Godavari
INS Cankarso
INS Kalpeni
1[173] 23 Oct 2008[145]  ?
Iran Islamic Republic of Iran Navy[174]    ? Bandar Abbas; Naghdi; Jamaran 1[175]  ?  ?
Italy Italian Navy Operation Ocean Shield
[citation needed]
240 1 (D560 Durand de la Penne)  ?  ?  ?
 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force[176]   400[177] 1st Escort Division:DD-113 Sazanami, DD-106 Samidare[177]
2nd Escort Division:DD-102 Harusame, DD-154 Amagiri,
3rd Escort Division:DD-110 Takanami, DD-155 Hamagiri
4th Escort Division:DD-111 Onami, DD-157 Sawagiri
5th Escort Division:DD-101 Murasame, DD-153 Yugiri
6th Escort Division:DD-112 Makinami, DD-156 Setogiri
7th Escort Division:DD-104 Kirisame, DD-103 Yudachi
8th Escort Division:DD-105 Inazuma, DD-113 Sazanami
9th Escort Division:DD-106 Samidare, DD-158 Umigiri
10th Escort Division:DD-110 Takanami, DD-111 Onami
11th Escort Division:DD-101 Murasame, DD-102 Harusame
12th Escort Division:DD-107 Ikazuchi, DD-157 Sawagiri
 ? March 14, 2009
July 6, 2009
October 13, 2009
January 29, 2010
May 10, 2010
August 23, 2010
December 1, 2010
March 15, 2011
June 20, 2011
October 11, 2011
January 21, 2012
May 11, 2012
August 16, 2009
November 29, 2009
March 18, 2010
July 2, 2010
October 15, 2010
January 18, 2011
May 9, 2011
August 11, 2011
December 3, 2011
March 12, 2012
July 5, 2012
Naval Jack of South Korea.svg Republic of Korea Navy[178] CTF 150 300 1 Destroyer (Currently Choi Young DDH-981) 1[179] April 16, 2009  ?
Malaysia Royal Malaysian Navy[180]   unknown Support Ship Bunga Mas 5 3[181]  ?  ?
Netherlands Royal Netherlands Navy[182] Atalanta 174-202 HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën 1[183] March 26, 2009 August 2010
Pakistan Pakistan Navy CTF 150 177 PNS Badr  ?  ?  ?
Portugal Portuguese Navy[184] Operation Ocean Shield 180 1 (Frigate NRP Corte Real – NATO flotilla flagship)  ? June 2009 January 2010
Saudi Arabia Royal Saudi Navy[185] Operation Ocean Shield  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?
Russia Russian Navy[186]   ~350 3 (Destroyer Admiral Panteleyev (BPK 548), Salvage Tugboat, Tanker[187]  ? April 2009  ?
Singapore Republic of Singapore Navy[188] CTF 151 240 LST RSS Persistence (209)  ? 24 April 2009[189]  ?
Spain Spanish Navy Operation Ocean Shield
[citation needed]
423 2 Frigates (F86 Canarias and F104 Méndez Núñez)  ?  ?  ?
Thailand Royal Thai Navy[190] CTF 150 371 including 20 marine special warfare task force 2 (OPV HTMS Pattani (OPV 511); Replenishment Ship HTMS Similan (871) and will soon deploy another mission in 2011)[191] 8.757 (270 Mil THB)[191] September 10, 2010[191] January 14, 2011[191]
Turkey Turkish Navy[192] Operation Ocean Shield
[citation needed]
503 2 (Frigates TCG Giresun (F 491), TCG Gokova (F 496))[193]  ?  ?  ?
United Kingdom Royal Navy Operation Ocean Shield
[citation needed]
950 HMS Cumberland
HMS Montrose
HMS Northumberland[194]
HMS Monmouth[195]
 ?  ?  ?
United States United States Navy Operation Ocean Shield, CTF 150, CTF 151  ? US 5th Fleet  ?  ?

[edit] Former contributions during previous rotation periods

This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it.
Country Mission Sailors Ships Cost [Mil of USD per annum] Start End
Finland Finnish Navy Atalanta 120[196] 1 (FNS Pohjanmaa)[196] (11.6 mil EUR)[196] 5 January 2011[197]
1 February 2011[198]
May 2011
Denmark Royal Danish Navy[199] Operation Ocean Shield
[citation needed]
300 2 (Command and Support Ship HDMS Absalon (L16); Patrol Ship HDMS Thetis (F357)  ? February 2007 April 2009
Sweden Swedish Navy[200] Atalanta 152[200] 3[200] (OPV HMS Carlskrona)  ? April 14, 2010[200] November 15, 2010[200]
Thailand Royal Thai Navy[190] CTF 150 371 including 20 marine special warfare task force 2 (OPV HTMS Pattani (OPV 511); Replenishment Ship HTMS Similan (871))[191] 8.757 (270 Mil THB)[191] September 10, 2010[191] January 14, 2011[191]

Brian Murphy (Associated Press) reported on 8 January 2009 that Rear Admiral Terence E. McKnight, U.S. Navy, is to command a new multi-national naval force to confront piracy off the coast of Somalia. This new anti-piracy force was designated Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), a multinational task force of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). The USS San Antonio was designated as the flagship of Combined Task Force 151, serving as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB) for the following force elements:

Initially, CTF-151 consisted of the San Antonio, USS Mahan (DDG-72), and HMS Portland (F79), with additional warships expected to join this force.[206]

On 28 January 2009, Japan announced its intention of sending a naval task force to join international efforts to stop piracy off the coast of Somalia. The deployment would be highly unusual, as Japan’s non-aggressive constitution means Japanese military forces can only be used for defensive purposes. The issue has been controversial in Japan, although the ruling party maintains this should be seen as fighting crime on the high seas, rather than a “military” operation. The process of the Prime Minister of Japan, Taro Aso, giving his approval is expected to take approximately one month.[176] However, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japanese government face legal problems on how to handle attacks by pirates against ships that either have Japanese personnel, cargo or are under foreign control instead of being under Japanese control as current Article 9 regulations would hamper their actions when deployed to Somalia.[207] It was reported on 4 February 2009, that the JMSDF was sending a fact-finding mission led by Gen Nakatani to the region prior to the deployment of the Murasame-class destroyer JDS DD-106 Samidare and the Takanami-class destroyer JDS DD-113 Sazanami to the coast of Somalia with a 13-man team composed of Japanese Ministry of Defense personnel, with members coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the JMSDF to visit Yemen, Djibouti, Oman, and Bahrain from February 8 to 20.[208][209] Both JMSDF vessels are units of the 8th Escort Division of the 4th Escort Flotilla based in Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture.[210] The JMSDF’s special forces unit, the Special Boarding Unit is also scheduled to potentially deploy to Somalia.[211][212] The SBU has been deployed alongside the two destroyers to Somalia on 14 March 2009.[213] According to JMSDF officials, the deployment would “regain the trust of the shipping industry, which was lost during the war.”[214] The JMSDF task force would be deployed off the coast of Somalia for 4 months.[215] In its first mission, the Takanami-class destroyer JDS DD-113 Sazanami was able to ward off pirates attempting to hijack a Singaporean cargo ship.[216] In addition, JMSDF P-3Cs are to be deployed in June from Djibouti to conduct surveillance on the Somali coast.[217][218] The House of Representatives of Japan has passed an anti-piracy bill, calling for the JMSDF to protect non-Japanese ships and nationals, though there are some concerns that the pro-opposition House of Councillors may reject it.[219] The Diet of Japan has passed an anti-piracy law that called for JMSDF forces to protect all foreign ships traveling off the coast of Somalia aside from protecting Japanese-owned/manned ships despite a veto from the House of Councillors, which the House of Representatives have overturned.[220] In 2009, the destroyers Harusame and DD-154 Amagiri left port from Yokusuka to replace the two destroyers that had been dispatched earlier on March 2009.[221] Under current arrangements, Japan Coast Guard officers would be responsible for arresting pirates since SDF forces are not allowed to have powers of arrest.[222]

The South Korean navy is also making plans to participate in anti-piracy operations after sending officers to visit the US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Bahrain and in Djibouti.[223] The South Korean cabinet had approved a government plan to send in South Korean navy ships and soldiers to the coast of Somalia to participate in anti-pirate operations.[178] The ROKN was sending the Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin class destroyer DDH 976 Munmu the Great to the coast of Somalia.[224] The Cheonghae Unit task force was also deployed in Somalia under CTF 151.[225]

The Swiss government calls for the deployment of Army Reconnaissance Detachment operators to combat Somali piracy with no agreement in Parliament[226] as the proposal was rejected after it was voted.[227] Javier Solana had said that Swiss soldiers could serve under the EU’s umbrella.[228]

The Philippine government ordered the dispatch of a Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers to work with the US Navy’s 5th Fleet as part of its contribution against piracy.[229]

On 12 June 2009, Bulgaria also announced plans to join the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and protect Bulgarian shipping, by sending a frigate with a crew of 130 sailors.[230]

The Danish Institute for Military Studies has in a report[dead link] proposed to establish a regionally based maritime unit: a Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol, to carry out surveillance in the area to secure free navigation and take on tasks such as fishery inspection and environmental monitoring. A Greater Horn of Africa Sea Patrol would comprise elements from the coastal states – from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south. The unit would be established with the support of the states that already have a naval presence in the area.[231]

In February 2010, Danish special forces from the Absalon freed 25 people from the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged vessel Ariella after it was hijacked by pirates off the Somali coast. The crew members had locked themselves into a store-room.[232][233]

Southern African waters are becomingly an increasingly attractive alternative to the more protected Eastern African sea lanes. The recent rise in counter-piracy patrols is pushing more pirates down the coast line into unprotected areas of the Indian Ocean, which will require the joint navies’ current patrols to widen their search area.[234]

In January 2012, US military forces freed an American and a Danish hostage after a gun battle with pirates during a night-time helicopter raid in Somalia. Two US helicopters attacked the site where the hostages were being held, 12 miles north of the town of Adado. Nine pirates were killed. There were no US casualties.[235]

In May 2012, EU Navfor conducted their first raid on pirate bases on the Somali mainland, destroying 5 pirate boats. The EU forces were transported by helicopter to the bases near the port of Harardhere, a well known pirate lair. The operation was carried out with the full support of the Somali government.[236][237]

[edit] Somalia

[edit] Puntland

Between 2009 and 2010, the government of the autonomous Puntland region in northeastern Somalia enacted a number of reforms and pre-emptive measures as a part of its officially declared anti-piracy campaign. The latter included the arrest, trial and conviction of pirate gangs, as well as raids on suspected pirate hideouts and confiscation of weapons and equipment; ensuring the adequate coverage of the regional authority’s anti-piracy efforts by both local and international media; sponsoring a social campaign led by Islamic scholars and community activists aimed at discrediting piracy and highlighting its negative effects; and partnering with the NATO alliance to combat pirates at sea.[238] In May 2010, construction also began on a new naval base in the town of Bandar Siyada, located 25 km west of Bosaso, the commercial capital of Puntland.[21] The facility is funded by Puntland’s regional government in conjunction with Saracen International, a UK-based security company, and is intended to assist in more effectively combating piracy. The base will include a center for training recruits, and a command post for the naval force.[21] These numerous security measures appear to have borne fruit, as many pirates were apprehended in 2010, including a prominent leader.[20] Puntland’s security forces also reportedly managed to force out the pirate gangs from their traditional safe havens such as Eyl and Gar’ad,[239] with the pirates now primarily operating from Hobyo, El Danaan and Harardhere in the neighboring Galmudug region.[239]

Following a Transitional Federal Government-Puntland cooperative agreement in August 2011 calling for the creation of a Somali Marine Force, of which the already established Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) would form a part, the Puntland administration resumed training of PMPF naval officials.[240] The Puntland Maritime Police Force is a locally recruited, professional maritime security force that is primarily aimed at fighting piracy off of the coast of Somalia, safeguarding the nation’s marine resources,[240] and providing logistics support to humanitarian efforts.[241] Supported by the United Arab Emirates,[240] PMPF officials are also trained by the Japanese Coast Guard.[242]

[edit] Galmudug

Government officials from the Galmudug administration in the north-central Hobyo district have also reportedly attempted to use pirate gangs as a bulwark against Islamist insurgents from southern Somalia’s conflict zones;[243] other pirates are alleged to have reached agreements of their own with the Islamist groups, although a senior commander from the Hizbul Islam militia vowed to eradicate piracy by imposing sharia law when his group briefly took control of Harardhere in May 2010 and drove out the local pirates.[243][244]

By the first half of 2010, these increased policing efforts by Somali government authorities on land along with international naval vessels at sea reportedly contributed to a drop in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 86 a year prior to 33, forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas such as the Somali Basin and the wider Indian Ocean.[20][22][23]

[edit] Somaliland

The government of Somaliland, a self-declared republic that is internationally recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia,[245] has adopted stringent anti-piracy measures, arresting and imprisoning pirates forced to make port in Berbera. According to officials in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, the Somaliland Coast Guard acts as an effective deterrent to piracy in waters under its jurisdiction.[246][247]

[edit] Arab League summit

Following the seizure by Somali pirates of an Egyptian ship and a Saudi oil supertanker worth $100 million of oil, the Arab League, after a meeting in Cairo, has called for an urgent summit for countries overlooking the Red Sea, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Djibouti and Yemen. The summit would offer several solutions for the piracy problem, in addition to suggesting different routes and looking for a more secure passageway for ships.

Another possible means of intervention by the Red Sea Arab nations’ navy might be to assist the current NATO anti-piracy effort as well as other navies.[248]

[edit] United Nations

In June 2008, following a letter from the Somalian Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the President of the UN Security Council requesting assistance for the TFG’s efforts to tackle acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a declaration authorizing nations that have the consent of the Transitional Federal Government to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates.[35] The measure, which was sponsored by France, the United States and Panama, lasted six months. France initially wanted the resolution to include other regions with pirate problems, such as West Africa, but were opposed by Vietnam, Libya and most importantly by veto-holding China, who wanted the sovereignty infringement limited to Somalia.[249]

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 20 November 2008, that was proposed by Britain to introduce tougher sanctions against Somalia over the country’s failure to prevent a surge in sea piracy.[250] The US circulated the draft resolution that called upon countries having naval capacities to deploy vessels and aircraft to actively fight against piracy in the region. The resolution also welcomed the initiatives of the European Union, NATO and other countries to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. US Alternate Representative for Security Council Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo said that the draft resolution “calls on the secretary-general to look at a long-term solution to escorting the safe passage of World Food Programme ships.”[251] Even Somalia’s Islamist militants stormed the Somali port of Harardheere in the hunt for pirates behind the seizure of a Saudi supertanker, the MV Sirius Star. A clan elder affiliated with the Islamists said “The Islamists arrived searching for the pirates and the whereabouts of the Saudi ship. I saw four cars full of Islamists driving in the town from corner to corner. The Islamists say they will attack the pirates for hijacking a Muslim ship.”[252]

On 17 December 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a tougher resolution, allowing for the first time international land and sea occupations in the pursuit of pirates.[253] Four ships, a Chinese fishing boat, a Turkish cargo ship, a Malaysian tug, and a private yacht were seized by pirates that same day.[254] Resolution 1851 takes current anti-piracy measures a step further.[255]

A Russian drafted resolution, Security Council Resolution 1918, adopted on 27 April 2010, called on all states to criminalise piracy and suggested the possibility of establishing a regional or international tribunal to prosecute suspected pirates.[256]

Pursuant to resolution 1976 and resolution 2015, both adopted in 2011, the United Nations Security Council has called for more structured international support for Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government as well as Puntland and other regional authorities in Somalia in creating counter-piracy special courts, laws, prisons and policing capabilities. Resolution 1976 also encourages regional and federal actors to engage in more effective marine resource defence against illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping in areas under their jurisdiction.[257][258]

[edit] Private initiatives

Armed guard escort on a merchant ship.

There have been reports of pirates repelled by private initiatives. One such case would have occurred by the end of 2008, by armed personnel of transportation entrepreneur Barthe Cortes.[259][260] VSOS, a Seychelles based company was authorized in 2008 by the authorities of Seychelles to operate armed maritime security guards. From this strategic hub the company extends its operations throughout the Indian Ocean.[261]

Other vessel owners and shipping line companies have also hired private security outfits for assistance. One such firm is Espada Logistics and Security Group based in San Antonio, Texas, whose security officers provide on-board protection from a ship’s point of entry to its point of destination. They also offer anti-piracy training en route to the Gulf of Aden,[262] and have teamed up with African Shipping Lines, a leading international shipping line company, to provide security to vessels traveling along the coast of East Africa.[263] Another private venture is MUSC, which specializes in counterpiracy and ship security.[264]

As of 21 May 2012, Nick Maroukis of Triton Risk MSS states that not a single vessel with armed privately contracted maritime security contractors has been successfully hijacked by Somali pirates. A table of incidents from October to December 2011 shows pirate successes against armed and unarmed vessels. However, it is quite possible in the future that an armed security team could be overwhelmed and the consequences to the team are likely to be deadly. Somali pirates have steadily ventured further across the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee (JWC) designated high risk area (HRA) in order to evade naval patrols and search for easier targets. This is just one example of how pirates adapt their tactics to counter-piracy measures. Triton Risk MSS has produced a short analysis which highlights other probable shifts in Somali pirate tactics, techniques and procedures in 2012/13. The maritime security industry has been actively trying to introduce self-regulation for private contracted armed security companies (PCASP) since 2010. Main industry actors are: Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) and the International Association of Maritime Security Professionals (IAMSP). Governmental initiatives include the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Swiss government’s International Code of Conduct (ICOC) initiative. As of spring 2012, one of the largest ship owners/operators organizations, BIMCO, has launched another intiative to bring standards into the maritime security industry though use of PCASP contracts for its members (called GUARDCON) and ISO accreditation and certification standards for PCASPs.

[edit] Trials

Kenya has become the leading criminal court system for Somali pirates captured in international waters. In the shadow of Fort Jesus, a 16th-century Portuguese stronghold that truly belongs to the era of slave raiders and pirate ships, is the office of Kenya’s premier pirate lawyer, Mr Francis Kadima. “When I first started handling pirate cases, I thought these guys would be like kidnappers, strong, you know, and really crafty and sophisticated,” Mr. Kadima said. “But not these guys. They’re just ordinary. If anything, they’re expressionless.” [265]

Kenya is emerging as the venue of choice for piracy cases and an important piece of the worldwide crackdown on piracy. The spate of hijackings off Somalia’s coast has stiffened international resolve. Foreign warships would catch suspected pirates cruising around in speedy skiffs with guns and ladders and then dump them back on the Somali beach because of sticky legal questions. Those days are just about gone. When it comes to putting pirates on trial, there are some practical complications, like serving papers to witnesses who may be Filipino or Kenyan sailors with no mailing addresses who spend all year at sea. Or finding a Somali translator in Mumbai, India, or Copenhagen. In light of those problems, most nations have been hesitant to undertake piracy trials. As a result, there is growing support for the Kenyan solution. In 2008 – 2009 more than six dozen Somali pirates sat behind bars in Shimo la Tewa, Mombasa’s notoriously decrepit prison, which just so happens to be a few miles up the beach from some of this country’s most magnificent palm-fringed resorts. Western diplomats are hoping that this courtroom effort, coupled with a reinvigorated military response involving warships from more than a dozen nations, will put a dent in Somalia’s stubborn piracy problem. At one meeting in Brussels in 2009, donor nations pledged more than $200 million for Somalia, much of it for security, on land and at sea. In 2008, Somali pirates hijacked more than 40 ships, netting tens of millions of dollars in ransom. Many major shipping companies are now opting to sail all the way around Africa instead of risking the Somali seas.[265]

Many of the suspects arrested in military operations in the Gulf of Aden in recent years have been set free for lack of evidence. Nearby countries in Africa have been reluctant to take on the burden of trials. In 2008, the Royal Navy was instructed by the Foreign Office not to arrest pirates for fear of breaching their human rights.[266]

In May 2010, a Yemeni court sentenced six Somali pirates to death and jailed six others for 10 years each for hijacking a Yemeni oil tanker, killing one cabin crew member and leaving another missing in April 2009.[267]

In May 2010, another Somali, Abdiwali Abdiqadir Muse, pleaded guilty in a New York federal court to seizing a United States-flagged ship Maersk Alabama and kidnapping its captain last year. He pled guilty, and was sentenced to 33 years imprisonment.[268]

The first European trial of alleged Somali pirates opened in the Netherlands in May 2010. They were arrested in the Gulf of Aden in January 2009 when their high-speed boat was intercepted by a Danish frigate while allegedly preparing to board the cargo ship Samanyolu, which was registered in the Dutch Antilles.[269] The pirates were sentenced to five years in prison, which was less than the maximum possible sentence. It is unlikely the men will be returned to Somalia after their sentence, as Somalia is considered too dangerous for deportation. One of the five has already applied for asylum in the Netherlands. Consequently, there are concerns that trials in European courts would encourage, rather than deter, pirates.[266] However, trials are continuing in Europe. Most recently in Paris, November 2011,[270] five men were sentenced to between four and eight years; one man was acquitted. A trial also continues in Hamburg, Germany.[271]

On 1 April 2010, the USS Nicholas (FFG-47) was on patrol off the Somali coast when it took fire from men in a small skiff. After chasing down the skiff and its mothership, US military captured five Somalis.[272] Judge Raymond A. Jackson, a Federal District Court judge in Norfolk, Virginia threw out the piracy charge, which dates from enactment in 1819 when piracy was defined only as robbery at sea. The penalty for piracy is mandatory life in prison. The U.S. government is appealing the ruling.[273] In March 2011 the five Somalis were sentenced to life for piracy to run consecutively with the 80-year term.[274] In the same month 13 Somalis and one Yemeni suspected of hijacking and killing four Americans aboard a yacht made their first appearance in federal court in Norfolk.[275]

On 28 January 2011, pursuant to the naval engagement of the pirate mother vessel MV Prantalay (a hijacked Thai trawler) by the INS Cankarso, the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard killed 10 pirates and apprehended 15, while rescuing 20 Thai and Burmese fishermen being held aboard the ship as hostages. The rescued fishermen were sent to Kochi while the 15 pirates, of Somali, Ethiopian and Kenyan origin, have been taken to Mumbai. The Mumbai Police have confirmed that they have registered a case against the pirates for attempt to murder and various other provisions under the Indian Penal Code and the Passports Act for entering the Indian waters without permission.[76]

The Somali government has questioned the authority of foreign countries to try the pirates abroad. The European Union has attempted to focus the prosecutions locally by involving Somalia’s neighbors,[276] but Somali authorities have called for the pirates to be tried at home.

In May 2012, a U.S. federal appeals court upheld the convictions of five pirate suspects, a decision which prosecutors described as the first United States-based piracy convictions in 190 years.[277]

In 2011, the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia each reached a security-related memorandum of understanding with the Seychelles. Following the framework of an earlier agreement signed between the country’s Transitional Federal Government and the Seychelles, the memorandum calls for the transfer of convicted pirates to prison facilities in Puntland and Somaliland.[278] The TFG and the two regional administrations later signed a similar cooperative agreement with Mauritius in 2012, with the island nation scheduled to take on pirate suspects for trial and prosecution starting in June of the year.[279]

[edit] Proposed solutions

In November 2008, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, a group of ship-owners representing 75% of the world’s independent tanker fleet, asked for United Nations intervention. It called on the United Nations to co-ordinate anti-piracy patrols, and suggested the possibility of a naval blockade of Somalia and monitoring all vessels leaving the country’s coastline. However, NATO responded by saying that it would be impossible to effectively blockade Somalia’s vast coast.[280] It also suggested that all home ports of Somali pirates be blockaded, or that ground forces be inserted in Somalia itself to destroy pirate bases.[281]

It has been suggested that land-based policies are the best way to combat piracy.[257][282] Governments would have to employ socioeconomic measures such as poverty alleviation and good governance in order to deal with piracy (and even terrorism) effectively. In particular, a sustainable solution requires the establishment not only of effective governance but also the rule of law, reliable security agencies, and alternative employment opportunities for the Somali people.[283] This however, would suggest possible military intervention, a solution which there is opposition to since 1993’s Operation Restore Hope.

On September 12, 2011 Philip Muyanga, a prominent Money Markets columnist with Business Daily reported how sea piracy is driving up the cost of insurance for importers. Mr. Francis Kadima a prominent Kenyan lawyer and Human Rights advocate said commercial interests could not replace fundamental rights of individuals. Mr. Kadima was quoted as saying: “There are no statistics that piracy trials have reduced piracy”.[284]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ “Piracy in Somali Waters: Rising attacks impede delivery of humanitarian assistance”. UN Chronicle (United Nations Department of Public Information, Outreach, Division). 
  2. ^ “Piracy: orchestrating the response”. International Maritime Organization. http://www.imo.org/mediacentre/secretarygeneral/speechesbythesecretarygeneral/pages/piracyactionplanlaunch.aspx
  3. ^ “Hijackings cut aid access to south Somalia, lives at risk”. World Food Programme. http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/hijackings-cut-aid-access-south-somalia-lives-risk
  4. ^ a b c d e f Venetia Archer, Robert Young Pelton. “Can We Ever Assess the True Cost of Piracy?”. Somalia Report. http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2867/Can_We_Ever_Assess_the_True_Cost_of_Piracy_. Retrieved 21 May 2012. 
  5. ^ a b c d “The Advantage of Piracy”. German-foreign-policy.com. http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/57866. Retrieved 2011-12-17. 
  6. ^ a b Dagne,Ted (2009), Somalia: Conditions and Prospects for Lasting Peace 
  7. ^ Axe, David (2009), Somalia Redux: a more hands off approach 
  8. ^ a b Washington, The (2009-04-11). “Somali pirates a far cry from buccaneers of old”. Washingtontimes.com. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/11/somali-pirates-a-far-cry-from-buccaneers-of-old/?page=1. Retrieved 2011-12-17. 
  9. ^ “3. Toxic Waste Behind Somali Pirates”. Top 25 of 2010. Project Censored. 2010. http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/3-toxic-waste-behind-somali-pirates. Retrieved 22 January 2011. 
  10. ^ Megalommatis, Muhammad (29 March 2010). “Ecoterra Press Release 257 – The Somalia Chronicle June – December 2009, no 70”. Buzzle.com. http://www.buzzle.com/articles/ecoterra-press-release-257-the-somalia-chronicle-june-december-2009-no-70.html. Retrieved 22 January 2011. 
  11. ^ Waldo, Mohamed (January 8, 2009). “The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World Ignores the Other”. WardheerNews.com. http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Jan/Waldo/08_The_two_piracies_in_Somalia.html. Retrieved 22 January 2011. 
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  267. ^ “Somali pirate sentenced to 33 years in US prison”. BBC News. 16 February 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12486129. Retrieved 16 February 2011. 
  268. ^ “Trial of alleged Somali pirates opens in Netherlands”. BBC. 2010-06-25. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/10151792.stm. Retrieved 2010-05-26. 
  269. ^ Thomas, Annie (17 November 2011). “Homesick Somali ‘pirates’ on trial in Paris”. Google News (New York). http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5juItAA87Q2zJfdQ561Wy_Bks8row?docId=CNG.4a103f4c12c31f010418ccb1595560e0.8c1
  270. ^ Connolly, Kate (22 November 2010). “Somali ‘pirates’ go on trial in Hamburg”. The Guardian (London). http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/22/somali-pirates-trial-hamburg
  271. ^ Nelson, Katie (1 April 2010). “U.S. Navy captures 5 Somali pirates; seizes pirate mother ship off Kenya, Somali coasts”. New York Daily News. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2010/04/01/2010-04-01_us_navy_captures_5_somali_pirates_siezes_pirate_mother_ship_off_kenya_somali_coa.html. Retrieved 2010-04-01. 
  272. ^ McGlone, Tim (2010-11-08). “Federal judges in Norfolk wrestle over definition of piracy | HamptonRoads.com | PilotOnline.com”. HamptonRoads.com. http://hamptonroads.com/2010/11/federal-courts-norfolk-wrestle-over-definition-piracy. Retrieved 2011-03-27. 
  273. ^ McGlone, Tim (2010-03-15). “5 Somali pirates get life for attack on Nicholas”. HamptonRoads.com. http://hamptonroads.com/2011/03/somalis-get-life-plus-80-years-pirate-attack-nicholas. Retrieved 2011-03-27. 
  274. ^ Reilly, Corinne (2010-11-03). “Arabian Sea piracy suspects appear in Norfolk court”. HamptonRoads.com. http://hamptonroads.com/2011/03/somali-pirate-suspects-leave-enterprise-possibly-norfolk. Retrieved 2011-03-27. 
  275. ^ “Somalia criticises US for putting pirate on trial”. Portalangop.co.ao. 2010-04-20. http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/en_us/noticias/africa/2010/4/20/Somalia-criticises-for-putting-pirate-trial,8b244622-c3d3-4951-ad9c-05c930fe9514.html. Retrieved 2011-03-27. 
  276. ^ “U.S. Court Upholds Somali Pirates’ Conviction”. New York Times. 23 May 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/africa/us-court-upholds-somali-pirates-conviction.html?_r=2
  277. ^ Report of the Secretary-General on specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other States in the region
  278. ^ “U.S. Court Upholds Somali Pirates’ Conviction”. New York Times. 23 May 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/africa/us-court-upholds-somali-pirates-conviction.html?_r=2
  279. ^ “Ship owners call for UN-led force”. BBC News. 2008-11-24. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7745682.stm
  280. ^ RT: Dangerous Route: Fighting Back Pirates (Television Documentary)
  281. ^ http://arabnews.com/opinion/columns/article564585.ece
  282. ^ “Velozo de Melo Bento, Lucas, ‘Along Liquid Paths’: The Dualistic Nature of International Maritime Piracy Law (September 25, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682624”. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682624
  283. ^ Muyanga, Philip (12 September 2011). “Sea piracy pushes up ‘cost of insurance’”. Investor’s Business Daily (Nairobi). http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Sea+piracy+pushes+up+++cost+of++insurance++++++/-/539552/1235208/-/8runc9/-/

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August 3, 2012 Posted by | Problem solution schemes, Propaganda, reparations and compensation, Sanctions, Secret prosecution, Timeline, World economics | , , | Leave a comment

The Americans with Disabilities Act Conspiracy

 

The American with Disabilities Act Conspiracy

The American with Disabilities Act was not the social security disability retirement act, and the timing of the enactment of the legislation by President George HW Bush on July 26, 1990 was an “inclusion” fraud and conspiracy with me specifically in mind, my postal hiring (orientation) had been scheduled approximately at least two months prior to my starting date of July 30, 1990. George HW Bush was Congressman from Texas, Ambassador to China, Central Intelligence director, and Vice president of the United States for eight years and President for four years.

The invasion into Kuwait on August 2, 1990 was an intentional scheme act. Jury duty beginning January 14, 1991 was an extension of the scheme, with Saddam Hussein’s deadline to withdraw troops from Kuwait being on January 16, 1991 and the declaration of Desert Storm, a name chosen from the bible…..Daniel chapter 11. The 9/11/90 New World Order speech was the first speech I watched the president make as a new Federal employee. A five point speech.

The directions and recommendation to fill out an EEO after the Waco, Texas siege that ended April 19, 1993, had begun was a continuation with the War crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The timing of proposed resolutions and nominations and resolution passage and confirmations, with the presumed foresight of those involved of the conclusions of the motions. The breakup of the Soviet Union after desert storm with the series of breakaway republics appears to have been intentional. Dissolving the Soviet Union over the Soviet Afghanistan War. The Christmas day coup in Russia was also not a coincidence, as I originally had thought.

In 1993 the Desert storm aftermath intervention, including the Somalia and Bosnian intervention began..

Prosecuting crimes against me and war crimes without me

1993 Don’t ask, don’t tell, surgeon General on tobacco(1964, 1982?,1993) and masturbation, Brady, Oslo Accord, Gay bomb (2006?) and the Gay ban (1981), H4 virus, Weapons in space.

The implications of a miracle translation book of the bible to criminals and the furthered support of CRIMINAL GLOBAL RELIGIOUS BASED POLICY ERROR. Star Wars, the Middle East, Africa, sexuality, military science and technology. Commandeering and control.

Policies based over me specifically or in principle- the six-day war, Sirhan Sirhan,

 

..Reclassification of crimes on me, the orchestration program and continuing the crimes..

The timing of stopping the Florida recount in 2001 was with my going to make inquiry into my case complaint. Gore versus Bush the ensuing case.

The 2001 mad shoe bomber’s plane diversion from Miami to Boston, MA, the Kennedy state. Kennedy I believe was a major proponent of the American with disabilities Act. John Kerry (Sen. Massachusetts) presumably was to be presumed a champion of relevant causes. John Kerry, the former presidential candidates of 2004.

Compound the situation, in February 2002, I called the police and told them I needed to be removed from my home……..Consequently the Bush administration opened up Guantanamo bay prison (radical agent provocateur fundamentalist Muslims). The fifth anniversary of the opening of Guantanamo Bay in 2007 was when I began to question and realize the relevancy of the timing. 2002 was also the formation of the International Criminal court (ICC).

Military prosecutions of crimes related to me, either individually or in principle were prosecuted in the War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq presumably.

Diversionary religious cults, and whatever. Black water and the purple 5 on the five dollar bill are symbolic. Attempting to make me the miracle fall guy for their doings. The then newly widely used spelling of Osama as Usama [USA], Al gorah, Torah Borah, Kabul, Swait Valley, Lahore(Pakistan).

 

 

 

Jurisdictionally I was not a UN member or military personnel or a foreigner or a cosmic clearance bearer. The issues without me are a crime, a fraud and a sin.

The slight difference of doing something for a person and actually doing it, is fraud or theft (formally known as conversion fraud).

Books don’t make earthquakes, stone hail, famine, drought or pestilence, etc. Requisite participation and knowledge also makes the fears unreasonable. My beliefs goals and understanding, also.

I would have to be a radical fundamentalist Muslim terrorist Christian economist politician sinner according to the collective issues. The multi religion, and cult agent provocateurs and coverts is the false fulfillment of alleged concerns. UFO religions, Some Christian denominations, polygamy and child abuse cults, radical fundamentalist Muslims are governments’ doings not mine.

 

 

 

August 3, 2012 Posted by | 1990, Desert storm, Desert Storm conspiracy, Dissolution of the USSR, Genocide, George Bush 41st, George H.W. Bush, Hired under Conspiracy, Kurdish, Legislative acts, National Security Council, NATO / OTAN, orchestrated movements, Propaganda, Sanctions, Soviet-Afghanistan War, The New World Order, The Soviet Afghanistan war, Timeline, UN, Uncategorized, World rulers | , , , | Leave a comment

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Deepwater Horizon oil spill

 
  

Deepwater Horizon oil spill

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

  (Redirected from BP oil spill)

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“2010 oil spill” and “BP oil spill” redirect here. For other oil spills in 2010, see 2010 oil spill (disambiguation). For the 2006 oil spill involving BP, see Prudhoe Bay oil spill. For the drilling rig and explosion, see Deepwater Horizon (disambiguation).
This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. Please consider splitting content into sub-articles and/or condensing it. (March 2011)
Deepwater Horizon oil spill
Deepwater Horizon oil spill - May 24, 2010 - with locator.jpg
The oil slick as seen from space by NASA‘s Terra satellite on May 24, 2010
Location Gulf of Mexico near Mississippi River Delta, United States
Coordinates 28°44′12.01″N 88°23′13.78″W / 28.7366694°N 88.3871611°W / 28.7366694; -88.3871611Coordinates: 28°44′12.01″N 88°23′13.78″W / 28.7366694°N 88.3871611°W / 28.7366694; -88.3871611[1]
Date Spill date: 20 April – 15 July 2010
Well officially sealed: 19 September 2010
Cause
Cause Wellhead blowout
Casualties 11 dead
Operator Transocean under contract for BP[2]
Spill characteristics
Volume up to 4.9 million barrels (210,000,000 US gallons; 780,000 cubic meters)[3]
Area 2,500 to 68,000 sq mi (6,500 to 180,000 km²)[4]

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also referred to as the BP oil spill, the BP oil disaster, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and the Macondo blowout)[5][6] is an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico which flowed unabated for three months in 2010, and may be continuing to seep.[7][8] It is the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry.[9][10][11] The spill stemmed from a sea-floor oil gusher that resulted from the 20 April 2010 explosion of Deepwater Horizon, which drilled on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect. The explosion killed 11 men working on the platform and injured 17 others.[12] On 15 July 2010, the gushing wellhead was capped,[13] after it had released about 4.9 million barrels (780,000 m3) of crude oil.[3] An estimated 53,000 barrels per day (8,400 m3/d) escaped from the well just before it was capped.[11] It is believed that the daily flow rate diminished over time, starting at about 62,000 barrels per day (9,900 m3/d) and decreasing as the reservoir of hydrocarbons feeding the gusher was gradually depleted.[11] On 19 September 2010, the relief well process was successfully completed, and the federal government declared the well “effectively dead”.[14] In August 2011, oil and oil sheen covering several square miles of water were reported surfacing not far from BP’s Macondo well.[15] Scientific analysis confirmed the oil is a chemical match for Macondo 252.[16][17] The Coast Guard said the oil was too dispersed to recover.[18] In March 2012, a “persistent oil seep”[19] near the Macondo 252 well was reported.[7]

The spill caused extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats and to the Gulf’s fishing and tourism industries.[20][21] Skimmer ships, floating containment booms, anchored barriers, sand-filled barricades along shorelines, and dispersants were used in an attempt to protect hundreds of miles of beaches, wetlands, and estuaries from the spreading oil. Scientists also reported immense underwater plumes of dissolved oil not visible at the surface[22] as well as an 80-square-mile (210 km²) “kill zone” surrounding the blown well.[23] In late November 2010, 4,200 square miles (11,000 km²) of the Gulf were re-closed to shrimping after tar balls were found in shrimpers’ nets.[24] The amount of Louisiana shoreline affected by oil grew from 287 miles (462 km) in July to 320 miles (510 km) in late November 2010.[25] In January 2011, an oil spill commissioner reported that tar balls continue to wash up, oil sheen trails are seen in the wake of fishing boats, wetlands marsh grass remains fouled and dying, and crude oil lies offshore in deep water and in fine silts and sands onshore.[26] A research team found oil on the bottom of the seafloor in late February 2011 that did not seem to be degrading.[27] On 26 May 2011, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality extended the state of emergency related to the oil spill.[28] By 9 July 2011, roughly 491 miles (790 kilometers) of coastline in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida remained contaminated by BP oil, according to a NOAA spokesperson.[29] In October 2011, a NOAA report stated that dolphins and whales continue to die at twice the normal rate.[30] In April 2012, scientists reported finding alarming numbers of mutated crab, shrimp and fish they believe to be the result of chemicals released during the oil spill.[31] Tar balls continue to wash up along the Gulf coast two years after the spill began. Studies show the tar balls contain the deadly bacteria Vibrio vulnificus[32][33] In April 2012, oil was found dotting 200 miles of Louisiana’s coast.[34]

In January 2011 the White House oil spill commission released its final report on the causes of the oil spill. They blamed BP and its partners for making a series of cost-cutting decisions and the lack of a system to ensure well safety. They also concluded that the spill was not an isolated incident caused by “rogue industry or government officials”, but that “The root causes are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might well recur”.[35] After its own internal probe, BP admitted that it made mistakes which led to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.[36] In June 2010 BP set up a $20 billion fund to compensate victims of the oil spill. To July 2011, the fund has paid $4.7 billion to 198,475 claimants. In all, the fund has nearly 1 million claims and continues to receive thousands of claims each week.[37]

In September 2011, the U.S. government published its final investigative report on the accident.[38] In essence, that report states that the main cause was the defective cement job, and put most of the fault for the oil spill with BP, also faulting Deepwater Horizon operator Transocean and contractor Halliburton.[39][40] Investigations continue, with U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder stating on April 24, 2012, “The Deepwater Horizon Task Force is continuing its investigation into the explosion and will hold accountable those who violated the law in connection with the largest environmental disaster in US history”. The first arrest related to the spill was in April 2012; an engineer was charged with obstruction of justice for allegedly deleting 300 text messages showing BP knew the flow rate was three times higher than initial claims by the company, and knew that Top Kill was unlikely to succeed, but claimed otherwise.[41][42][43]

Contents

 [hide

[edit] Background

[edit] Deepwater Horizon drilling rig

Main article: Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater Horizon prior to explosion. Parts of the rig providing buoyancy are not visible below the waterline in this picture.

Origin of oil spill

Origin of oil spill
 
Location of the Deepwater Horizon on 20 April 2010

The Deepwater Horizon was a 9-year-old semi-submersible mobile offshore drilling unit, a massive floating, dynamically positioned drilling rig that could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet (2,400 m) deep and drill down to 30,000 feet (9,100 m).[44] The rig was built by South Korean company Hyundai Heavy Industries.[45] It was owned by Transocean, operated under the Marshallese flag of convenience, and was under lease to BP from March 2008 to September 2013.[46] At the time of the explosion, it was drilling an exploratory well at a water depth of approximately 5,000 feet (1,500 m) in the Macondo Prospect, located in the Mississippi Canyon Block 252 of the Gulf of Mexico in the United States exclusive economic zone about 41 miles (66 km) off the Louisiana coast.[47][48] BP was the operator and principal developer of the Macondo Prospect with a 65% share, while 25% is owned by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, and 10% by MOEX Offshore 2007, a unit of Mitsui.[49]

[edit] Explosion

Vessels combat the fire on the Deepwater Horizon while the United States Coast Guard searches for missing crew

At approximately 9:45 pm CDT, on 20 April 2010, high-pressure methane gas from the well expanded into the drilling riser and was released onto the drilling rig, where it ignited and exploded, engulfing the drilling rig.[50][51] Most of the workers escaped the rig by lifeboat and were subsequently evacuated by boat or airlifted by helicopter for medical treatment;[52] however, eleven workers were never found despite a three-day Coast Guard search operation, and are believed to have died in the explosion.[53] Efforts by multiple ships to douse the flames were unsuccessful. After burning for approximately 36 hours, the Deepwater Horizon sank on the morning of 22 April 2010.[54]

[edit] Volume and extent of oil spill

An oil leak was discovered on the afternoon of 22 April when a large oil slick began to spread at the former rig site.[55] According to the Flow Rate Technical Group, the leak amounted to about 4.9 million barrels (780,000 m3) of oil, exceeding the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill as the largest ever to originate in U.S.-controlled waters and the 1979 Ixtoc I oil spill as the largest spill in the Gulf of Mexico.[3][11]

[edit] Spill flow rate

In its permit to drill the well, BP estimated the worst case flow at 162,000 barrels per day (25,800 m3/d).[56] Immediately after the explosion, BP and the United States Coast Guard did not estimate any oil leaking from the sunken rig or from the well.[57] On 24 April, Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mary Landry announced that a damaged wellhead was indeed leaking.[58][59] She stated that “the leak was a new discovery but could have begun when the offshore platform sank . . . two days after the initial explosion.”[58] Initial estimates by Coast Guard and BP officials, based on remotely operated vehicles as well as the oil slick size, indicated the leak was as much as 1,000 barrels per day (160 m3/d).[58] Outside scientists quickly produced higher estimates, which presaged later increases in official numbers.[60][61][62] Official estimates increased from 1,000 to 5,000 barrels per day (160 to 790 m3/d) on 29 April,[63][64] to 12,000 to 19,000 barrels per day (1,900 to 3,000 m3/d) on 27 May,[65][66][67][68] to 25,000 to 30,000 barrels per day (4,000 to 4,800 m3/d) on 10 June,[69][70][71] and to between 35,000 and 60,000 barrels per day (5,600 and 9,500 m3/d), on 15 June.[72][73] Internal BP documents, released by Congress, estimated the flow could be as much as 100,000 barrels per day (16,000 m3/d), if the blowout preventer and wellhead were removed and if restrictions were incorrectly modeled.[74][75]

Progression of oil spill flow rate estimates
Source Date Barrels per day Gallons per day Cubic metres per day
BP estimate of hypothetical worst case scenario (assumes no blowout preventer) Permit 162,000 6,800,000 25,800
United States Coast Guard 23 April (after sinking) 0 0 0
BP and United States Coast Guard 24 April 1,000 42,000 160
Official estimates 29 April 1,000 to 5,000 42,000 to 210,000 790
Official estimates 27 May 12,000 to 19,000 500,000 to 800,000 1,900 to 3,000
Official estimates 10 June 25,000 to 30,000 1,100,000 to 1,300,000 4,000 to 4,800
Flow Rate Technical Group 19 June 35,000 to 60,000 1,500,000 to 2,500,000 5,600 to 9,500
Internal BP documents hypothetical worst case (assumes no blowout preventer) 20 June up to 100,000 up to 4,200,000 up to 16,000
Official estimates[76] 2 August 62,000 2,604,000 9,857

Official estimates were provided by the Flow Rate Technical Group—scientists from USCG, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and outside academics, led by United States Geological Survey (USGS) director Marcia McNutt.[77][78][79] The later estimates were believed to be more accurate because it was no longer necessary to measure multiple leaks, and because detailed pressure measurements and high-resolution video had become available.[80] According to BP, estimating the oil flow was very difficult as there was no underwater metering at the wellhead and because of the natural gas in the outflow.[63] The company had initially refused to allow scientists to perform more accurate, independent measurements, saying that it was not relevant to the response and that such efforts might distract from efforts to stem the flow.[22] Former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Carol Browner and Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA) both accused BP of having a vested financial interest in downplaying the size of the leak in part due to the fine they will have to pay based on the amount of leaked oil.[81]

The final estimate reported that 53,000 barrels per day (8,400 m3/d) were escaping from the well just before it was capped on 15 July. It is believed that the daily flow rate diminished over time, starting at about 62,000 barrels per day (9,900 m3/d) and decreasing as the reservoir of hydrocarbons feeding the gusher was gradually depleted.[11]

[edit] Spill area and thickness

Oil slicks surround the Chandeleur Islands, Louisiana, in this aerial photo.

The oil’s spread was initially increased by strong southerly winds caused by an impending cold front. By 25 April 2010, the oil spill covered 580 square miles (1,500 km²) and was only 31 miles (50 km) from the ecologically sensitive Chandeleur Islands.[82] An 30 April 2010, estimate placed the total spread of the oil at 3,850 square miles (10,000 km²).[83] The spill quickly approached the Delta National Wildlife Refuge and Breton National Wildlife Refuge.[84] On 19 May 2010, both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and other scientists monitoring the spill with the European Space Agency Envisat radar satellite stated that oil had reached the Loop Current, which flows clockwise around the Gulf of Mexico towards Florida and then joins the Gulf Stream along the U.S. east coast.[85] On 29 June 2010, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration determined that the oil slick was no longer a threat to the loop current and stopped tracking offshore oil predictions that include the loop currents region. The omission is noted prominently on the ongoing nearshore surface oil forecasts that are posted daily on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration site.[85][86]

On 14 May 2010, the Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills model indicated that about 35% of a hypothetical 114,000 barrels (18,100 m3) spill of light Louisiana crude oil released in conditions similar to those found in the Gulf would evaporate, that 50% to 60% of the oil would remain in or on the water, and the rest would be dispersed in the ocean. In the same report, Ed Overton, a Louisiana State University chemist who analyzed the spill for NOAA, said he thought most of the oil was floating within 1 foot (30 cm) of the surface.[87] The New York Times tracked the size of the spill over time using data from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the US Coast Guard and Skytruth.[88]

The wellhead was capped on 15 July 2010, and by 30 July, the oil appeared to have dissipated more rapidly than expected. Some scientists believe that the rapid dissipation of the surface oil may have been due to a combination of factors that included the natural capacity of the region to break down oil (petroleum normally leaks from the ocean floor by way of thousands of natural seeps and certain bacteria can consume it.); winds from storms appeared to have aided in rapidly dispersing the oil, and the cleanup response by BP and the government helped control surface slicks. As much as 40% of the oil may have simply evaporated at the ocean surface[citation needed], and an unknown amount remains below the surface.[89]

However, many scientists dispute the report’s methodology and figures.[90] Scientists said much oil was still underwater and could not be detected.[91] According to the NOAA report released on 4 August 2010, about half of the oil leaked into the Gulf remains on or below the Gulf’s surface.[92] Some scientists are calling the NOAA estimates “ludicrous.” According to University of South Florida chemical oceanographer David Hollander, while 25% of the oil can be accounted for by burning, skimming, etc., 75% is still unaccounted for.[93] The federal calculations are based on direct measurements for only 430,000 barrels (68,000 m3) of the oil spilled – the oil burned and skimmed. According to Bill Lehr, an author of the NOAA report, the other numbers are “educated scientific guesses,” because “it is impossible to measure oil that is dispersed”. FSU oceanography professor Ian MacDonald called it “a shaky report” and is unsatisfied with the thoroughness of the presentation and “sweeping assumptions” involved.[94] John Kessler of Texas A&M, who led a National Science Foundation on-site study of the spill, said the report that 75% of the oil is gone is “just not true” and that 50% to 75% of the material that came out of the well remains in the water in a “dissolved or dispersed form”.[95] On 16 August 2010, University of Georgia scientists said their analysis of federal estimates show that 80% of the oil the government said was gone from the Gulf of Mexico is still there. The Georgia team said “it is a misinterpretation of data to claim that oil that is dissolved is actually gone”.[96]

In a 3 December 2010, statement, BP claimed the government overestimated the size of the spill by between 20% and 50%. A document submitted by BP to the commission, NOAA, and The Justice Department says that “they rely on incomplete or inaccurate information, rest in large part on assumptions that have not been validated, and are subject to far greater uncertainties than have been acknowledged. Representative Edward Markey, a member of the House energy panel that is investigating the spill, said in a statement that BP has done whatever it could to avoid revealing the true flow rate of the spill. “With billions of dollars at stake, it is no surprise that they are now litigating the very numbers which they sought to impede.” A BP spokesperson said that BP “fully intends to present its own estimate as soon as the information is available to get the science right.”[97]

[edit] Oil sightings

Oil began washing up on the beaches of Gulf Islands National Seashore on 1 June 2010.[98] By 4 June 2010, the oil spill had landed on 125 miles (201 km) of Louisiana’s coast, had washed up along Mississippi and Alabama barrier islands, and was found for the first time on a Florida barrier island at Pensacola Beach.[99] On 9 June 2010, oil sludge began entering the Intracoastal Waterway through Perdido Pass after floating booms across the opening of the pass failed to stop the oil.[100] On 23 June 2010, oil appeared on Pensacola Beach and in Gulf Islands National Seashore, and officials warned against swimming for 33 miles (53 km) east of the Alabama line.[101][102] On 27 June 2010, tar balls and small areas of oil reached Gulf Park Estates, the first appearance of oil in Mississippi.[103] Early in July 2010, tar balls reached Grand Isle, but 800 volunteers were cleaning them up.[104] On 3 and 4 July 2010, tar balls and other isolated oil residue began washing ashore at beaches in Bolivar and Galveston, though it was believed a ship transported them there, and no further oil was found 5 July.[105] On 5 July 2010, strings of oil were found in the Rigolets in Louisiana, and the next day tar balls reached the shore of Lake Pontchartrain.[105][106]

On 10 September 2010, it was reported that a new wave of oil suddenly coated 16 miles (26 km) of Louisiana coastline and marshes west of the Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish. The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries confirmed the sightings.[107] On 23 October 2010, it was reported that miles-long stretches of weathered oil had been sighted in West Bay, Texas between Southwest Pass, the main shipping channel of the Mississippi River, and Tiger Pass near Venice, Louisiana. The sightings were confirmed by Matthew Hinton of The Times-Picayune.[108]

At the end of October 2010, two research vessels studying the spill’s effect on sea life found substantial amounts of oil on the seafloor. Kevin Yeager, a University of Southern Mississippi assistant professor of marine sciences found oil in samples dug up from the seafloor in a 140-mile (230 km) radius around the site of the Macondo well. The oil ranged from light degraded oil to thick raw crude. The sheer abundance of oil and its proximity to the well site, though, makes it “highly likely” that the oil is from the Macondo well. A second research team turned up traces of oil in sediment samples as well as evidence of chemical dispersants in blue crab larvae and long plumes of oxygen-depleted water emanating from the well site 50 miles (80 km) off Louisiana’s coast.[109]

In late November, Plaquemine Parish, Louisiana coastal zone director P.J. Hahn reported that more than 32,000 US gallons (120 m3) of oil had been sucked out of nearby marshes in the previous 10 day period. In Barataria Bay, Louisiana, photos and firsthand accounts show oil still reaching high into the marshes, baby crabs and adult shrimp covered by crude and oil slicks on the surface of the water.[25]

[edit] Underwater oil plumes

On 15 May 2010, researchers from the National Institute for Undersea Science and Technology,[110] aboard the research vessel RV Pelican, identified oil plumes in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico,[111] including one as large as 10 miles (16 km) long, 3 miles (4.8 km) wide and 300 feet (91 m) thick in spots. The shallowest oil plume the group detected was at about 2,300 feet (700 m), while the deepest was near the seafloor at about 4,593 feet (1,400 m).[112] Other researchers from the University of Georgia found that the oil may have occupied multiple layers.[113]

By 27 May 2010, marine scientists from the University of South Florida had discovered a second oil plume, stretching 22 miles (35 km) from the leaking wellhead toward Mobile Bay, Alabama. The oil had dissolved into the water and was no longer visible. Undersea plumes may have been the result of the use of wellhead chemical dispersants.[114]

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) conducted an independent analysis of the water samples provided from the 22–28 May 2010, research mission of the University of South Florida‘s Weatherbird II vessel. The samples from all undersea plumes were in very low concentrations, less than 0.5 parts per million. NOAA indicated that one of the plumes was unrelated to the BP wellhead leak, while the other plume samples were in concentrations too low or too highly fractionated to determine their origin.[115]

Reporting on a study that ended on 28 June 2010, scientists published conclusive evidence of a deep plume 22 miles (35 km) long linked directly to the Deepwater Horizon well. They reported that it did not appear to be degrading quickly and that it may pose a long-lasting threat for marine life deep in the ocean.[116]

On 23 July 2010, University of South Florida researchers and NOAA released two separate studies confirming subsea plumes of oil resulting from the Deepwater Horizon well.[117]

Researchers from NOAA and Princeton University concluded that the deep plumes of dissolved oil and gas would likely remain confined to the northern Gulf of Mexico and that the peak impact on dissolved oxygen would be delayed (several months) and long lasting (years).[118]

David Valentine of the University of California, Santa Barbara believes that the oil plumes had been diluted in the ocean faster than they had biodegraded, suggesting that the LBNL researchers were overestimating the rate of biodegration.[119] He did not challenge the conclusion that the oil plumes had dispersed.

When scientists initially reported the discovery of undersea oil plumes, BP stated its sampling showed no evidence that oil was massing and spreading in the gulf water column. NOAA chief Jane Lubchenco urged caution, calling the reports “misleading, premature and, in some cases, inaccurate.”[120] Researchers from the Universities of South Florida and Southern Mississippi claim the government tried to squelch their findings.[121][122][123] In a report released on 8 June 2010, NOAA stated that one plume was consistent with the oil from the leak, one was not consistent, and that they were unable to determine the origin of two samples.[115]

On 23 June 2010, NOAA released a report which confirmed deepwater oil plumes in the Gulf and that they did originate from BP’s well, citing a “preponderance of evidence” gathered from four separate sampling cruises. From the government’s report:[124] “The preponderance of evidence based on careful examination of the results from these four different cruises leads us to conclude that DWH-MC252 oil exists in subsurface waters near the well site in addition to the oil observed at the sea surface and that this oil appears to be chemically dispersed. While no chemical “fingerprinting” of samples was conducted to conclusively determine origin, the proximity to the well site and the following analysis support this conclusion”.[125]

In October 2010, scientists reported a continuous plume of over 22 miles (35 km) in length at a depth of about 3,600 ft (1,100 m). That plume persisted for several months without substantial degradation.[126]

[edit] Oil on seafloor

On 10 September 2010, Samantha Joye, a professor in the Department of Marine Sciences at the University of Georgia on a research vessel in the Gulf of Mexico announced her team’s findings of a substantial layer of oily sediment stretching for dozens of miles in all directions suggesting that a lot of oil did not evaporate or dissipate but may have settled to the seafloor. She describes seeing layers of oily material covering the bottom of the seafloor, in some places more than 2 inches (51 mm) thick on top of normal sediments containing dead shrimp and other organisms. She speculates that the source may be organisms that have broken down the spilled oil and excreted an oily mucus that sinks, taking with it oil droplets that stick to the mucous. “We have to [chemically] fingerprint the oil and link it to the Deepwater Horizon,” she says. “But the sheer coverage here is leading us all to come to the conclusion that it has to be sedimented oil from the oil spill, because it’s all over the place.”[127][128]

By January 2011, USF researchers found layers of oil near the wellhead that were “up to 5 times thicker” than recorded by the team in August 2010. USF’s David Hollander remarked, “Oil’s presence on the ocean floor didn’t diminish with time; it grew” and he pointed out, “the layer is distributed very widely,” radiating far from the wellhead.[129]

[edit] Independent monitoring

Wildlife and environmental groups accused BP of holding back information about the extent and impact of the growing slick, and urged the White House to order a more direct federal government role in the spill response. In prepared testimony for a congressional committee, National Wildlife Federation President Larry Schweiger said BP had failed to disclose results from its tests of chemical dispersants used on the spill, and that BP had tried to withhold video showing the true magnitude of the leak.[130] On 19 May 2010, BP established a live feed, popularly known as spillcam, of the oil spill after hearings in Congress accused the company of withholding data from the ocean floor and blocking efforts by independent scientists to come up with estimates for the amount of crude flowing into the Gulf each day.[131][132] On 20 May 2010, United States Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar indicated that the U.S. government would verify how much oil had leaked into the Gulf of Mexico.[133] Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson and United States Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano asked for the results of tests looking for traces of oil and dispersant chemicals in the waters of the gulf.[134]

Journalists attempting to document the impact of the oil spill were repeatedly refused access to public areas, and photojournalists were prevented from flying over areas of the gulf to document the scope of the disaster. These accusations were leveled at BP, its contractors, local law enforcement, USCG, and other government officials.[135][136] Scientists also complained about prevention of access to information controlled by BP and government sources.[135] BP stated that its policy was to allow the media and other parties as much access as possible.[135] On 30 June 2010, the Coast Guard put new restrictions in place across the Gulf Coast that prevented vessels from coming within 20 meters (66 ft) “of booming operations, boom, or oil spill response operations”.[137] In a press briefing, Coast Guard admiral Thad Allen said the new regulation was related to safety issues.[138] On CNN‘s 360, host Anderson Cooper rejected the motivation for the restrictions outright.[139] The Civil Air Patrol also monitored the oil spill on behalf of the US Coast Guard. 27 May 2010[140]

[edit] Efforts to stem the flow of oil

[edit] Short-term efforts

Oil containment dome under construction in Port Fourchon, Louisiana, at Wild Well Control on 26 April

The first attempts to stop the flow of oil was the use of remotely operated underwater vehicles to close the blowout preventer valves on the well head; however, all these attempts failed.[82][141] The second technique, placing a 125-tonne (280,000 lb) containment dome (which had worked on leaks in shallower water) over the largest leak and piping the oil to a storage vessel on the surface, failed when gas leaking from the pipe combined with cold water formed methane hydrate crystals that blocked the opening at the top of the dome.[142] Attempts to close the well by pumping heavy drilling fluids into the blowout preventer to restrict the flow of oil before sealing it permanently with cement (“top kill“) also failed.[143][144]

More successful was positioning a riser insertion tube into the wide burst pipe. There was a stopper-like washer around the tube that plugs the end of the riser and diverts the flow into the insertion tube.[145] The collected gas was flared and oil stored on the board of drillship Discoverer Enterprise.[146] Before the tube was removed, 924,000 US gallons (22,000 bbl) of oil were collected.[147] By 3 June 2010, BP removed the damaged riser from the top of the blowout preventer and covered the pipe by the cap which connected it to a riser.[148] CEO of BP Tony Hayward stated that as a result of this process the amount captured was “probably the vast majority of the oil.”[149] However, the FRTG member Ira Leifer said that more oil was escaping than before the riser was cut and the cap containment system was placed.[150]

The Q4000 and the Discoverer Enterprise during the failed top kill procedure

On 16 June 2010, a second containment system connected directly to the blowout preventer became operational carrying oil and gas to service vessels where it was immolated in a clean-burning system.[151][151][152]

On 5 July 2010, BP announced that its one-day oil recovery effort accounted for about 25,000 barrels (4,000 m3) of oil, and the flaring off of 57.1 million cubic feet (1.62×10^6 m3) of natural gas. The total oil collection to date for the spill was estimated at 660,000 barrels (105,000 m3).[153] The government’s estimates suggested the cap and other equipment were capturing less than half of the oil leaking from the sea floor as of late June 2010.[101]

On 10 July 2010, the containment cap was removed to replace it with a better-fitting cap consisting of a Flange Transition Spool and a 3 Ram Stack (“Top Hat Number 10”).[154][155] On 15 July BP tested the well integrity by shutting off pipes that were funneling some of the oil to ships on the surface, so the full force of the gusher from the wellhead went up into the cap.[156][157] The attempt to cap the wellhead was successful and mud and cement were later pumped in through the top of the well to reduce the pressure inside it, providing a temporary stop to the flow of oil.[13]

[edit] Considerations of using explosives

In mid-May, United States Secretary of Energy Steven Chu assembled a team of nuclear physicists, including hydrogen bomb designer Richard Garwin and Sandia National Laboratories director Tom Hunter.[158] On 24 May 2010, BP ruled out conventional explosives, saying that if blasts failed to clog the well, “We would have denied ourselves all other options.”[159]

[edit] Permanent closure

Transocean’s Development Driller III started drilling a first relief well on 2 May 2010. GSF Development Driller II started drilling a second relief on 16 May 2010.[160][161][162][163][164][165] On 3 August 2010, first test oil and then drilling mud was pumped at a slow rate of approximately 2 barrels (320 L) per minute into the well-head. Pumping continued for eight hours, at the end of which time the well was declared to be “in a static condition.”[166] On 4 August, BP began pumping cement from the top, sealing that part of the flow channel permanently.[167]

On 3 September 2010, the 300 ton failed blowout preventer was removed from the well and a replacement blowout preventer was placed on the well.[168][169] On 16 September, the relief well reached its destination and pumping of cement to seal the well began.[170] The well was effectively killed on 19 September 2010.[171][171]

[edit] Efforts to protect the coastline and marine environments

Men in hard hats standing near water next to large pile of bundled large yellow deflated rubber tubing

United States Environmental Services workers prepare oil containment booms for deployment

The three fundamental strategies for addressing spilled oil were: to contain it on the surface, away from the most sensitive areas, to dilute and disperse it into less sensitive areas, and to remove it from the water. The Deepwater response employed all three strategies, using a variety of techniques. While most of the oil drilled off Louisiana is a lighter crude, the leaking oil was of a heavier blend which contained asphalt-like substances. According to Ed Overton, who heads a federal chemical hazard assessment team for oil spills, this type of oil emulsifies well. Once it becomes emulsified, it no longer evaporates as quickly as regular oil, does not rinse off as easily, cannot be eaten by microbes as easily, and does not burn as well. “That type of mixture essentially removes all the best oil clean-up weapons”, Overton said.[172]

On 6 May 2010, BP began documenting the daily response efforts on its web site.[173] While these efforts began using only BP’s resources, on 28 April, Doug Suttles, chief operating officer, welcomed the US military as it joined the cleanup operation.[63] The response increased in scale as the spill volume grew. Initially, BP employed remotely operated underwater vehicles, 700 workers, four airplanes, and 32 vessels.[58] By 29 April 69 vessels, including skimmers, tugs, barges, and recovery vessels, were active in cleanup activities. On 4 May, the US Coast Guard estimated that 170 vessels, and nearly 7,500 personnel were participating, with an additional 2,000 volunteers assisting.[174] On 26 May, all 125 commercial fishing boats helping in the clean up were ordered ashore after some workers began experiencing health problems.[175] On 31 May, BP set up a call line to take cleanup suggestions which received 92,000 responses by late June, 320 of which were categorized as promising.[176]

[edit] Containment

An oil containment boom deployed by the U.S. Navy surrounds New Harbor Island, Louisiana.

The response included deploying many miles of containment boom, whose purpose is to either corral the oil, or to block it from a marsh, mangrove, shrimp/crab/oyster ranch or other ecologically sensitive areas. Booms extend 18–48 inches (0.46–1.2 m) above and below the water surface and are effective only in relatively calm and slow-moving waters. More than 100,000 feet (30 km) of containment booms were initially deployed to protect the coast and the Mississippi River Delta.[177] By the next day, that nearly doubled to 180,000 feet (55 km), with an additional 300,000 feet (91 km) staged or being deployed.[178][179]

Some US lawmakers and local officials claimed that the booms didn’t work as intended, saying there is more shoreline to protect than lengths of boom to protect it and that inexperienced operators didn’t lay the boom correctly. Billy Nungesser, president of Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, said the boom “washes up on the shore with the oil, and then we have oil in the marsh, and we have an oily boom. So we have two problems”.[180]

[edit] Barrier island plan

On 21 May, Plaquemines Parish president Billy Nungesser publicly complained about the federal government’s hindrance of local mitigation efforts. State and local officials had proposed building sand berms off the coast to catch the oil before it reached the wetlands, but the emergency permit request had not been answered for over two weeks. The following day, Nungesser complained that the plan had been vetoed, while Army Corps of Engineers officials said that the request was still under review.[181] Gulf Coast Government officials released water through Mississippi River diversions to create an outflow of water that would keep the oil off the coast. The water from these diversions comes from the entire Mississippi watershed. Even with this approach, on 23 May, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration predicted a massive landfall to the west of the Mississippi River at Port Fourchon.[182] On 23 May, Louisiana Attorney General Buddy Caldwell wrote to Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp of the US Army Corps of Engineers, stating that Louisiana had the right to dredge sand to build barrier islands to keep the oil spill from its wetlands without the Corps’ approval, as the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents the federal government from denying a state the right to act in an emergency.[183][184][185] He also wrote that if the Corps “persists in its illegal and ill-advised efforts” to prevent the state from building the barriers that he would advise Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal to build the berms and challenge the Corps in court.[186] On 3 June, BP said barrier projects ordered by Adm. Thad Allen would cost $360 million.[187] On 16 June, Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company under the Shaw Environmental and Infrastructure Group began constructing sand berms off the Louisiana coast.[188]

By late October, the state of Louisiana had spent $240 million of the proposed $360 million from BP. The barrier had captured an estimated 1,000 barrels (160 m3) of oil, but critics and experts[who?] say the barrier is purely symbolic and call it “an exercise in futility” given the estimated 5,000,000 barrels (790,000 m3) of oil in the gulf and the millions of dollars and man-hours used to build the barrier. Many scientists say the remaining oil in the Gulf is far too dispersed to be blocked or captured by the sand structures. “It certainly would have no impact on the diluted oil, which is what we’re talking about now,” said Larry McKinney, head of the Gulf of Mexico research center at Texas A&M University. “The probability of their being effective right now is pretty low.”[189]

On 16 December, a report by a presidential commission called the berms project “underwhelmingly effective, overwhelmingly expensive” because little oil appeared on the berms. However, the commission admitted the berm might help with reversing the effects of erosion on the coast. Jindal called the report “partisan revisionist history at taxpayer expense”.[190]

[edit] Dispersal

Spilled oil naturally disperses through storms, currents, and osmosis with the passage of time. Chemical dispersants accelerate the dispersal process, although they may have significant side-effects. Corexit EC9500A and Corexit EC9527A have been the principal dispersants employed.[191] These contain propylene glycol, 2-Butoxyethanol, and dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate.[192][193] 2-butoxyethanol was identified as a causal agent in the health problems experienced by cleanup workers after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.[193] Warnings from the Hazardous Substance Fact Sheet for 2-Butoxyethanol include “Cancer Hazard: 2-Butoxy Ethanol may be a carcinogen in humans since it has been shown to cause liver cancer in animals. Many scientists believe there is no safe level of exposure to a carcinogen” and “Reproductive Hazard: 2-Butoxy Ethanol may damage the developing fetus. There is limited evidence that 2-Butoxy Ethanol may damage the male reproductive system (including decreasing the sperm count) in animals and may affect female fertility in animals”.[194]

Environmental groups attempted to obtain information regarding the composition and safety of ingredients in Corexit through the Freedom of Information Act but were denied by the EPA. After Earthjustice sued on behalf of the Gulf Restoration Network and the Florida Wildlife Federation, the EPA released a list of all 57 chemicals in the 14 dispersents on the EPA’s National Contingency Plan Product Schedule. In August 2011, Earthjustice and Toxipedia released an analysis of the 57 chemicals, stating that “5 chemicals are associated with cancer; 33 are associated with skin irritation from rashes to burns; 33 are linked to eye irritation; 11 are or are suspected of being potential respiratory toxins or irritants; 10 are suspected kidney toxins; 8 are suspected or known to be toxic to aquatic organisms; and 5 are suspected to have a moderate acute toxicity to fish.”[195]

Corexit manufacturer Nalco states that “[COREXIT 9500] is a simple blend of six well-established, safe ingredients that biodegrade, do not bioaccumulate and are commonly found in popular household products….COREXIT products do not contain carcinogens or reproductive toxins. All the ingredients have been extensively studied for many years and have been determined safe and effective by the EPA”.[196] According to the OSHA-required Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) for both versions of Corexit used in the Gulf,[197][197] “Component substances have a low potential to bioconcentrate” (or bioaccumulate), defined by the EPA as “accumulation of a chemical in tissues of a fish or other organism to levels greater than in the surrounding medium”. The data sheets further state: “No toxicity studies have been conducted on this product”.[198]

Corexit EC9500A and EC9527A are neither the least toxic, nor the most effective, among the Environmental Protection Agency approved dispersants.[199] They are also banned from use on oil spills in the United Kingdom.[200] Twelve other products received better toxicity and effectiveness ratings, but BP says it chose to use Corexit because it was available the week of the rig explosion.[199][201] Critics contend that the major oil companies stockpile Corexit because of their close business relationship with its manufacturer Nalco.[199][202]

A large four propeller airplane spraying liquid over oil-sheen water

A C-130 Hercules drops an oil-dispersing chemical into the Gulf of Mexico

On 1 May, two military C-130 Hercules aircraft were employed to spray oil dispersant.[203] On 7 May, Secretary Alan Levine of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Secretary Peggy Hatch, and Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Secretary Robert Barham sent a letter to BP outlining their concerns related to potential dispersant impact on Louisiana’s wildlife and fisheries, environment, aquatic life, and public health. Officials requested that BP release information on their dispersant effects. The Environmental Protection Agency later approved the injection of dispersants directly at the leak site, to break up the oil before it reaches the surface, after three underwater tests.[204] Independent scientists suggest that underwater injection of Corexit into the leak might be responsible for the oil plumes discovered below the surface.[201] However, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration administrator Jane Lubchenco said that there was no information supporting this conclusion, and indicated further testing would be needed to ascertain the cause of the undersea oil clouds.[201] By 12 July, BP had reported applying 1,070,000 US gallons (4,100 m3) of Corexit on the surface and 721,000 US gallons (2,730 m3) underwater (subsea).[205] The same document listed available stocks of Corexit which decreased by over 965,000 US gallons (3,650 m3) without reported application, suggesting either stock diversion or unreported application. Under reported subsea application of 1,690,000 US gallons (6,400 m3) would account for this discrepancy. Given the suggested dispersant to oil ratio between 1:10 and 1:50, the possible use of 1,690,000 US gallons (6,400 m3) in subsea application could be expected to suspend between 400,000 barrels (64,000 m3) to 2,000,000 barrels (320,000 m3) of oil below the surface of the Gulf.[citation needed]

On 19 May, the Environmental Protection Agency gave BP 24 hours to choose less toxic alternatives to Corexit from the list of dispersants on the National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, begin applying the new dispersant(s) within 72 hours of Environmental Protection Agency approval or provide a detailed reasoning why the approved products did not meet the required standards.[206][207] On 20 May, US Polychemical Corporation reportedly received an order from BP for its Dispersit SPC 1000 dispersant. US Polychemical said that it could produce 20,000 US gallons (76 m3) a day in the first few days, increasing up to 60,000 US gallons (230 m3) a day thereafter.[208] Also on 20 May, BP determined that none of the alternative products met all three criteria of availability, toxicity, and effectiveness.[209] On 24 May, Environmental Protection Agency administrator Jackson ordered the Environmental Protection Agency to conduct its own evaluation of alternatives and ordered BP to scale back dispersant use.[210][211] According to analysis of daily dispersant reports provided by the Deepwater Horizon Unified Command, before 26 May, BP used 25,689 US gallons (97.24 m3) a day of Corexit. After the EPA directive, the daily average of dispersant use dropped to 23,250 US gallons (88.0 m3) a day, a 9% decline.[212] By 30 July, more than 1,800,000 US gallons (6,800 m3) of dispersant had been used, mostly Corexit 9500.[213]

On 31 July, Rep. Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Energy and Environment Subcommittee, released a letter sent to National Incident Commander Thad Allen, and documents revealing that the U.S. Coast Guard repeatedly allowed BP to use excessive amounts of the dispersant Corexit on the surface of the ocean. Markey’s letter, based on an analysis conducted by the Energy and Environment Subcommittee staff, further showed that by comparing the amounts BP reported using to Congress to the amounts contained in the company’s requests for exemptions from the ban on surface dispersants it submitted to the Coast Guard, that BP often exceeded its own requests, with little indication that it informed the Coast Guard or that the Coast Guard attempted to verify whether BP was exceeding approved volumes. “Either BP was lying to Congress or to the Coast Guard about how much dispersants they were shooting onto the ocean,” said Rep. Markey.[214]

On 2 August, the EPA said dispersants did no more harm to the environment than the oil itself, and that they stopped a large amount of oil from reaching the coast by making the oil break down faster.[215] However, independent scientists and EPA’s own experts continue to voice concerns regarding the use of dispersants.[216]

Dispersant use was said to have stopped after the cap was in place.[215] Marine toxicologist Riki Ott wrote an open letter to the EPA in late August with evidence that dispersant use had not stopped and that it was being administered near shore.[217] Independent testing supported her claim. New Orleans-based attorney Stuart Smith, representing the Louisiana-based United Commercial Fisherman’s Association and the Louisiana Environmental Action Network said he “personally saw C-130s applying dispersants from [his] hotel room in the Florida Panhandle. They were spraying directly adjacent to the beach right at dusk. Fishermen I’ve talked to say they’ve been sprayed. This idea they are not using this stuff near the coast is nonsense.”[218]

[edit] Use of dispersants deep under water

Some 1,100,000 US gallons (4,200 m3) of chemical dispersants were sprayed at the wellhead 5,000 feet (1,500 m) under the sea.[219] This had never previously been tried but due to the unprecedented nature of this spill, BP along with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency, decided to use “the first subsea injection of dispersant directly into oil at the source”.[220]

Dispersants are said to facilitate the digestion of the oil by microbes. Mixing the dispersants with the oil at the wellhead would keep some oil below the surface and in theory, allow microbes to digest the oil before it reached the surface. Various risks were identified and evaluated, in particular that an increase in the microbe activity might reduce the oxygen in the water. Various models were run and the effects of the use of the dispersants was monitored closely. The use of dispersants at the wellhead was pursued and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated that roughly 409,000 barrels (65,000 m3) of oil were dispersed underwater.[221]

Environmental scientists say the dispersants, which can cause genetic mutations and cancer, add to the toxicity of the spill and that sea turtles and bluefin tuna are exposed to an even greater risk than crude alone. According to them, the dangers are even greater for dispersants poured into the source of the spill, where they are picked up by the current and wash through the Gulf.[222] University of South Florida scientists released preliminary results on the toxicity of microscopic drops of oil in the undersea plumes, finding that they may be more toxic than previously thought. The researchers say the dispersed oil appears to be negatively affecting bacteria and phytoplankton – the microscopic plants which make up the basis of the Gulf’s food web. The field-based results were consistent with shore-based laboratory studies showing that phytoplankton are more sensitive to chemical dispersants than the bacteria, which are more sensitive to oil.[223] On the other hand, NOAA says that toxicity tests have suggested that the acute risk of dispersant-oil mixtures is no greater than that of oil alone.[221] However, some experts believe that all the benefits and costs may not be known for decades.[221]

Because the dispersants were applied deep under the sea, much of the oil never rose to the surface – which means it went somewhere else, said Robert Diaz, a marine scientist at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Va. “The dispersants definitely don’t make oil disappear. They take it from one area in an ecosystem and put it in another,” Diaz said.[219] One plume of dipersed oil measured at 22 miles (35 km) long, more than a mile wide and 650 feet (200 m) tall. The plume showed the oil “is persisting for longer periods than we would have expected,” said researchers with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. “Many people speculated that subsurface oil droplets were being easily biodegraded. Well, we didn’t find that. We found it was still there”.[224] In a major study on the plume, experts found the most worrisome part to be the slow pace at which the oil was breaking down in the cold, 40 °F (4 °C) water at depths of 3,000 feet (910 m) ‘making it a long-lasting but unseen threat to vulnerable marine life’.[225] In September, Marine Sciences at the University of Georgia reported findings of a substantial layer of oily sediment stretching for dozens of miles in all directions from the capped well.[127]

[edit] Removal

The three basic approaches for removing the oil from the water were burning the oil, filtering offshore, and collecting for later processing. On 28 April, the US Coast Guard announced plans to corral and burn off up to 1,000 barrels (160 m3) of oil each day. It tested how much environmental damage a small, controlled burn of 100 barrels (16 m3) did to surrounding wetlands, but could not proceed with an open ocean burn due to poor conditions.[178][226]

BP stated that more than 215,000 barrels (34,200 m3) of oil-water mix had been recovered by 25 May.[83] In mid June, BP ordered 32 machines that separate oil and water with each machine capable of extracting up to 2,000 barrels (320 m3) per day,[227][228] BP agreed to use the technology after testing machines for one week.[229] By 28 June, BP had successfully removed 890,000 barrels (141,000 m3) of oily liquid and burned about 314,000 barrels (49,900 m3) of oil.[230]

In November the EPA reported that there were successful attempts made to contain the environmental impact of the oil spill, in which the Unified Command used the “situ burning” method to burn off the oil in controlled environments on the surface of the ocean to try to limit the environmental damages on the ocean as well as the shorelines. 411 controlled burn events took place, of which 410 could be quantified. Burning off approximately 9,300,000 to 13,100,000 US gallons (35,000 to 50,000 m3) on the ocean surface.[231]

The Environmental Protection Agency prohibited the use of skimmers that left more than 15 parts per million of oil in the water. Many large-scale skimmers were therefore unable to be used in the cleanup because they exceed this limit.[232] An urban myth developed that the U.S. government declined the offers because of the requirements of the Jones Act.[233] This proved untrue and many foreign assets deployed to aid in cleanup efforts.[234] The Taiwanese supertanker A Whale, recently retrofitted as a skimmer, was tested in early July but failed to collect a significant amount of oil.[235] According to Bob Grantham, a spokesman for shipowner TMT, this was due to BP’s use of chemical dispersants.[236] The Coast Guard said 33,000,000 US gallons (120,000 m3) of tainted water had been recovered, with 5,000,000 US gallons (19,000 m3) of that consisting of oil. An estimated 11,000,000 US gallons (42,000 m3) of oil were burned. BP said 826,000 barrels (131,300 m3) had been recovered or flared. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated that about 25% of the oil had been removed from the Gulf. The table below presents the NOAA estimates based on an estimated release of 4,900,000 barrels (780,000 m3) of oil (the category “chemically dispersed” includes dispersal at the surface and at the wellhead; “naturally dispersed” was mostly at the wellhead; “residual” is the oil remaining as surface sheen, floating tarballs, and oil washed ashore or buried in sediment). However, there is plus or minus 10% uncertainty in the total volume of the oil spill.[237] [238]

Two months after these numbers were released Carol Browner, director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy, said they were “never meant to be a precise tool” and that the data “was simply not designed to explain, or capable of explaining, the fate of the oil… oil that the budget classified as dispersed, dissolved, or evaporated is not necessarily gone”.[239]

Category Estimate Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Direct recovery from wellhead 17% 17% 17%
Burned at the surface 5% 5% 5%
Skimmed from the surface 3% 3% 3%
Chemically dispersed 8% 10% 6%
Naturally dispersed 16% 20% 12%
Evaporated or dissolved 25% 32% 18%
Residual remaining 26% 13% 39%

Based on these estimates, up to 75% of the oil from BP’s Gulf oil disaster still remained in the Gulf environment, according to Christopher Haney, chief scientist for Defenders of Wildlife, who called the government report’s conclusions misleading. Haney said. “Terms such as ‘dispersed,’ ‘dissolved’ and ‘residual’ do not mean gone. That’s comparable to saying the sugar dissolved in my coffee is no longer there because I can’t see it. By Director Lubchenco’s own acknowledgment, the oil which is out of sight is not benign. “Whether buried under beaches or settling on the ocean floor, residues from the spill will remain toxic for decades.”[240]

Appearing before Congress, Bill Lehr, a senior scientist at NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration, defended a report written by the National Incident Command (NIC) on the fate of the oil. This report relied on numbers generated by government and non-government oil spill experts, using an Oil Budget Calculator (OBC) developed for this spill. Based upon the OBC, Lehr said 6% was burned and 4% was skimmed but he could not be confident of numbers for the amount collected from beaches. As seen in the table above, he pointed out that much of the oil has evaporated or been dispersed or dissolved into the water column. Under questioning from congressman Ed Markey, Lehr agreed that the report said the amount of oil that went into the Gulf was 4.1m barrels, noting that 800,000 barrels (130,000 m3) were siphoned off directly from the well.

NOAA has been criticized by some independent scientists and Congress for the report’s conclusions and for failing to explain how the scientists arrived at the calculations detailed in the table above. A formally peer-reviewed report documenting the OBC was scheduled for release in early October.[241] Markey told Lehr the NIC report had given the public a false sense of confidence. “You shouldn’t have released it until you knew it was right,” he said. Ian MacDonald, an ocean scientist at Florida State University, claims the NIC report “was not science”. He accused the White House of making “sweeping and largely unsupported” claims that three-quarters of the oil in the Gulf was gone. “I believe this report is misleading,” he said. “The imprint will be there in the Gulf of Mexico for the rest of my life. It is not gone and it will not go away quickly.”[242]

By late July, two weeks after the flow of oil had stopped, oil on the surface of the Gulf had largely dissipated but concern still remained for underwater oil and ecological damage.[243] In August, scientists had determined as much as 79% of the oil remains in the Gulf of Mexico, under the surface.[244] In March 2011, it was reported that thousands of pounds of oil and dispersant were still collected each day from highly visible resort areas and that 17,000 lb (7,700 kg) were collected from a beach in Alabama after a winter storm.[245]

[edit] Oil eating microbes

In August, a study of bacterial activity in the Gulf led by Terry Hazen of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, found a previously unknown bacterial species and reported in the journal Science that it was able to break down the oil without depleting oxygen levels. [246] Hazen’s interpretation had its skeptics. John Kessler, a chemical oceanographer at Texas A&M University says “what Hazen was measuring was a component of the entire hydrocarbon matrix,” which is a complex mix of literally thousands of different molecules. Although the few molecules described in the new paper in Science may well have degraded within weeks, Kessler says, “there are others that have much longer half-lives – on the order of years, sometimes even decades.”[247] He noted that the missing oil has been found in the form of large oil plumes, one the size of Manhattan, which do not appear to be biodegrading very fast.[248]

By mid-September, research showed these microbes mainly digested natural gas spewing from the wellhead – propane, ethane, and butane – rather than oil, according to a subsequent study published in the journal Science.[249] David L. Valentine, a professor of microbial geochemistry at UC Santa Barbara, said that the oil-gobbling properties of the microbes had been grossly overstated.[250] Methane was the most abudant hydrocarbon released during the spill. It has been suggested that vigorous deepwater bacterial bloom respired nearly all the released methane within 4 months, leaving behind a residual microbial community containing methanotrophic bacteria.[251]

Some experts have suggested that the proliferation of the bacteria may be causing health issues for residents of the Gulf Coast. Marine toxicologist Riki Ott says that the bacteria, some of which have been genetically modified, or otherwise bio-engineered to better eat the oil, might be responsible for an outbreak of mysterious skin rashes noted by Gulf physicians.[250][252]

[edit] Consequences

[edit] Ecology

The spill is the “worst environmental disaster the US has faced”, according to White House energy adviser Carol Browner.[253] Indeed, the spill was by far the largest in US history, almost 20 times greater than the Exxon Valdez oil spill.[254] Factors such as petroleum toxicity, oxygen depletion and the use of Corexit dispersant are expected to be the main causes of damage.[255][256] Eight U.S. national parks are threatened.[257] More than 400 species that live in the Gulf islands and marshlands are at risk, including the endangered Kemp’s Ridley turtle, the Green Turtle, the Loggerhead Turtle, the Hawksbill Turtle, and the Leatherback Turtle. In the national refuges most at risk, about 34,000 birds have been counted, including gulls, pelicans, roseate spoonbills, egrets, terns, and blue herons.[83] A comprehensive 2009 inventory of offshore Gulf species counted 15,700. The area of the oil spill includes 8,332 species, including more than 1,200 fish, 200 birds, 1,400 molluscs, 1,500 crustaceans, 4 sea turtles, and 29 marine mammals.[258][259] As of 2 November 2010, 6,814 dead animals had been collected, including 6,104 birds, 609 sea turtles, 100 dolphins and other mammals, and 1 other reptile.[260][261] According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, cause of death had not been determined as of late June. According to NOAA, since 1 January 2011, 67 dead dolphins have been found in the area affected by the oil spill, with 35 of them premature or newborn calves. The cause is under investigation.[262]

In May 2010, Duke University marine biologist Larry Crowder said threatened loggerhead turtles on Carolina beaches could swim out into contaminated waters. Ninety percent of North Carolina’s commercially valuable sea life spawn off the coast and could be contaminated if oil reaches the area. Douglas Rader, a scientist for the Environmental Defense Fund, said prey could be negatively affected as well. Steve Ross of UNC-Wilmington said coral reefs could be smothered.[263] In early June Harry Roberts, a professor of Coastal Studies at Louisiana State University, stated that 4,000,000 barrels (640,000 m3) of oil would be enough to “wipe out marine life deep at sea near the leak and elsewhere in the Gulf” as well as “along hundreds of miles of coastline.” Mak Saito, an Associate Scientist at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts indicated that such an amount of oil “may alter the chemistry of the sea, with unforeseeable results.”[264] Samantha Joye of the University of Georgia indicated that the oil could harm fish directly, and microbes used to consume the oil would also reduce oxygen levels in the water.[265] According to Joye, the ecosystem could require years or even decades to recover, as previous spills have done.[266] Oceanographer John Kessler estimated that the crude gushing from the well contained approximately 40% methane by weight, compared to about 5% found in typical oil deposits.[267] Methane could potentially suffocate marine life and create dead zones where oxygen is depleted.[267] Also oceanographer Dr. Ian MacDonald at Florida State University believes that the natural gas dissolving below the surface has the potential to reduce the Gulf oxygen levels and emit benzene and other toxic compounds.[80][268] In early July, researchers discovered two new previously unidentified species of bottom-dwelling pancake batfish of the Halieutichthys genus, in the area affected by the oil spill.[269] Damage to the ocean floor is yet unknown.[238] In particular was the Louisiana pancake batfish, whose range is entirely contained within the area affected by the spill.[270]

In late July 2010, Tulane University scientists found signs of an oil-and-dispersant mix under the shells of tiny blue crab larvae in the Gulf, indicating that the use of dispersants had broken the oil into droplets small enough to easily enter the food chain. Marine biologists from the University of Southern Mississippi’s Gulf Coast Research Laboratory found “orange blobs” under the shells of crab larvae “in almost all” of the larvae they collected from over 300 miles (480 km) of coastline stretching from Grand Isle, Louisiana, to Pensacola, Florida.[256]

On 29 September 2010, Oregon State University researchers announced the oil spill waters contain carcinogens. The team had found sharply heightened levels of chemicals in the waters off the coast of Louisiana in August, the last sampling date, even after BP successfully capped its well in mid-July. Near Grand Isle, Louisiana, the team discovered that polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons or PAHs, which are often linked to oil spills and include carcinogens and chemicals that pose various risks to human health, remained at levels 40 times higher than before the oil spill. Researchers said the compounds may enter the food chain through organisms like plankton or fish. The PAH chemicals are most concentrated in the area near the Louisiana Coast, but levels have also jumped 2 to 3 fold in other spill-affected areas off Alabama, Mississippi and Florida. As of August, PAH levels remained near those discovered while the oil spill was still flowing heavily.[271] Kim Anderson, an OSU professor of environmental and molecular toxicology, said that based on the findings of other researchers, she suspects that the abundant use of dispersants by BP increased the bioavailability of the PAHs in this case. “There was a huge increase of PAHs that are bio-available to the organisms – and that means they can essentially be uptaken by organisms throughout the food chain.” Anderson added that exactly how many of these toxic compounds ended up in the food chain was beyond her area of research.[272]

On 22 October 2010, it was reported that miles-long strings of weathered oil had been sighted moving toward marshes on the Mississippi River delta. Hundreds of thousands of migrating ducks and geese spend the winter in this delta.[273]

Researchers reported in early November 2010 that toxic chemicals at levels high enough to kill sea animals extended deep underwater soon after the BP oil spill. Terry Wade of Texas A&M University, Steven Lohrenz of the University of Southern Mississippi and Stennis Space Center found evidence of the chemicals as deep as 3,300 feet (1,000 m) and as far away as 8 miles (13 km) in May, and say the spread likely worsened as more oil spilled. The chemicals (PAHs), they said, can kill animals right away in high enough concentrations and can cause cancer over time. “From the time that these observations were made, there was an extensive release of additional oil and dispersants at the site. Therefore, the effects on the deep sea ecosystem may be considerably more severe than supported by the observations reported here,” the researchers wrote in the journal Geophysical Research Letters. They added that PAHs include a group of compounds, and different types were at different depths, and said “It is possible they dissipate quickly, but no one has yet showed this”.[274]

In November 2010, federally funded scientists found damage to deep sea coral several miles from BP’s Macondo well. While tests are needed to verify that the coral died from the well, expedition leader Charles Fisher, a biologist with Penn State University, said, “There is an abundance of circumstantial data that suggests that what happened is related to the recent oil spill.” According to the Associated Press, this discovery indicated that the spill’s ecological consequences may be greater than what officials have said. Previous federal teams have stated that they found no damage on the ocean floor.[275] “We have never seen anything like this,” Fisher added. “The visual data for recent and ongoing death are crystal clear and consistent over at least 30 colonies; the site is close to the Deepwater Horizon; the research site is at the right depth and direction to have been impacted by a deep-water plume, based on NOAA models and empirical data; and the impact was detected only a few months after the spill was contained.”[276]

A Coast Guard report released on 17 December 2010, said that little oil remained on the sea floor except within a mile and a half of the well. The report said that since 3 August, only 1% of water and sediment samples had pollution above EPA-recommended limits. Charlie Henry of NOAA warned even small amounts of oil could cause “latent, long-term chronic effects”. And Ian R. MacDonald of Florida State University said even where the government claimed to find little oil, “We went to the same place and saw a lot of oil. In our samples, we found abundant dead animals.”[277]

In February 2011, the first birthing season for dolphins since the spill, the director of the Institute for Marine Mammal Studies in Gulfport reported that dead baby dolphins were washing up along the Mississippi and Alabama shorelines at about 10 times the normal number for the first two months of the year. “For some reason, they’ve started aborting or they were dead before they were born; the average is one or two a month. This year we have 17 and February isn’t even over yet.” It is not yet certain if the deaths are related to the oil spill.[278]

From mid-January to late March 2011, scientists counted almost 200 dead dolphins in the Gulf, with another 90 in 2010. After investigating the deaths, NOAA put a gag order on the results, saying that the research is part of a criminal investigation of the oil spill. Numerous independent scientists said they have been “personally rebuked by federal officials for speaking out of turn to the media about efforts to determine the cause” of the deaths.[279] A study published in the journal Conservation Letters[280] showed the actual number of mammal deaths due to the spill may be as much as 50 times higher than the number of recovered carcasses. “The Deepwater oil spill was the largest in US history, however, the recorded impact on wildlife was relatively low, leading to suggestions that the environmental damage of the disaster was actually modest. This is because reports have implied that the number of carcasses recovered… equals the number of animals killed by the spill.” said Rob Williams from the University of British Columbia.[281]

In April 2011, one year from the onset of the spill, scientists confirmed that they had discovered oil on dead dolphins found along the Gulf Coast. Fifteen of the 406 dolphins that had washed ashore in the last 14 months had oil on their bodies; the oil found on eight of them was linked to the April 2010 BP oil spill. A NOAA spokesperson stated,”It is significant that even a year after the oil spill we are finding oil on the dolphins, the latest just two weeks ago.”[282]

A study performed by NOAA in the summer of 2011 showed dolphins that came in contact with the petroleum are “seriously ill” with drastically low weight, low blood sugar and for some, cancer of the liver and lungs.[283]

According to a March 2012 study, oil from the Macondo well entered the ocean’s food chain through zooplankton. Dr. Michael Roman of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science stated “traces of oil in the zooplankton prove that they had contact with the oil and the likelihood that oil compounds may be working their way up the food chain”.[284]

In March 2012, definitive link was found between the death of a Gulf coral community the size of half a football field and the BP oil spill.[285]

A NOAA study in Spring 2012, along with two other studies reported at the same time, suggest that the long-term environmental effects of the spill may have been “far more profound than previously thought”. The joint study by NOAA and BP found “many of the 32 dolphins studied were underweight, anemic and suffering from lung and liver disease, while nearly half had low levels of a hormone that helps the mammals deal with stress as well as regulating their metabolism and immune systems”. Other researchers discovered dead and dying corals “coated in brown gunk”. Deep sea corals are usually unaffected by oil spills, but scientists surmised that the depth of the oil and cold temperatures were to blame for the unprecedented affects. Another researcher found that some types of spiders and other insect were far less numerous than before the spill.[286]

The variety of organisms in beach sand, one of the lowest links in the Gulf’s food chain, was found to have dropped dramatically since the spill. The remaining species are believed to be those that favor polluted conditions and that consume hydrocarbons. “We went from this very diverse community with an abundance of different organisms to this really (impoverished) community that was really dominated by a couple of fungal species” said the lead author of the study.[287]

[edit] Mutations

“Disturbing numbers” of mutated fish are appearing in the Gulf. Scientists and fishermen are pointing to the BP oil spill, the dispersants and chemicals used in its cleanup as the cause of these deformities which include shrimp born without eyes, fish with lesions, fish with oozing sores and, according to a local fisher-woman, “We are also finding eyeless crabs, crabs with their shells soft instead of hard, full grown crabs that are one-fifth their normal size, clawless crabs, and crabs with shells that don’t have their usual spikes … they look like they’ve been burned off by chemicals”. The dispersants are known to be mutagenic.[31] In Barataria Bay, LA, one of the most heavily oiled areas, 50 percent of shrimp were found lacking eyes and eye sockets.[288] Another lifelong fisher-woman reported seeing “fish without covers over their gills and others with large pink masses hanging off their eyes and gills”.[289]

Prior to the spill, only 1/10 of 1 percent of Gulf fish had lesions or sores. Today, many locations showed between 20 and 50 percent of fish with lesions, according to the University of South Florida.

Dr. Jim Cowan of NOAA believes polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), released from BP’s submerged oil, are likely the cause of mutations he is finding since the spill. “There’s no other thing we can use to explain this phenomenon. We’ve never seen anything like this before.”[31]

According to marine biologist Riki Ott, “The dispersants used in BP’s draconian experiment contain solvents, such as petroleum distillates and 2-butoxyethanol. Solvents dissolve oil, grease, and rubber. It should be no surprise that solvents are also notoriously toxic to people, something the medical community has long known”.[289]

[edit] Fisheries

21 June 2010 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration map of the Gulf of Mexico showing the areas closed to fishing.

As of 21 June 2010, the area closed to fishing encompassed 86,985 square miles (225,290 km²), or about 36% of Gulf of Mexico federal waters.

In BP’s Initial Exploration Plan, dated 10 March 2009, it said that “it is unlikely that an accidental spill would occur” and “no adverse activities are anticipated” to fisheries or fish habitat.[56] On 29 April 2010, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal declared a state of emergency in the state after weather forecasts predicted the oil slick would reach the Louisiana coast.[290] An emergency shrimping season was opened on 29 April so that a catch could be brought in before the oil advanced too far.[291] By 30 April, the Coast Guard received reports that oil had begun washing up to wildlife refuges and seafood grounds on the Louisiana Gulf Coast.[292] On 22 May, The Louisiana Seafood Promotion and Marketing Board stated said 60 to 70% of oyster and blue crab harvesting areas and 70 to 80% of fin-fisheries remained open.[293] The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals closed an additional ten oyster beds on 23 May, just south of Lafayette, Louisiana, citing confirmed reports of oil along the state’s western coast.[294]

On 2 May, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration closed commercial and recreational fishing in affected federal waters between the mouth of the Mississippi River and Pensacola Bay. The closure initially incorporated 6,814 square miles (17,650 km²).[295][296] By 21 June, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration had increased the area under closure over a dozen times, encompassing by that date 86,985 square miles (225,290 km²), or approximately 36% of Federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico, and extending along the coast from Atchafalaya Bay, Louisiana to Panama City, Florida.[297][298] On 24 May, the federal government declared a fisheries disaster for the states of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.[299] Initial cost estimates to the fishing industry were $2.5 billion.[292]

On 23 June, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ended its fishing ban in 8,000 square miles (21,000 km²), leaving 78,597 square miles (203,570 km²) with no fishing allowed,[300] or about one-third of the Gulf. The continued fishing ban helps assure the safety of seafood, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration inspectors have determined that as of 9 July, Kevin Griffis of the Commerce Department said, only one seafood sample out of 400 tested did not pass, though even that one did not include “concerning levels of contaminants”.[301] On 10 August, Jane Lubchenco of NOAA said no one had seen oil in a 8,000 square miles (21,000 km2) area east of Pensacola since 3 July, so the fishing ban in that area was being lifted.[302]

On 31 August, a Boston lab hired by the United Commercial Fishermen’s Association to analyze coastal fishing waters said it found dispersant in a seafood sample taken near Biloxi, Miss., almost a month after BP said it had stopped using the chemical.[303]

According to the European Space Agency, the agency’s satellite data was used by the Ocean Foundation to conclude that 20% of the juvenile bluefin tuna were killed by oil in the gulf’s most important spawning area. The foundation combined satellite data showing the oil spill extent each week with data on weekly tuna spawning to make their conclusion. The agency also said that the loss of juvenile tuna was significant due to the 82% decline of the tuna’s spawning stock in the western Atlantic during the 30 years before the oil spill.[304]

The waters had been reopened to fishing on 15 November 2010,[305] but on 24 November NOAA re-closed 4,200 square miles (11,000 km²) area to shrimping.[306] A Florida TV station sent frozen Gulf shrimp to be tested for petroleum by-products after recent reports showed scientists disagreed on whether it is safe to eat after the oil spill.[307] A private lab found levels of Anthracene, a toxic hydrocarbon and a by-product of petroleum, at twice the levels the FDA finds acceptable.[308][309] On 20 April, NOAA reopened 1,041 square miles (2,700 km2) of Gulf waters immediately surrounding the Deepwater Horizon wellhead to commercial and recreational fishing of fish, oysters, crabs and shrimp after testing results found that 99 percent of samples contained no detectable dispersant residues or oil-related compounds, and the few samples that did contain residues showed levels more than 1000 times lower than FDA levels of concern. This is the twelfth and final reopening in federal waters since 22 July, and opens all the formerly closed areas in Federal waters.[310] Allowable levels for the toxins in Gulf seafood are based on health impacts for a 176 pound adult eating less than 2 medium shrimp per day.[311]

In July 2011 BP released a report[312] claiming that the economy had recovered and there was no reason to believe that anyone would suffer future losses from the spill, with the limited exception of oyster harvesters. However, Bruce Guerra, a crab fisherman in Louisiana for 25 years, said that since the BP oil spill crabbers are trapping 75 percent fewer crabs and that “crabs have been coming up dead, discolored, or riddled with holes since last year’s spill”. Others in the fishing industry say it could take years to fully realize the spill’s effects. “The problem is right when they used the dispersants, that’s when the tuna came to the Gulf to spawn,” said Cheril Carey, a national sales representative for a Louisiana company specializing in yellow fin tuna. “It takes a tuna five to 15 years to mature. So although we may have fish now, we may not have them in five to 15 years.”[313]

[edit] Tourism

Although many people cancelled their vacations due to the spill, hotels close to the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama reported dramatic increases in business during the first half of May 2010. However, the increase was likely due to the influx of people who had come to work with oil removal efforts. Jim Hutchinson, assistant secretary for the Louisiana Office of Tourism, called the occupancy numbers misleading, but not surprising. “Because of the oil slick, the hotels are completely full of people dealing with that problem,” he said. “They’re certainly not coming here as tourists. People aren’t sport fishing, they aren’t buying fuel at the marinas, they aren’t staying at the little hotels on the coast and eating at the restaurants.”[314]

On 25 May, BP gave Florida $25 million to promote the beaches where the oil had not reached, and the company planned $15 million each for Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The Bay Area Tourist Development Council bought digital billboards showing recent photos from the gulf coast beaches as far north as Nashville, Tennessee and Atlanta. Along with assurances that the beaches were so far unaffected, hotels cut rates and offered deals such as free golf. Also, cancellation policies were changed, and refunds were promised to those where oil may have arrived. However, revenues remained below 2009 levels.[314][315]

The U.S. Travel Association estimated that the economic impact of the oil spill on tourism across the Gulf Coast over a three-year period could exceed approximately $23 billion, in a region that supports over 400,000 travel industry jobs generating $34 billion in revenue annually.[316][317]

On 1 November, BP announced plans to spend $78 million to help Louisiana tourism and test and advertise seafood.[318]

[edit] Other economic consequences

On 5 July 2010, BP reported that its own expenditures on the oil spill had reached $3.12 billion, including the cost of the spill response, containment, relief well drilling, grants to the Gulf states, claims paid, and federal costs.[319] The United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 limits BP’s liability for non-cleanup costs to $75 million unless gross negligence is proven.[320] BP has said it would pay for all cleanup and remediation regardless of the statutory liability cap. Nevertheless, some Democratic lawmakers sought to pass legislation that would increase the liability limit to $10 billion.[321][322] Analysts for Swiss Re have estimated that the total insured losses from the accident could reach $3.5 billion. According to UBS, final losses could be $12 billion.[323] According to Willis Group Holdings, total losses could amount to $30 billion, of which estimated total claims to the market from the disaster, including control of well, re-drilling, third-party liability and seepage and pollution costs, could exceed $1.2 billion.[324]

On 25 June, BP’s market value reached a 1-year low. The company’s total value lost since 20 April was $105 billion. Investors saw their holdings in BP shrink to $27.02, a nearly 54% loss of value in 2010.[325] A month later, the company’s loss in market value totalled $60 billion, a 35% decline since the explosion. At that time, BP reported a second-quarter loss of $17 billion, its first loss in 18 years. This included a one-time $32.2 billion charge, including $20 billion for the fund created for reparations and $2.9 billion in actual costs.[326]

BP announced that it was setting up a new unit to oversee management of the oil spill and its aftermath, to be headed by former TNK-BP chief executive Robert Dudley,[327] who a month later was named CEO of BP.[326]

On 1 October, BP pledged as collateral all royalties from the Thunder Horse, Atlantis, Mad Dog, Great White, Mars, Ursa, and Na Kika fields in the Gulf of Mexico. At that time, BP also said that it had spent $11.2 billion, while the company’s London Stock Exchange price reached 439.75 pence, the highest point since 28 May.[328]

By the end of September, BP reported that it had spent $11.2 billion. Third-quarter profit of $1.79 billion (compared to $5.3 billion in 2009) showed, however, that BP continued to do well and should be able to pay total costs estimated at $40 billion.[318]

BP gas stations, the majority of which the company does not own, reported sales off between 10 and 40% due to backlash against the company. Some BP station owners that lost sales said the name should change back to Amoco, while others said after all the effort that went into promoting BP, such a move would be a gamble, and the company should work to restore its image.[329]

Local officials in Louisiana expressed concern that the offshore drilling moratorium imposed in response to the spill would further harm the economies of coastal communities.[330] In a 2010 news story, The Christian Science Monitor reported, “The oil industry employs about 58,000 Louisiana residents and has created another 260,000 oil-related jobs, accounting for about 17% of all Louisiana jobs.”[330] BP agreed to allocate $100 million for payments to offshore oil workers who were unemployed due to the six-month moratorium on drilling in the deep-water Gulf of Mexico.[151]

The real estate prices and a number of transactions in the Gulf of Mexico area decreased significantly during the period of the oil spill. As a result, area officials wanted the state legislature to allow property tax to be paid based on current market value, which according to State Rep. Dave Murzin could mean millions of dollars in losses for each county affected.[331]

The Organization for International Investment, a Washington-based advocate for overseas investment into the U.S., warned in early July that the political rhetoric surrounding the disaster was potentially damaging the reputation of all British companies with operations in the U.S.[332] and sparked a wave of U.S. protectionism that restricted British firms from winning government contracts, making political donations and lobbying.[333]

[edit] Litigation

By 26 May 2010, over 130 lawsuits relating to the spill had been filed[323] against one or more of BP, Transocean, Cameron International Corporation, and Halliburton Energy Services,[334] although it is considered likely by observers that these will be combined into one court as a multidistrict litigation.[334] By 17 June over 220 lawsuits were filed against BP alone.[335] Because the spill has been largely lingering offshore, the plaintiffs who can claim damages so far are mostly out-of-work fishers and tourist resorts that are receiving cancellations.[336] The oil company says 23,000 individual claims have already been filed, of which 9,000 have so far been settled.[323] BP and Transocean want the cases to be heard in Houston, seen as friendly to the oil business. Plaintiffs have variously requested the case be heard in Louisiana, Mississippi or Florida.[336] Five New Orleans judges have recused themselves from hearing oil spill cases because of stock ownership in companies involved or other conflicts of interest.[337] BP has retained law firm Kirkland & Ellis to defend most of the lawsuits arising from the oil spill.[338]

On 21 April 2011, BP issued $40bn worth of lawsuits against rig owner Transocean, cementer Halliburton and blowout preventer manufacturer Cameron. The oil firm alleged failed safety systems and irresponsible behaviour of contractors had led to the explosion, including claims that Halliburton failed to properly use modelling software to analyze safe drilling conditions.[339] The firms deny the allegations.

On 2 March 2012, BP and plaintiffs agreed to settle their lawsuits. If approved by the court, the deal would settle roughly 100,000 claims filled by individuals and businesses affected by the oil spill.[340] According to a group presenting the plaintiffs, the deal has no specific cap; BP estimated that it would pay approximately $7.8 billion.[341] BP says that it has $9.5 billion in assets set aside in a trust to pay the claims, and the settlement will not increase the $37.2 billion the company budgeted for spill-related expenses.[340] Individual claimants would not be required to agree to the settlement, but experts estimate that such claims would be insignificant.[340]

Not included in the settlement are claims by US states and federal fines.[340] David Uhlmann, a lawyer who has served Justice Department‘s environmental crime section, believes the settlement of private claims will facilitate a deal between BP and the various governmental departments being reached.[340] Fadel Gheit, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Co., agreed.[340]

[edit] Health consequences

On 29 May 2010, ten oil spill clean-up workers had been admitted to West Jefferson Medical Center in Marrero, Louisiana. All but two had been hospitalized suffering from symptoms emergency room doctors diagnosed as dehydration. At a press briefing about the 26 May medical evacuation of seven crewmembers from Vessels of Opportunity working in the Breton Sound area, Coast Guard Captain Meredith Austin, Unified Command Deputy Incident Commander in Houma, LA, said that air monitoring done before beginning work showed no volatile organic compounds above limits of concern. No respiratory protection was issued, said Austin “because air ratings were taken and there were no values found to be at an unsafe level, prior to us sending them in there.”[342]

On 15 June, Marylee Orr, Executive Director for Louisiana Environmental Action Network (LEAN),[343] said on MSNBC‘s Countdown with Keith Olbermann that people along the Gulf Coast were getting very sick, with symptoms of dizziness, vomiting, nausea, headaches, and chest pains, not only from the first responders to the crisis, but residents living along the coast as well. LEAN’s director reported that BP had threatened to fire their workers if they used respirators distributed by LEAN, though health and safety officials had not required their use, as they may exacerbate risks of heat exhaustion.[344][345] By 21 June 143 oil spill exposure cases had been reported to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) since the crisis began; 108 of those cases involved workers in the oil spill clean-up efforts, while thirty-five were reported by the general public.[346]

The Institute of Medicine of the U.S. National Academies held a workshop to assess known health effects of this and previous oil spills and to coordinate epidemiological monitoring and ongoing medical research. The Louisiana state health officer Jimmy Guidry stated that need as: “This is more than a spill. This is ongoing leakage of a chemical, and adding chemicals to stop the chemicals. We’re feeling like we’re in a research lab.”[347][348] On the second day of the meeting the suicide of William Allen Kruse, a charter boat captain working as a BP clean-up worker,[349] intensified previous expert commentary on the current and likely long-term mental health effects of the ongoing crisis. David Abramson, director of research for Columbia’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness, noted the increased risk of mental disorders and stress-related health problems.[350][351] On 10 August, the Institute of Medicine released a Workshop Summary: Assessing the Effects of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill on Human Health.

Chemicals from the oil and dispersant are believed to be the cause of illness reported by people who live along the Gulf of Mexico. According to chemist Bob Naman, the addition of dispersants created an even more toxic substance when mixed with crude oil. According to Naman, poly-aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are making people sick. PAHs contain compounds that have been identified as carcinogenic, mutagenic, and teratogenic. “The dispersants are being added to the water and are causing chemical compounds to become water soluble, which is then given off into the air, so it is coming down as rain, in addition to being in the water and beaches of these areas of the Gulf,” Naman said, and added “I’m scared of what I’m finding. These cyclic compounds intermingle with the Corexit dispersant and generate other cyclic compounds that aren’t good. Many have double bonds, and many are on the EPA’s danger list. This is an unprecedented environmental catastrophe.” Dr. Riki Ott has been working with oil-spill related illness since the Exxon Valdez. She is working in the Gulf and says: “People are already dying from this… I’m dealing with three autopsies’ right now. I don’t think we’ll have to wait years to see the effects like we did in Alaska, people are dropping dead now. I know two people who are down to 4.75 per cent of their lung capacity, their heart has enlarged to make up for that, and their esophagus is disintegrating, and one of them is a 16-year-old boy who went swimming in the Gulf.”[352][353] According to Mississippi Riverkeeper of the Waterkeeper Alliance, blood samples from eight individuals from Florida (Pensacola) and Alabama, male and female, residents and BP cleanup workers “were analyzed for volatile solvents and all came back with ethylbenzene and m,p-xylene in excess of 95th percentile values of 0.11 ppb for ethylbenzene and 0.34 ppb for m,p-xylene.” The highest concentration value was four times the 95th percentile. “The blood of all three females and five males had chemicals that are found in the BP crude oil”, the report went on to say.[354]

In August 2011, The Government Accountability Project (GAP) began a survey of the health effects of the oil spill on cleanup workers. Reports included “eye, nose and throat irritation; respiratory problems; blood in urine, vomit and rectal bleeding; seizures; nausea and violent vomiting episodes that last for hours; skin irritation, burning and lesions; short-term memory loss and confusion; liver and kidney damage; central nervous system effects and nervous system damage; hypertension; and miscarriages”. Cleanup workers claimed to have been threatened with termination when requesting respirators, because it would “look bad in media coverage,” or they were told that respirators were unnecessary, as Corexit was “as safe as Dawn dishwashing soap”. Cleanup workers and residents reported being sprayed directly with Corexit, with skin lesions and blurred eyesight as the result. Dr. James Diaz, writing for the American Journal of Disaster Medicine said the ailments appearing among Gulf response workers and residents reflected those reported after previous oil spills, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Diaz warned that “chronic adverse health effects, including cancers, liver and kidney disease, mental health disorders, birth defects and developmental disorders should be anticipated among sensitive populations and those most heavily exposed”. Diaz also believes neurological disorders should be anticipated.[355]

[edit] U.S. and Canadian offshore drilling policies

After the Deepwater Horizon explosion, a six-month offshore drilling (below 500 feet (150 m) of water) moratorium was enforced by the United States Department of the Interior.[356] Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar ordered immediate inspections of all deep-water operations in the Gulf of Mexico. An Outer Continental Shelf safety review board within the Department of the Interior is to provide recommendations for conducting drilling activities in the Gulf.[357] The moratorium suspended work on 33 rigs.[356] It was challenged by several drilling and oil services companies. On 22 June, a United States federal judge on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana Martin Leach-Cross Feldman when ruling in the case Hornbeck Offshore Services LLC v. Salazar, lifted the moratorium finding it too broad, arbitrary and not adequately justified.[356] The Department of Justice appealed to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted the request for an expedited hearing. A three judge panel is scheduled to hear oral arguments on 8 July.[358][359]

U.S. Oil Production and Imports 1920 to 2005

On 30 June, Salazar said that “he is working very hard to finalize a new offshore drilling moratorium”.[360] Michael Bromwich, the head of the newly created Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, said that a record of “bad performance, deadly performance” by an oil company should be considered “a relevant factor” for the government when it decides if that company should be awarded future drilling leases.[360] Representative George Miller plans to introduce to the energy reform bill under consideration in the United States House of Representatives that a company’s safety record should factor into leasing decisions. By this amendment he wants to ban BP from leasing any additional offshore area for seven years because of “extensive record of serious worker safety and environmental violations”.[361]

On 28 April, the National Energy Board of Canada, which regulates offshore drilling in the Canadian Arctic and along the British Columbia Coast, issued a letter to oil companies asking them to explain their argument against safety rules which require same-season relief wells.[362] Five days later, the Canadian Minister of the Environment Jim Prentice said the government would not approve a decision to relax safety or environment regulations for large energy projects.[363] On 3 May California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger withdrew his support for a proposed plan to allow expanded offshore drilling projects in California.[364][365] On 8 July, Florida Governor Charlie Crist called for a special session of the state legislature to draft an amendment to the state constitution banning offshore drilling in state waters, which the legislature rejected on 20 July.[366][367]

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico accounts for 23.5% of U.S. oil production.[368] The chief argument in the U.S. offshore drilling debate has been to make the United States less dependent on imported oil.[369][370] American dependence on imports grew from 24% in 1970[371] to 66% in 2008.[372]

[edit] Spill response fund

BP initially promised to compensate all those affected. Tony Hayward stated, “We are taking full responsibility for the spill and we will clean it up and where people can present legitimate claims for damages we will honour them. We are going to be very, very aggressive in all of that.”[373]

On 16 June, after meeting with President Obama, BP executives agreed to create a $20 billion spill response fund.[151][374][375] BP has said it will pay $3 billion in third quarter of 2010 and $2 billion in fourth quarter into the fund followed by a payment of $1.25 billion per quarter until it reaches $20 billion. In the interim, BP posts its US assets worth $20 billion as bond. The amount of this fund is not a cap on BP’s liabilities. For the fund’s payments, BP will cut its capital spending budget, sell $10 billion in assets, and drop its dividend.[151][376] The fund will be administered by Kenneth Feinberg.[151][374][375] One aim of the fund will be to minimize lawsuits against the company.[377] According to BP’s officials, the fund can be used for natural resource damages, state and local response costs and individual compensation but cannot be used for fines or penalties.[151]

After provisions of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust were released 11 August, it was revealed that the BP Spill Fund may be backed by future drilling revenue, using BP’s production as collateral.[378]

The Gulf Coast Claims Facility began accepting claims on 23 August. Kenneth Feinberg, the man in charge of the $20 billion fund, has confirmed that BP is paying his salary, but questioned who else should pay it. Feinberg has been asked repeatedly to reveal his salary. In late July, he stated that he will disclose the salary BP is paying him, after initially declining to do so.[379] In mid-August, he said that he would disclose the amount “probably next month” but insists that he is not beholden to BP.[380] However, in early October, he had not yet divulged the information as promised, and when asked, he declined to say how much he is being paid, only that it is a flat fee “totally unrelated” to the size of the fund and amounts paid.[381] On 8 October, it was revealed that Feinberg and his law firm have been paid more than $2.5 million from mid-June to 1 October.[382]

Feinberg said almost 19,000 claims were submitted in the first week. Of those, roughly 1,200 claims were compensated, totaling about six million dollars, the remainder “lacked proper paperwork”.[383] Feinberg pointed out that those closest to the spill area were the most likely to receive compensation. Under the new claims facility, claimants can receive between one and six months’ compensation without waiving their right to sue; only those who file for and receive a lump-sum payment later in the year will waive their right to litigate.[384] BP had already paid out $375 million, but those who had already filed claims would need to submit a new form.[385] Feinberg stated, “If I haven’t found you eligible, no court will find you eligible.” Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum disputed Feinberg’s statement in a letter.[386]

As of 8 September 2010 (2010 -09-08)[update], 50,000 claims, 44,000 of those for lost income, had been filed. Over 10,000 claims had been paid, totaling nearly $80 million.[387] By 17 September, about 15,000 claims remained unpaid. The claims were from individuals and businesses that had been fully documented and had already received loss payments from BP. Feinberg acknowledged that he had no excuse for the delay.[388]

By late September, Floridians and businesses criticized the claims process, claiming it has gotten worse under Feinberg’s leadership, some saying the president and BP “should dump Feinberg if he doesn’t get his act together soon”.[389] The Obama Administration responded to criticism from Florida officials, including Gov. Charlie Crist and CFO Alex Sink, with a stern letter to Feinberg, saying the present pace of claims is “unacceptable” and directing his office to make whatever changes necessary to move things along. “The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill has disrupted the lives of thousands upon thousands of individuals, often cutting off the income on which they depend. Many of these individuals and businesses simply do not have the resources to get by while they await processing by the GCCF” associate U.S. Attorney General Thomas Perrelli wrote.[390] One family in Louisiana has been waiting for a month on emergency funds from Feinberg’s Gulf Coast Claims Fund, and says for them it is urgent. “Bills aren’t paid, they take my car, they take my insurance, they take my house, and then I can’t get him back and forth to dialysis,” claims the wife of the former owner of “Lafourche Seafood”.[391]

On 25 September, Feinberg responded to the complaints in a news release. “Over the past few weeks, I have heard from the people of the Gulf, elected officials, and others that payments remain too slow and not generous enough,” Feinberg said. “I am implementing new procedures that will make this program more efficient, more accelerated and more generous.” In less than five weeks, the dedicated $20 billion fund that BP set up has paid out over $400 million to more than 30,000 claimants. Funds allocated so far equal 2% of the total amount that BP agreed to set aside.[392] Feinberg has denied about 2,000 claims, another 20,000 applications were returned for more financial documentation, and about 15,000 more claims await review. Feinberg has said he’s processing claims at a rate of 1,500 a day.[393]

By early October, denied claims dropped from 528 to 116, as checks were cut and mailed to businesses that were initially told they would get no help. Along with those still waiting for money, dozens of people say they have received small fractions of the compensation they requested.[381]

By November, BP said it had sent $1.7 billion in checks.[318] About 92,000 claimants had been paid or approved for payment as of 30 October 2010 (2010 -10-30)[update]. The claims facility declined to reveal the total amount requested by the nearly 315,000 people who have now filed. Denied claims rose dramatically in October; some 20,000 people had been told they have no right to emergency compensation, compared to about 125 denials at the end of September. Others say they are getting mere fractions of what they’ve lost, while still others received large checks and full payments.[394]

In a letter sent 20 November by the Department of Justice, Associate Attorney General Thomas Perrelli told Kenneth Feinberg that transparency is needed in the claims process so victims can see they’re being treated fairly. The DOJ also expressed concerns about the pace of the pay-out process as the interim and final claims begin.[395][396]

Feinberg had said claimants would have to surrender their right to sue BP to receive payments beyond emergency disbursements. The deadline to apply for emergency payments expired 23 November. But after Gulf residents complained that the emergency payments were so small that they felt pushed into a hurried settlement to get more money, Feinberg made a concession. Under the new rules (beginning 24 November and lasting until 23 August 2013), businesses and individuals may request compensation once a quarter while they decide whether to permanently settle their claim. Still, the claims process has its critics. Alabama Rep. Jo Bonner asked the Justice Department to investigate the claims facility and to assume direct oversight of the process, saying he had no more trust in the new process than he had in the emergency-payment program. Feinberg had said he would hire his own adjusters, but according to Rep. Bonner, he is still using the same ones as when BP administered the fund. A spokeswoman for Feinberg said the hiring process of new adjusters was under way.[397]

According to BP’s law firm, Feinberg’s law firm received a total of $3.3 million from BP as of early November. The law firm was paid $850,000 a month since June 2010, and payment of this fee will continue until the end of the year; afterwards, the contract will be reviewed.[398]

In March 2011, Feinberg’s law firm received an increase in the monthly wage from BP. Compensation rose from $850,000 to $1.25 million.[399]

Feinberg estimates that about $6 billion of the fund will be paid out in claims, including government claims and cleanup costs. He plans to return the remaining $14 billion to BP once all the settlements are paid out by August 2013.[400]

In July 2011, Mississippi’s attorney general Jim Hood announced he is suing Feinberg to get access to claims filed by coastal residents, saying he’s “seeking to make the process more transparent so people will know if Feinberg is looking out for the best interests of oil spill victims or BP”. Hood has stated he believes Feinberg’s operation is “intentionally delaying and denying legitimate claims”. Feinberg has been criticized by others about the amount and speed of payments as well as a lack of transparency.[401] Also in July, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that an independent audit will be performed on the $20 billion fund set up to compensate victims of the BP oil spill. To July 2011, the fund has paid $4.7 billion to 198,475 claimants. The total number who have filed claims stands at 522,506, many with multiple claims. In all, the fund has nearly 1 million claims and continues to receive thousands of claims each week.[37]

An independent audit of the GCCF won Senate approval 21 October 2011. The audit is seen as a means of assuring claimants of efficiency and transparency in the BP claims process.[402]

In early 2012, an independent auditor found that 7,300 claimants were wrongly denied or underpaid an average of about $8,800 by Feinberg. 2,600 claimants were incorrectly rejected but “can’t get their money now because their files didn’t include information needed to calculate their proper payment amount”.[403] On 19 April 2012 the Justice Department announced that because of the claimants being shortchanged, more than $64 million in additional payments is coming to roughly 7,300 residents and businesses.[404]

[edit] Reactions

Reactions to the oil spill, from various officials and interested parties, ranged from blame and outrage at the damage caused by the spill, and spills in the past, to calls for greater accountability on the part of the U.S. government and BP, including new legislation dealing with preventative security and cleanup improvements.[citation needed]

[edit] Investigations

On 22 April 2010, the United States Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service launched an investigation of the possible causes of the explosion.[50] On 11 May the Obama administration requested the National Academy of Engineering conduct an independent technical investigation to determine the root causes of the disaster so that corrective steps could be taken to address the mechanical failures underlying the accident.[405] On 22 May President Obama announced that he had issued Executive Order 13543 establishing the bipartisan National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, with former Florida Governor and Senator Bob Graham and former Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William K. Reilly serving as co-chairs. The purpose of the commission is to “consider the root causes of the disaster and offer options on safety and environmental precautions.”[406][407] On 1 June, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that he has opened an investigation of the oil spill.[408] According to Holder, the Justice Department is interviewing witnesses as part of a criminal and civil investigation. Besides BP, the investigation could apply to other companies involved in the drilling of the damaged well.[409]

The United States House Committee on Energy and Commerce has conducted a number of hearings. On 17 June, Tony Hayward testified before the Committee.[410] The heads of Anadarko and Mitsui’s exploration unit will testify before the Committee 22 July.[411] In a statement made in June the Committee noted that in a number of cases leading up to the explosion, BP appears to have chosen riskier procedures to save time or money, sometimes against the advice of its staff or contractors.[412]

On 30 April, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce asked Halliburton to brief it as well as provide any documents it might have related to its work on the Macondo well.[357] Attention has focused on the cementing procedure and the blowout preventer, which failed to fully engage.[413] A number of significant problems have been identified with the blowout preventer: There was a leak in the hydraulic system that provides power to the shear rams. The underwater control panel had been disconnected from the pipe ram, and instead connected to a test ram. The blowout preventer schematic drawings, provided by Transocean to BP, do not correspond to the structure that is on the ocean bottom. The shear rams are not designed to function on the joints where the drill pipes are screwed together or on tools that are passed through the blowout preventer during well construction. The explosion may have severed the communication line between the rig and the sub-surface blowout preventer control unit such that the blowout preventer would have never received the instruction to engage. Before the backup dead man’s switch could engage, communications, power and hydraulic lines must all be severed, but it is possible hydraulic lines were intact after the explosion. Of the two control pods for the deadman switch, the one that has been inspected so far had a dead battery.[414] Employee Tyrone Benton told the BBC on 21 June that a leak was spotted on a crucial piece of equipment in the oil rig’s blowout preventer weeks before the accident, and that Transocean and BP were emailed about it.[415]

According to the testimony of Doug Brown, the chief mechanic on the Deepwater Horizon, on 26 May at the joint U.S. Coast Guard and Minerals Management Service hearing, a BP representative overruled Transocean employees and insisted on displacing protective drilling mud with seawater just hours before the explosion.[416] One of the BP representatives on the board responsible for making the final decision, Robert Kaluza, refused to testify on the Fifth Amendment grounds that he might incriminate himself; Donald Vidrine, another BP representative, cited medical reasons for his inability to testify, as did James Mansfield, Transocean’s assistant marine engineer on board.[417][418][419]

In a 18 June statement, Jim Hackett, the CEO of Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, said research “indicates BP operated unsafely and failed to monitor and react to several critical warning signs during the drilling. … BP’s behavior and actions likely represent gross negligence or willful misconduct.”[420] BP responded by strongly disagreeing with the Anadarko statement and said that, despite being contractually liable for sharing clean-up costs, Anadarko is “refusing to accept responsibility for oil spill removal costs and damages”.[421] BP has sent Anadarko a bill for $272.2 million; Anadarko is “assessing our contractual remedies”.[105]

According to the US Congressional investigation, the rig’s blowout preventer, a fail-safe device fitted at the base of the well, built by Cameron International Corporation, had a hydraulic leak and a failed battery, and therefore failed.[422] On 19 August, Admiral Thad Allen ordered BP to keep the blowout preventer to be used as evidence in any court actions.[423] On 25 August, Harry Thierens, BP’s vice president for drilling and completions, told the hearing that he found that the blowout preventer was connected to a test pipe, rather than the one conveying oil to the surface. He said that he was “frankly astonished that this could have happened.”[424]

In late August, BP released findings from its own internal probe, which it began immediately after the spill began. BP found that on 20 April managers misread pressure data and gave their approval for rig workers to replace drilling fluid in the well with seawater, which was not heavy enough to prevent gas that had been leaking into the well from firing up the pipe to the rig, causing the explosion. The investigation also questioned why an engineer with BP, the team leader overseeing the project, ignored warnings about weaknesses in cement outside the well which could have prevented the gas from escaping. The conclusion was that BP was partly to blame, as was Transocean, which owned the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.[36]

On 8 September, BP released a 193-page report on its web site. The report says BP employees and those of Transocean did not correctly interpret a pressure test, and both companies neglected signs such as a pipe called a riser[clarification needed] losing fluid. It also says that while BP did not listen to recommendations by Halliburton for more centralizers, the lack of centralizers probably did not affect the cement. The blowout preventer, removed on 4 September, had not reached a NASA facility in time for it to be part of the report. Transocean, responding to the report, blamed “BP’s fatally flawed well design.”[425]

On 8 November, the inquiry by the Oil Spill Commission revealed its findings that BP had not sacrificed safety in attempts to make money, but that some decisions had increased risks on the rig.[426] However, the panel said a day later that there had been “a rush to completion” on the well, criticizing poor management decisions. “There was not a culture of safety on that rig,” co-chair Bill Reilly said.[427] One of the decisions met with tough questions was that BP refuted[clarification needed] the findings of advanced modelling software that had ascertained over three times as many centralizers were needed on the rig. It also decided not to rerun the software when it stuck with only six centralizers, and ignored or misread warnings from other key tests, the panel said.[428]

On 16 November, an independent 15-member committee[who?] released a report stating BP and others, including federal regulators, ignored “near misses”. University of Michigan engineering practice professor and committee chairman Donald Winter that sealing the well continued “despite several indications of potential hazard”. For example, tests showed the cement was not strong enough to prevent oil and gas from escaping. Also, BP lost drilling materials in the hole.[429] According to Donald Winter, the panel of investigators could not pin the explosion aboard the rig on a single decision made by BP, or anyone else, they found that the companies’ focus on speed over safety, given that the well was behind schedule costing BP $1.5 million a day-helped lead to the accident. As Donald Winter told The New York Times, “A large number of decisions were made that were highly questionable and potentially contributed to the blowout of the Macondo well… Virtually all were made in favor of approaches which were shorter in time and lower in cost. That gives us concern that there was not proper consideration of the tradeoffs between cost and schedule and risk and safety.”[430] An unused Oil Spill Commission slide[431] obtained by Greenwire, outlines 11 decisions that BP and its contractors ( Halliburton Co., Transocean Ltd. and MI Swaco) made before the disaster that may have increased risk on the rig. At least nine of the decisions saved time, and the majority were made on shore, mainly by BP.[432]

On 8 December, Joe Keith, a senior Halliburton manager, said to the U.S. Coast Guard-Interior Department panel in Houston that he left his post aboard Transocean’s rig to smoke a cigarette on the night of the April disaster in the Gulf. While he was away from his monitors, charts entered into evidence showed that pressure data indicated the well was filling up with explosive natural gas and crude. Halliburton shares immediately fell on the New York Stock Exchange when news of his testimony emerged.[433]

In a 23 December letter, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board asked the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement to discontinue its investigation of the blowout preventer, which began 16 November at a NASA facility near New Orleans, until dealing with conflicts of interest. The board said Transocean and Cameron International, maker of the blowout preventer, had more access than the board did, and that Det Norske Veritas, which led the testing, should be removed or monitored more closely. Transocean said the board’s “accusations are totally unfounded.”[434]

On 23 March 2011, BOEMRE and the Coast Guard published the forensic examination report prepared by U.S. Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Columbus, the contractor that performed the examination.[435] The report concluded that the primary cause of failure was that the blind shear rams failed to fully close and seal due to a portion of drill pipe trapped between the shearing blocks. This happened because the drill pipe elastically buckled within the wellbore due to forces induced on the drill pipe during loss of well control, consequently, drill pipe in process of shearing was deformed outside the shearing blade surfaces, and, consequently, the blind shearing rams were not able to move the entire pipe cross section into the shearing surfaces of the blades. Therefore, oil continued to flow through the drill pipe trapped between the ram block faces and subsequently through the gaps between the ram blocks. Since the pipe buckled when well control was lost, the blind shear rams would have failed to function as planned no matter when they were made active.[436]

In September 2011, the US government published its final investigative report on the accident. In essence, that report states that the main cause was the defective cement job, and Halliburton, BP and Transocean were, in different ways, responsible for the accident.[40] The report consists of two volumes. Volume I contains the report of the US Coast Guard.[437] That volume states that, although the events leading to the sinking of Deepwater Horizon were set into motion by the failure to prevent a well blowout, the investigation revealed numerous systems deficiencies, and acts and omissions by Transocean and its Deepwater Horizon crew, that had an adverse impact on the ability to prevent or limit the magnitude of the disaster. These included poor maintenance of electrical equipment that may have ignited the explosion, bypassing of gas alarms and automatic shutdown systems that could prevent an explosion, and lack of training of personnel on when and how to shut down engines and disconnect the MODU from the well to avoid a gas explosion and mitigate the damage from an explosion and fire. These deficiencies indicate that Transocean’s failure to have an effective safety management system and instill a culture that emphasizes and ensures safety contributed to this disaster. This investigation also revealed that the oversight and regulation of Deepwater Horizon by its flag state, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), was ineffective in preventing this casualty. By delegating all of its inspection activities to “recognized organizations,” without itself conducting on board oversight surveys, the RMI effectively abdicated its vessel inspection responsibilities.

Volume II of the report cited above contains the report of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).[438] That volume states that a central cause of the blowout was failure of a cement barrier in the production casing string, a high‐strength steel pipe set in a well to ensure well integrity and to allow future production. The failure of the cement barrier allowed hydrocarbons to flow up the wellbore, through the riser and onto the rig, resulting in the blowout. The loss of life and the subsequent pollution of the Gulf of Mexico were the result of poor risk management, last‐minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical indicators, inadequate well control response, and insufficient emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the drilling platform. BP, as the designated operator under BOEMRE regulations, was ultimately responsible for conducting operations at Macondo in a way that ensured the safety and protection of personnel, equipment, natural resources, and the environment. Transocean, the owner of the Deepwater Horizon, was responsible for conducting safe operations and for protecting personnel onboard. Halliburton, as a contractor to BP, was responsible for conducting the cement job, and, through its subsidiary (Sperry Sun), had certain responsibilities for monitoring the well.

[edit] Finding of fault

On 5 January 2011,[439] the White House oil spill commission released a final report detailing faults by the companies that led to the spill.[440] The panel found that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean had attempted to work more cheaply and thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage.[441] The report states: “Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money).”[441][442] BP released a statement in response to this, saying, “Even prior to the conclusion of the commission’s investigation, BP instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management.”[443] Transocean, however, blamed BP for making the decisions before the actual explosion occurred and government officials for permitting those decisions.[444] Halliburton stated that it was acting only upon the orders of BP when it injected the cement into the wall of the well.[443][445] Halliburton also blamed the governmental officials and BP. It criticized BP for its failure to run a cement bond log test.[444]

In the report, BP was accused of nine faults.[443][445] One was that it had not used a diagnostic tool to test the strength of the cement.[441] Another was ignoring a pressure test that had failed.[443] Still another was for not plugging the pipe with cement.[441] The study did not, however, place the blame on any one of these events. Rather, it concluded with the following statement blaming the management of Macondo:[443][445]

Better management of decision-making processes within BP and other companies, better communication within and between BP and its contractors and effective training of key engineering and rig personnel would have prevented the Macondo incident.

The panel also noted that the government regulators did not have sufficient knowledge or authority to notice these cost-cutting decisions.[442] The report advises Changing Business as Usual[446]

The record shows that without effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to respond in emergencies. However, government oversight, alone, cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government oversight (see Chapter 9) must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a fundamental transformation of its safety culture. Only through such a demonstrated transformation will industry—in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster—truly earn the privilege of access to the nation’s energy resources located on federal properties.

As noted above, the US government report issued in September 2011 states Halliburton, BP and Transocean were all, in different ways, responsible for the accident.[40]

[edit] Disposition of financial obligation

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ United States Environmental Protection Agency. Deepwater Horizon Response April 2010. Download KML Geographic Data.
  2. ^ Power, Stephen; Gold, Russell; King, Neil Jr. (2010-06-08). “Staffing Levels on Deepwater Horizon Are Questioned”. The Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company). http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703302604575294670738866384.html. Retrieved 2010-06-08. : BP had contracted the rig from Transocean, which both owned and operated the rig.
  3. ^ a b c Hoch, Maureen (2010-08-02). “New Estimate Puts Gulf Oil Leak at 205 Million Gallons”. PBS NewsHour (MacNeil/Lehrer Productions). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/08/new-estimate-puts-oil-leak-at-49-million-barrels.html. Retrieved 2010-12-19. 
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  445. ^ a b c Cappiello, Dina; Weber, Harry R. (2011-01-05). “Panel: Without changes in oil industry and government, BP-like spill could happen again”. Chicago Tribune. http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-bc-us-gulfoilspill,0,7248032.story. Retrieved 2011-02-26. 
  446. ^ “Final Report: BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” (PDG). https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdf_final/9_OSC_CH_8.pdf

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  • Annual revenue increase $246.1 billion USD (2009)
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August 3, 2012 Posted by | 2010, reparations and compensation, Sanctions, Timeline | , , , | Leave a comment