Classified information [COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS)] The International Union
Classified information
A typical classified document. Page 13 of a U.S. National Security Agency report[1] on the USS Liberty incident, partially declassified and released to the public in July 2004. The original overall classification of the page, “top secret”, and the Special Intelligence code word “umbra,” are shown at top and bottom. The classification of individual paragraphs and reference titles is shown in parentheses – there are six different levels on this page alone. Notations with leader lines at top and bottom cite statutory authority for not declassifying certain sections.
Classified information is a categorization applied to information that a government claims is sensitive information. Access is restricted by law or regulation to particular groups of persons. A formal security clearance is often required to handle classified documents or access classified data. The clearance process requires a satisfactory background investigation. There are typically several levels (classes) of sensitivity, with differing clearance requirements. This sort of hierarchical system of secrecy is used by virtually every national government. The act of assigning the level of sensitivity to data is called data classification. Although the root sense of the word “classified” is simply synonymous with “categorized“, it has developed a sense synonymous with “censored” in the context of classified information.
A distinction could be made between formal security classification and privacy markings such as “Commercial in confidence”.
Some corporations and non-government organizations also assign sensitive information to multiple levels of protection, either from a desire to protect trade secrets, or because of laws and regulations governing various matters such as personal privacy, sealed legal proceedings and the timing of financial information releases.
[edit] Government classification
The purpose of classification is to protect information from being used to damage or endanger national security. Classification formalises what constitutes a “state secret” and accords different levels of protection based on the expected damage the information might cause in the wrong hands.
However, classified information is frequently ‘leaked’ to reporters by officials for political purposes. Several US presidents have leaked sensitive information to get their point across to the public.[2][3]
[edit] Classification levels
Although the classification systems vary from country to country, most have levels corresponding to the following British definitions (from the highest level to lowest)
[edit] Top Secret (TS)
The highest level of classification of material on a national level. Such material would cause “exceptionally grave damage” to national security if made publicly available.
[edit] Secret
“It is desired that no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse effect on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work field should be classified `secret’.”
Such material would cause “serious damage” to national security if it were publicly available.
[edit] Confidential
Such material would cause “damage” or be “prejudicial” to national security if publicly available.
[edit] Restricted
Such material would cause “undesirable effects” if publicly available. Some countries do not have such a classification.
[edit] Unclassified
Technically not a classification level, but is used for government documents that do not have a classification listed above. Such documents can sometimes be viewed by those without security clearance.
There are a plethora of pseudo-classifications under this category. Please see the articles on Sensitive but unclassified and Controlled Unclassified Information for more information. Some government prosecutors have retro-actively changed unclassified information into classified information after charging someone with a crime; see the Thomas Andrews Drake case for example.
[edit] Clearance
Depending on the level of classification there are different rules controlling the level of clearance needed to view such information, and how it must be stored, transmitted, and destroyed. Additionally, access is restricted on a “need to know” basis. Simply possessing a clearance does not automatically authorize the individual to view all material classified at that level or below that level. The individual must present a legitimate “need to know” in addition to the proper level of clearance.
[edit] Compartmented information
In addition to the general risk-based classification levels above, often there are additional constraints on access, such as (in the U.S.) Special Intelligence (SI), which protects intelligence sources and methods, No Foreign dissemination (NOFORN), which restricts dissemination to U.S. nationals, and Originator Controlled dissemination (ORCON), which ensures that the originator can track possessors of the information. Documents in some compartments are marked with specific “code words” in addition to the classification level.
[edit] Nuclear information
Government information about nuclear weapons such as nuclear warheads often has an additional marking to show it contains such information.
[edit] Sharing classified information between countries
When a government agency or group shares information between an agency or group of other country’s government they will generally employ a special classification scheme that both parties have previously agreed to honour.
For example the marking ATOMAL, is applied to U.S. RESTRICTED DATA or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA and United Kingdom ATOMIC information that has been released to NATO. ATOMAL information is marked COSMIC TOP SECRET ATOMAL (CTSA), NATO SECRET ATOMAL (NSAT), or NATO CONFIDENTIAL ATOMAL (NCA).
In cases where a country wishes to share classified information bilaterally (or multilaterally) with a country that has a sharing agreement, the information is with the countries it can be shared with. Those countries would have to maintain the classification of the document at the level originally classified (TOP-SECRET, SECRET, etc.) with the appropriate caveat (USNZ, AUSGE, CANUK, etc.).
[edit] NATO classifications
For example, sensitive information shared amongst NATO allies has four levels of security classification; from most to least classified:
- COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS),
- NATO SECRET (NS),
- NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC), and
- NATO RESTRICTED (NR).
A special case exists with regard to NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NU) information. Documents with this marking is NATO property (copyright) and must not be made public without NATO permission. In general documents with this classification, aren’t cleared for internet-transmission either, unless clearly marked with RELEASABLE FOR INTERNET TRANSMISSION. Documents that can be made public however, should be clearly marked with NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC.
In addition to the above classification levels NATO operates with
- COSMIC TOP SECRET – A
This level is given to people who need to have access to the joined Atomic program of NATO. This level is never given permanently to anyone, regardless of jobtitle – e.g. President of the U.S.A. etc. It is only given for short periods of time, when needed.
[edit] International organisations
- European Commission, has 5 levels, EU TOP SECRET, EU SECRET, EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU RESTRICTED, and EU COUNCIL / COMMISSION.[5] (Note that usually the French term is used)
- OCCAR, a European defence organisation, has three levels of classification: OCCAR SECRET, OCCAR CONFIDENTIAL, OCCAR RESTRICTED.[6]
[edit] By country
Facsimile of the cover page from an East German operation manual for the M-125 Fialka cipher machine. The underlined classification markings can be translated as “Cryptologic material! Secret classified material” de:Verschlusssache.
Most countries employ some sort of classification system for certain government information. For example, in Canada, information that the U.S. would classify SBU (Sensitive but Unclassified) is called “protected” and further subcategorised into levels A, B, and C.
[edit] Australia
On 19 July 2011, the National Security (NS) classification marking scheme and the Non-National Security (NNS) classification marking scheme in Australia was unified into one structure.
The Australian Government Security Classification system now comprises TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and PROTECTED. A new dissemination limiting markers (DLMs) scheme was also introduced for information where disclosure may be limited or prohibited by legislation, or where it may otherwise require special handling. The DLM marking scheme comprises For Official Use Only (FOUO), Sensitive, Sensitive: Personal, Sensitive: Legal, and Sensitive Cabinet. [7]
Documents marked Sensitive Cabinet, relating to discussions in Federal Cabinet, are treated as PROTECTED at minimum due to its higher sensitivity.
Background checks for access to TOP SECRET material are carried out at either of two levels: at TOP SECRET NEGATIVE VETTING (TSNV), or at the more stringent and expensive TOP SECRET POSITIVE VETTING (TSPV) level, depending on the extent of required access to TOP SECRET material and on the potential damage to national security should such material be disclosed to unauthorised parties. Most background checks for access to TOP SECRET material are carried out at the TOP SECRET NEGATIVE VETTING level.
[edit] Brazil
In Brazil, a top secret (Ultrassecreto) government-issued document may be classified for a period of 25 years, which may be extended up to another 25 years. Thus, no document remains classified for more than 50 years. This is mandated by the 2011 Information Access Law (Lei de Acesso à Informação), a change from the previous rule, under which documents could have their classification time length renewed indefinitely, effectively shuttering state secrets from the public. The new law applies retroactively to existing documents.
[edit] Canada
[edit] Background and hierarchy
There are 2 main type of sensitive information designation used by the Government of Canada: Classified and Designated. The access and protection of both types of information is governed by the Security of Information Act, effective December 24, 2001, replacing the Official Secrets Act 1981.[8] To access the information, a person must have the appropriate level of clearance and a Need to know.
[edit] Special operational information
SOI is not a classification of data per se. It is defined under the Security of Information Act, and unauthorised release of such information constitutes a higher breach of trust, with penalty of life imprisonment.
SOIs include:
- military operations in respect of a potential, imminent or present armed conflict
- the identity of confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada
- tools used for information gathering or intelligence
- the object of a covert investigation, or a covert collection of information or intelligence
- the identity of any person who is under covert surveillance
- encryption and cryptographic systems
- information or intelligence to, or received from, a foreign entity or terrorist group
[edit] Classified information
Classified information can be designated Top Secret, Secret or Confidential. These classifications are only used on matters of national interest.
- Top Secret: This applies when compromise might reasonably cause exceptionally grave injury to the national interest. The possible impact must be great, immediate and irreparable.
- Secret: This applies when compromise might reasonably cause serious injury to the national interest.
- Confidential: When disclosure might reasonably cause injury to the national interest.
[edit] Designated information
Designated information is not classified. Designated information pertains to any sensitive information that does not relate to national security and cannot be disclosed under the access and privacy legislation because of the possible injury to particular public or private interests.[9][10]
- Protected C (Extremely Sensitive designated information): is used to protect extremely sensitive information if compromised, could reasonably be expected to cause extremely grave injury outside the national interest. Examples could include bankruptcy, identities of informants in criminal investigations, etc.
- Protected B (Particularly Sensitive designated information): is used to protect information that could cause severe injury or damage to the people or group involved if it was released. Examples include medical records, annual personnel performance reviews, etc.
- Protected A (Low-Sensitive designated information): is applied to low sensitivity information that should not be disclosed to the public without authorisation and could reasonably be expected to cause injury or embarrassment outside the national interest. Example of Protected A information could include employee number, pay deposit banking information, etc.
Federal Cabinet (Queen’s Privy Council for Canada) papers are either designated (i.e. overhead slides prepared to make presentations to Cabinet) or classified (draft legislations, certain memos).[11]
[edit] People’s Republic of China
A building in Wuhan housing provincial offices for dealing with foreign countries etc. The red slogan says, “Protection of national secrets is a duty of every citizen”
The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (which is not operative in the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao) makes it a crime to release a state secret. Regulation and enforcement is carried out by the National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets.
Under the 1989 “Law on Guarding State Secrets,”[12] state secrets are defined as those that concern:
- Major policy decisions on state affairs;
- The building of national defence and in the activities of the armed forces;
- Diplomatic activities and in activities related to foreign countries and those to be maintained as commitments to foreign countries;
- National economic and social development;
- Science and technology;
- Activities for preserving state security and the investigation of criminal offences; and
- Any other matters classified as “state secrets” by the national State Secrets Bureau.[13]
Secrets can be classified into one of three categories:
- Top secret (绝密): Defined as “vital state secrets whose disclosure would cause extremely serious harm to state security and national interests”;
- Highly secret (机密): Defined as “important state secrets whose disclosure would cause serious harm to state security and national interests”; and
- Secret (秘密): Defined as “ordinary state secrets whose disclosure would cause harm to state security and national interests”.[13]
[edit] France
In France, classified information defined by article 413-9 of the Penal Code.[14] The three levels of military classification are
- Confidentiel Défense (Confidential Defence): Information deemed potentially harmful to national defence, or that could lead to uncovering an information classified at a higher level of security.
- Secret Défense (Secret Defence): Information deemed very harmful to national defence. Such information cannot be reproduced without authorisation from the emitting authority, except in exceptional emergencies.
- Très Secret Défense (Very Secret Defence): Information deemed extremely harmful to national defence, and relative to governmental priorities in national defence. No service or organisation can elaborate, process, stock, transfer, display or destroy information or protected supports classified at this level without authorisation from the Prime Minister or the national secretary for National Defence. Partial or exhaustive reproduction is strictly forbidden.
Less sensitive information is “protected”. The levels are
- Non Protégé (unprotected)
- Diffusion restreinte administrateur (“administrative restricted information”)
- Diffusion restreinte (“restricted information”)
- Confidentiel personnels Sous-Officiers (“Confidential non-commissioned officers”)
- Confidentiel personnels Officiers (“Confidential officers”)
A further mention, “spécial France” (reserved France) restricts the document to French citizens (in its entirety or by extracts). This is not a classification level.
Declassification of documents can be done by the Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale (CCSDN), an independent authority. Transfer of classified information is done with double envelopes, the outer layer being plastified and numbered, and the inner in strong paper. Reception of the document involves examination of the physical integrity of the container and registration of the document. In foreign countries, the document must be transferred through specialised military mail or diplomatic bag. Transport is done by an authorised convoyer or habilitated person for mail under 20 kg. The letter must bear a seal mentioning “PAR VALISE ACCOMPAGNEE-SACOCHE“. Once a year, ministers have an inventory of classified information and supports by competent authorities.
Once their usage period is expired, documents are transferred to archives, where they are either destroyed (by incineration, crushing or electrical overtension), or stored.
In case of unauthorized release of classified information, competent authorities are the Ministry of Interior, the Haut fonctionnaire de défense et de sécurité (“high civil servant for defence and security”) of the relevant ministry, and the General secretary for National Defence. Violation of such secrets is an offence punishable with 7 years of imprisonment and a 100 000 Euro fine; if the offence is committed by imprudence or negligence, the penalties are 3 years of imprisonment and a 45 000 Euro fine.
[edit] Hong Kong
The Security Bureau is responsible for developing policies in regards to the protection and handling of confidential government information. In general, the system used in Hong Kong is very similar to the UK system, developed from the Colonial Hong Kong era.
Four classifications exists in Hong Kong, from highest to lowest in sensitivity:[15]
- Top Secret (高度機密)
- Secret (機密)
- Confidential (保密)
- Temporary Confidential (臨時保密)
- Restricted (限閱文件/內部文件)
- Restricted (staff) (限閱文件(人事))
- Restricted (tender) (限閱文件 (投標))
- Restricted (administration) (限閱文件 (行政))
Restricted documents are not classified per se, but only those who have a need to know will have access to such information, in accordance with the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance.[16][dead link]
[edit] New Zealand
New Zealand uses the Restricted classification, which is lower than Confidential. People may be given access to Restricted information on the strength of an authorisation by their Head of Department, without being subjected to the background vetting associated with Confidential, Secret and Top Secret clearances. New Zealand’s security classifications and the national-harm requirements associated with their use are roughly similar to those of the United States.
In addition to national security classifications there are two additional security classifications, In Confidence and Sensitive, which are used to protect information of a policy and privacy nature. There are also a number of information markings used within ministries and departments of the government, to indicate, for example, that information should not be released outside the originating ministry.
Because of strict privacy requirements around personal information, personnel files are controlled in all parts of the public and private sectors. Information relating to the security vetting of an individual is usually classified at the In Confidence level.
[edit] Russian Federation
In the Russian Federation, a state secret (Государственная тайна) is information protected by the state on its military, foreign policy, economic, intelligence, counterintelligence, operational and investigative and other activities, dissemination of which could harm state security.
[edit] Sweden
The Swedish classification has been updated due to increased NATO/PfP co-operation. All classified defence documents will now have both a Swedish classification (Kvalificerat Hemlig or Hemlig), and an English classification (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential or Restricted).[citation needed]
[edit] United Kingdom
The United Kingdom currently uses five levels of classification — from lowest to highest, they are: PROTECT, RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET (formerly MOST SECRET). Those working with such material should have the relevant security clearance and often are required to sign to confirm their understanding and acceptance of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989, although the Act applies in the same way regardless of signature. PROTECT is not in itself a security protective marking level (such as RESTRICTED or greater), but is used to indicate information which should not be disclosed because, for instance, the document contains tax, or national insurance or other personal information.
Government documents without a classification may be marked as UNCLASSIFIED or NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED.[17]
[edit] United States
The U.S. classification system is currently established under Executive Order 13292 and has three levels of classification — Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. The U.S. had a Restricted level during World War II but no longer does. U.S. regulations state that information received from other countries at the Restricted level should be handled as Confidential. A variety of markings are used for material that is not classified, but whose distribution is limited administratively or by other laws, e.g., For Official Use Only (FOUO), or Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for the protection of information related to the design of nuclear weapons. The term “Restricted Data” is used to denote certain nuclear technology. Information about the storage, use or handling of nuclear material or weapons is marked “Formerly Restricted Data.” These designations are used in addition to level markings (Confidential, Secret and Top Secret). Information protected by the Atomic Energy Act is protected by law and information classified under the Executive Order is protected by Executive privilege.
[edit] Table of equivalent classification markings in various countries
| (State) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Teper Sekret | Sekret | Konfidencial | I Kufizuar |
| Argentina | Estrictamente Secreto y Confidencial | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Australia | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Protected |
| Austria | Streng Geheim | Geheim | Vertraulich | Eingeschränkt |
| Belgium (Dutch) | Zeer Geheim | Geheim | Vertrouwelijk | Beperkte Verspreiding |
| Belgium (French) | Très Secret | Secret | Confidentiel | Diffusion restreinte |
| Bolivia | Supersecreto or Muy Secreto |
Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Bosnia | Strogo Povjerljivo | Tajno | Konfidencialno | Restiktirano |
| Brazil | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Bulgaria | Строго секретно | Секретно | Поверително | За служебно ползване |
| Cambodia | Sam Ngat Bamphot | Sam Ngat Roeung | Art Kambang | Ham Kom Psay |
| Canada | Top Secret/Très secret | Secret/Secret | Confidential/Confidentiel | Protected A, B or C / Protégé A, B ou C |
| Chile | Secreto | Secreto | Reservado | Reservado |
| China, People’s Republic of | Juémì (绝密) | Jīmì (机密) | Mìmì (秘密) | Nèibù (内部) |
| China, Republic of | “Absolutely” Secret (絕對機密) | “Extremely” Secret (極機密) | Secret (機密) | no direct equivalent |
| Colombia | Ultrasecreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reserva del sumario |
| Costa Rica | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | |
| Croatia | Vrlo tajno | Tajno | Povjerljivo | Ograničeno |
| Czech Republic | Přísně tajné | Tajné | Důvěrné | Vyhrazené |
| Denmark | Yderst Hemmeligt | Hemmeligt | Fortroligt | Til Tjenestebrug Foreign Service: Fortroligt (thin Black border) |
| Ecuador | Secretisimo | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Egypt | Sirriy lil-Ġāyah سري للغاية |
Sirriy Ǧiddan سري جداً |
Khāṣ خاص |
Maḥzūr محظور |
| El Salvador | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Estonia | Täiesti salajane | Salajane | Konfidentsiaalne | Piiratud |
| Ethiopia | Yemiaz Birtou Mistir | Mistir | Kilkil | |
| European Union (EU) | TRES SECRET UE / EU TOP SECRET | SECRET UE / EU SECRET | CONFIDENTIEL UE / EU CONFIDENTIAL | RESTREINT UE / EU RESTRICTED |
| European Union (Western) (WEU) | FOCAL TOP SECRET | WEU SECRET | WEU CONFIDENTIAL | WEU RESTRICTED |
| Euratom | EURA TOP SECRET | EURA SECRET | EURA CONFIDENTIAL | EURA RESTRICTED |
| Finland | Erittäin salainen (TLL I) | Salainen (TLL II) | Luottamuksellinen (TLL III) | Viranomaiskäyttö (TLL IV) |
| France | Très secret défense | Secret défense | Confidentiel défense | Diffusion restreinte |
| Germany | Streng Geheim | Geheim | VS-Vertraulich | VS-Nur für den Dienstgebrauch |
| Greece | Άκρως Απόρρητον | Απόρρητον | Εμπιστευτικόν | Περιορισμένης Χρήσης |
| Guatemala | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Haiti | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Reserve |
| Honduras | Super Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Hong Kong | Top Secret, 高度機密 | Secret, 機密 | Confidential, 保密 | Restricted, 內部文件/限閱文件 |
| Hungary | Szigorúan Titkos | Titkos | Bizalmas | Korlátozott Terjesztésű |
| India (Hindi) | परम गुप्त (Param Gupt) | गुप्त (Gupt) | गोपनीय (Gopniya) | प्रतिबंधित/सीमित (Pratibandhit/seemit) |
| India (English) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Indonesia | Sangat Rahasia | Rahasia | Rahasia Dinas | Terbatas |
| Iran | Fararaz فَراراز | Raz راز | Sar-be-moher سـَر به مـُهر | Sarbaste سَربسته |
| Iraq | Sirriy lil-Ġāyah سري للغاية |
Sirriy سري |
Khāṣ خاص |
Maḥdūd محدود |
| Iceland | Algert Leyndarmál | Leyndarmál | Trúnaðarmál | Þjónustuskjal |
| Ireland (Irish language) | An-sicreideach | Sicreideach | Runda | Srianta |
| Israel | Sodi Beyoter סודי ביותר |
Sodi סודי |
Shamur שמור |
Mugbal מוגבל |
| Italy | Segretissimo | Segreto | Riservatissimo | Riservato |
| Japan | Kimitsu, 機密 | Gokuhi, 極秘 | Hi, 秘 | Toriatsukaichuui, 取り扱い注意 |
| Jordan | Maktūm Ǧiddan مكتوم جداً |
Maktūm مكتوم |
Sirriy سري |
Maḥdūd محدود |
| Korea, South | I(Il)-Kup Bi Mil, 1급비밀 | II(I)-Kup Bi Mil, 2급비밀 | III(Sam)-Kup Bi Mil, 3급비밀 | Dae Woi Bi, 대외비 |
| Korea, North | Unknown, 익명의 | Unknown, 익명의 | Unknown, 익명의 | Unknown, 익명의 |
| Laos | Lup Sood Gnod | Kuam Lup | Kuam Lap | Chum Kut Kon Arn |
| Latvia | Sevišķi slepeni | Slepeni | Konfidenciāli | Dienesta vajadzībām |
| Lebanon | Tres Secret | Secret | Confidentiel | |
| Lithuania | Visiškai Slaptai | Slaptai | Konfidencialiai | Riboto Naudojimo |
| Malaysia | Rahsia Besar | Rahsia | Sulit | Terhad |
| Mexico | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Restringido |
| Montenegro | Strogo Tajno | Tajno | Povjerljivo | Interno |
| Netherlands[18] | STG. Zeer Geheim | STG. Geheim | STG. Confidentieel | Departementaal Vertrouwelijk |
| New Zealand | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Nicaragua | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Norway | STRENGT HEMMELIG | HEMMELIG | KONFIDENSIELT | BEGRENSET |
| Pakistan (Urdu) | Intahai Khufia | Khufia | Sigh-e-Raz | Barai Mahdud Taqsim |
| Pakistan (English) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Paraguay | Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Peru | Estrictamente Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Philippines | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Poland | Ściśle tajne | Tajne | Poufne | Zastrzeżone |
| Portugal | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Romania | Strict Secret de Importanţă Deosebită | Strict Secret | Secret | Secret de serviciu |
| Russia | Особой важности (вариант: Совершенно Секретно (Sovershenno Sekretno)) |
Совершенно секретно (вариант: Секретно (Sekretno)) |
Секретно (вариант: Не подлежит оглашению (Конфиденциально) (Ne podlezhit oglasheniyu (Konfidentsial’no)) |
Для Служебного Пользования (ДСП) (Dlya Sluzhebnogo Pol’zovaniya) |
| Saudi Arabia | Saudi Top Secret | Saudi Very Secret | Saudi Secret | Saudi Restricted |
| Serbia | Latin: Državna tajna Cyrillic: Државна тајна |
Latin: Strogo poverljivo Cyrillic: Строго поверљиво |
Latin: Poverljivo Cyrillic: Поверљивo |
Latin: Interno Cyrillic: Интерно |
| Singapore | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| Slovak Republic | Prísne tajné | Tajné | Dôverné | Vyhradené |
| Slovenija | Strogo tajno | Tajno | Zaupno | Interno |
| Spain | Secreto | Reservado | Confidencial | Difusión Limitada |
| Sweden | Kvalificerat Hemlig (KH); Hemlig/Top Secret (H/TS) | Hemlig (H); Hemlig/Secret H/S) | Hemlig/Confidential (H/C) | Hemlig/Restricted (H/R) |
| Switzerland | Geheim / Secret | Vertraulich / Confidentiel | Dienstlich / Interne au service | |
| Tanzania (Swahili) | SIRI KUU | SIRI | STIRI | IMEZUILIWA |
| Thailand | Lap thi sut (ลับที่สุด) | Lap mak (ลับมาก) | Lap (ลับ) | |
| Turkey | Çok Gizli | Gizli | Özel | Hizmete Özel |
| South Africa (English) | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted |
| South Africa (Afrikaans) | Uiters Geheim | Geheim | Vertroulik | Beperk |
| Ukraine | Особливої важливості | Цілком таємно | Таємно | Для службового користування |
| United Kingdom | TOP SECRET | SECRET | CONFIDENTIAL | RESTRICTED |
| United States | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | For Official Use Only |
| Uruguay | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado |
| Vietnam | Tuyệt Mật | Tối Mật | Mật | Phổ Biến Hạn Chế |
Original source: NISPOM Appendix B[19] ¹ In addition, Finland uses label Salassa pidettävä, “to be kept secret” for information that is not classified but must not be revealed on some other basis than national security. (E.g. privacy, trade secrets etc.)
[edit] Corporate classification
Private corporations often require written confidentiality agreements and conduct background checks on candidates for sensitive positions.[20] In the U.S. the Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibits private employers from requiring lie detector tests, but there are a few exceptions. Policies dictating methods for marking and safeguarding company-sensitive information (e.g. “IBM Confidential”) are common and some companies have more than one level. Such information is protected under trade secret laws. New product development teams are often sequestered and forbidden to share information about their efforts with un-cleared fellow employees, the original Apple Macintosh project being a famous example. Other activities, such as mergers and financial report preparation generally involve similar restrictions. However, corporate security generally lacks the elaborate hierarchical clearance and sensitivity structures and the harsh criminal sanctions that give government classification systems their particular tone.
[edit] Traffic Light Protocol
The Traffic Light Protocol[21][22] was developed by the G8 countries to enable the sharing of sensitive information between government agencies and corporations. This protocol has now been accepted as a model for trusted information exchange by over 30 other countries. The protocol provides for four “information sharing levels” for the handling of sensitive information.
[edit] See also
- Economic Espionage Act of 1996
- Espionage
- Espionage Act of 1917
- Freedom of information legislation
- Illegal number
- Official Secrets Act (UK, India, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand)
- Security of Information Act (Canada)
- State Secrets Privilege (US)
- Wassenaar Arrangement
- Wikileaks
[edit] References
- ^ http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/attack_sigint.pdf
- ^ Burn Before Reading, Stansfield Turner, 2006
- ^ Classified Information in Woodward’s “Obama’s Wars”, September 29, 2010, Jack Goldsmith, Lawfare, via stephenkim.org
- ^ Atomic Energy Commission’s Declassification Review of Reports on Human Experiments and the Public Relations and Legal Liability Consequences, presented as evidence during the 1994 ACHRE hearings.
- ^ http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/docs/guide_citoyen/en.pdf
- ^ http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/306652_CM6554.pdf
- ^ http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(689F2CCBD6DC263C912FB74B15BE8285)~Australian+Government+information+security+management+guidelines-+Australian+Government+Security+classification+system.pdf/$file/Australian+Government+information+security+management+guidelines-+Australian+Government+Security+classification+system.pdf
- ^ Security of Information Act[dead link]
- ^ Non-Insured Health Benefits Program Privacy Code[dead link]
- ^ Security Policy – Manager’s Handbook[dead link]
- ^ Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada[dead link]
- ^ Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, “Law on Guarding State Secrets” (中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法), promulgated 1988 and effective 1989.
- ^ a b Translation per Human Rights in China, State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth, (2007).
- ^ Article 413-9, Legifrance
- ^ [1][dead link]
- ^ LCQ3: Equal Opportunities Commission[dead link]
- ^ “[ARCHIVED CONTENT] Understanding the Security Policy Framework & frequently asked questions”. Cabinetoffice.gov.uk. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/spf/faqs.aspx. Retrieved 2012-06-01.
- ^ [2][dead link]
- ^ [3][dead link]
- ^ “Employment Background Checks: A Jobseeker’s Guide | Privacy Rights Clearinghouse”. Privacyrights.org. http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs16-bck.htm. Retrieved 2011-12-12.
- ^ http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/10/40761118.pdf
- ^ “‘Re: OpenSSH security advisory: cbc.adv’ – MARC”. Marc.info. http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=122754275122010&w=2. Retrieved 2011-12-12.
[edit] External links
- US “NISPOM” manual, explaining rules on classified information among other things – full title is “National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual”.
- Marking Classified National Security Information ISOO booklet PDF
- Defence Vetting Agency. Carries out national security checks in the UK.
- Los Alamos table of equivalent US and UK classifications
- The Black Vault – a database of more than a half million declassified pages on many different topics, all acquired through the FOIA
- The National Security Archive – a collection of declassified documents acquired through the FOIA
- Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth & K. Lee Lerner, eds. Terrorism: essential primary sources. Thomson Gale, 2006. ISBN 978-1-4144-0621-3 Library of Congress. Jefferson or Adams Bldg General or Area Studies Reading Rms LC Control Number: 2005024002.
- Peter Galison, Removing Knowledge in Critical Inquiry n°31 (Autumn 2004)
- Parlament of Serbia, Law on confidentiality of data. (Serbian)
- Parlament of Montenegro, Law on confidentiality of data. (Serbian)
- Christopher Moran, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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Scott Ritter
Scott Ritter
| Scott Ritter | |
|---|---|
 |
|
| Born | July 15, 1961(1961-07-15) Gainesville, Florida |
| Alma mater | Franklin and Marshall College |
| Occupation | United Nations weapons inspector (resigned) |
| Known for | Criticism on U.S. policy toward Iraq |
William Scott Ritter, Jr. (born July 15, 1961, Gainesville, Florida) is noted for his role as a chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, and later for his criticism of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Ritter publicly argued that Iraq possessed no significant weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). He became a popular anti-war figure and talk show commentator as a result of his stance. Since 2001 Ritter has been arrested and subsequently released twice on charges related to sexual exploitation of minors. A third incident is awaiting trial.
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[edit] Military background
Ritter was born into a military family in 1961. He graduated from Kaiserslautern American High School in 1979, and later from Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, with a Bachelor of Arts in the history of the Soviet Union and departmental honors. In 1980 he served in the U.S. Army as a Private. Then in May 1984 he was commissioned as an intelligence officer in the United States Marine Corps. He served in this capacity for about 12 years.[1] He initially served as the lead analyst for the Marine Corps Rapid Deployment Force concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq War. Ritter’s academic work focused on the Basmachi resistance movement in Soviet Central Asia during the 1920s and 1930s, specifically on the Basmachi commanders Fazail Maksum and Ibrahim Bek.[2][3] During Desert Storm, he served as a ballistic missile advisor to General Norman Schwarzkopf. Ritter later worked as a security and military consultant for the Fox News network.
[edit] Weapons inspector
Ritter served from 1991 to 1998 as a United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq in the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was charged with finding and destroying all weapons of mass destruction and WMD-related manufacturing capabilities in Iraq. He was chief inspector in fourteen of the more than thirty inspection missions in which he participated.
In January 1998, his inspection team in Iraq was blocked from some weapons sites by Iraqi officials making claims that information obtained from these sites would be used for future planning of attacks. UN Inspectors were then ordered out of Iraq by the United States Government, shortly before Operation Desert Fox attacks began in December 1998, using information which had been gathered for the purpose of disarmament to identify targets which would reduce Iraq’s ability to wage both conventional and possibly unconventional warfare. This action undermined the position of the UN Weapons Inspectors, who were thereafter denied access to Iraq. Shortly thereafter, he spoke on the Public Broadcasting Service show, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer :
I think the danger right now is that without effective inspections, without effective monitoring, Iraq can in a very short period of time measured in months, reconstitute chemical and biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons, and even certain aspects of their developing of nuclear weapons. program.[4]
When the United States and the UN Security Council failed to take action against Iraq for their ongoing failure to cooperate fully with inspectors (a breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1154), Ritter resigned from the United Nations Special Commission on August 26, 1998.[5]
In his letter of resignation, Ritter said the Security Council’s reaction to Iraq’s decision earlier that month to suspend co-operation with the inspection team made a mockery of the disarmament work. Ritter later said, in an interview, that he resigned from his role as a United Nations weapons inspector over inconsistencies between United Nations Security Council Resolution 1154 and how it was implemented.
The investigations had come to a standstill, were making no effective progress, and in order to make effective progress, we really needed the Security Council to step in a meaningful fashion and seek to enforce its resolutions that we’re not complying with.[4]
On September 3, 1998, several days after his resignation, Ritter testified before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services and the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and said that he resigned his position “out of frustration that the United Nations Security Council, and the United States as its most significant supporter, was failing to enforce the post-Gulf War resolutions designed to disarm Iraq.”[6]
[edit] Opinions on U.S. policy toward Iraq
Following his resignation from UNSCOM, Ritter continued to be an outspoken commentator on U.S. policy toward Iraq, particularly with respect to the WMD issue. He became a popular anti-war figure and talk show commentator.[1]
[edit] Commentary in the post-inspection period
Scott Ritter speaks at SUNY New Paltz on March 16, 2006.
In 1999, Ritter wrote Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem – Once and For All in which he reiterated his claim that Iraq had obstructed the work of inspectors and attempted to hide and preserve essential elements for restarting WMD programs at a later date. However, he also expressed frustration at alleged attempts by the CIA to infiltrate UNSCOM and use the inspectors as a means of gathering intelligence with which to pursue regime change in Iraq – a violation of the terms under which UNSCOM operated, and the very rationale the Iraqi government had given in restricting the inspector’s activities in 1998.
In the book’s conclusion, Ritter criticized the current U.S. policy of containment in the absence of inspections as inadequate to prevent Iraq’s re-acquisition of WMD’s in the long term. He also rejected the notion of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime by force. Instead, he advocated a policy of diplomatic engagement, leading to gradual normalization of international relations with Iraq in return for inspection-verified abandonment of their WMD programs and other objectionable policies.
Ritter again promoted a conciliatory approach toward Iraq in the 2000 documentary In Shifting Sands: The Truth About UNSCOM and the Disarming of Iraq, which he wrote and directed. The film tells the history of the UNSCOM investigations through interviews and video footage of inspection missions. In the film, Ritter argues that Iraq is a “defanged tiger” and that the inspections were successful in eliminating significant Iraqi WMD capabilities.[7] (For more see below under “Documentary”.)
[edit] Iraq War Predictions
Just after the coalition invasion of Iraq had been launched, but prior to troops arriving in Baghdad, BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair told parliament that the United States and the United Kingdom believed they had “sufficient forces” in Iraq. At that very time Ritter offered an opposing view on Portuguese radio station TSF: “The United States is going to leave Iraq with its tail between its legs, defeated. It is a war we can not win… We do not have the military means to take over Baghdad and for this reason I believe the defeat of the United States in this war is inevitable… Every time we confront Iraqi troops we may win some tactical battles, as we did for ten years in Vietnam, but we will not be able to win this war, which in my opinion is already lost,” Ritter added.[8]
U.S. forces swiftly took Baghdad, but characterizing the result as “winning the war” remains controversial. Shortly after the fall of Baghdad, Ritter appeared on the Sean Hannity show debating the validity of the invasion and his involvement in the Weapons Inspection program.
[edit] Commentary on Iraq’s lack of WMDs
Despite identifying himself as a Republican and having voted for George W. Bush in 2000,[9] by 2002 Ritter had become an outspoken critic of the Bush administration’s claims that Iraq possessed significant WMD stocks or manufacturing capabilities, the primary rationale given for the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. His views at that time are well summarized in War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You To KnowWilliam Rivers Pitt. In the interview, Ritter responds to the question of whether he believes Iraq has weapons of mass destruction: a 2002 publication which consists largely of an interview between Ritter and anti-war activist
There’s no doubt Iraq hasn’t fully complied with its disarmament obligations as set forth by the Security Council in its resolution. But on the other hand, since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capacity has been verifiably eliminated… We have to remember that this missing 5-10% doesn’t necessarily constitute a threat… It constitutes bits and pieces of a weapons program which in its totality doesn’t amount to much, but which is still prohibited… We can’t give Iraq a clean bill of health, therefore we can’t close the book on their weapons of mass destruction. But simultaneously, we can’t reasonably talk about Iraqi non-compliance as representing a de-facto retention of a prohibited capacity worthy of war. (page 28)
We eliminated the nuclear program, and for Iraq to have reconstituted it would require undertaking activities that would have been eminently detectable by intelligence services. (page 32)
If Iraq were producing [chemical] weapons today, we’d have proof, pure and simple. (page 37)
[A]s of December 1998 we had no evidence Iraq had retained biological weapons, nor that they were working on any. In fact, we had a lot of evidence to suggest Iraq was in compliance. (page 46)[10]
In the Pitt interview, Ritter also remarked on several examples of members of the Bush or Clinton administration making statements he “knew to be misleading or false” with regard to Iraqi WMD’s.
[edit] Later statements on Iraq
In February 2005, writing on Al Jazeera‘s website, Ritter wrote that the “Iraqi resistance” is a “genuine grassroots national liberation movement,” and “History will eventually depict as legitimate the efforts of the Iraqi resistance to destabilise and defeat the American occupation forces and their imposed Iraqi collaborationist government.”[11]
In an October 19, 2005 interview with Seymour Hersh, Ritter claimed that regime change, rather than disarmament, has been the primary objective of President George H. W. Bush, and later of President ClintonPresident Bush, in imposing and maintaining economic sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War. Said Ritter: and the second
The United States needed to find a vehicle to continue to contain Saddam because the CIA said all we have to do is wait six months and Saddam is going to collapse on his own volition. That vehicle is sanctions. They needed a justification; the justification was disarmament. They drafted a Chapter 7 resolution of the United Nations Security Council calling for the disarmament of Iraq and saying in Paragraph 14 that if Iraq complies, sanctions will be lifted. Within months of this resolution being passed–and the United States drafted and voted in favor of this resolution–within months, the President, George Herbert Walker Bush, and his Secretary of State, James Baker, are saying publicly, not privately, publicly that even if Iraq complies with its obligation to disarm, economic sanctions will be maintained until which time Saddam Hussein is removed from power.
That is proof positive that disarmament was only useful insofar as it contained through the maintenance of sanctions and facilitated regime change. It was never about disarmament, it was never about getting rid of weapons of mass destruction. It started with George Herbert Walker Bush, and it was a policy continued through eight years of the Clinton presidency, and then brought us to this current disastrous course of action under the current Bush Administration.[12]
In March 2007, in “Calling Out Idiot America,” Ritter posted a quiz on Iraq to be taken by citizens:
If the reader can fully answer the question raised, then he or she qualifies as one capable of pointing an accusatory finger at Congress as its members dither over what to do in Iraq. If the reader fails the quiz, then there should be an honest appraisal of the reality that we are in way over our heads regarding this war, and that it is irresponsible for anyone to make sweeping judgments about the ramifications of policy courses of action yet to be agreed upon. Claiming to be able to divine a solution to a problem improperly defined is not only ignorant but dangerously delusional.[13]
Ritter has also been harshly critical of Bill Clinton for politicizing the inspection process during his presidency and of Hillary Clinton for obfuscating that record.
From January 1993 until my resignation from the United Nations in August 1998, I witnessed first hand the duplicitous Iraq policies of the administration of Bill Clinton, the implementation of which saw a President lie to the American people about a threat he knew was hyped, lie to Congress about his support of a disarmament process his administration wanted nothing to do with, and lie to the world about American intent, which turned its back on the very multilateral embrace of diplomacy as reflected in the resolutions of the Security Council Hillary Clinton so piously refers to in her speech, and instead pursued a policy defined by the unilateral interests of the Clinton administration to remove Saddam Hussein from power.[14]
[edit] Opinions on US policy toward Iran
On February 18, 2005 Scott Ritter told an audience in Olympia, Washington that George Bush had signed-off on preparations to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities, and that these preparations would be completed by June 2005. On the same occasion, he also made reference to the Iraqi elections, saying that the United States had manipulated the 2005 parliamentary election, changing the percentage of United Iraqi Alliance[15] votes from 56% to 48%.
Ritter reiterated and clarified his statements about Iran in a March 30, article published by Al Jazeera.[16]
In a June 20, 2005, article published by Al Jazeera, after noting that the Iraq war, which supposedly began in March 2003, in fact began with military operations authorized by the president in late August 2002 and executed in September 2002, Ritter wrote: “The reality is that the US war with Iran has already begun.”[17]
On October 21, 2005, Ritter was interviewed by Amy Goodman of the radio and TV show “Democracy Now!” and commented on his earlier statements about U.S.A. policy toward Iran, as they had been reported by some sources.
I was very clear, based upon the information given to me, and it’s 100% accurate, that in October 2004, the President of the United States ordered the Pentagon to be prepared to launch military strikes against Iran as of June 2005. That means, have all the resources in place so that if the President orders it, the bombing can begin. It doesn’t mean that the bombing is going [to] begin in June. And a lot of people went, “Ah, you said they were going to attack in June.” Absolutely not.[18][19]
Although there were no air strikes against Iran by the United States in June 2005, there were bomb blasts in the southern west Iranian city of Ahwaz on June 12, 2005.[20] Some believe the attacks were carried out by the Mujahideen al-Khalq (MEK) organization. Scott Ritter as well as other sources have claimed that the United States, after the invasion of Iraq, have been working with Mojahedin-e-Khalq to continue covert operations in Iran.[21]
Ritter has also made the following two statements regarding military intervention in Iran[22]
The real purpose of the EU-3 intervention – to prevent the United States from using Iran’s nuclear ambition as an excuse for military intervention – is never discussed in public.
The EU-3 would rather continue to participate in fraudulent diplomacy rather than confront the hard truth – that it is the United States, and not Iran, that is operating outside international law when it comes to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme.
On February 6, 2006, in the James A. Little Theater in Santa Fe, Ritter stated about a U.S. war with Iran: “We just don’t know when, but it’s going to happen,” and said that after the U.N. security Council will have found no evidence of WMD, Bolton “will deliver a speech that has already been written. It says America cannot allow Iran to threaten the United States and we must unilaterally defend ourselves.”“How do I know this? I’ve talked to Bolton’s speechwriter,”[23] and continued
In an interview with Amy Goodman broadcast on Democracy Now! on October 16, 2006, Ritter again reaffirmed the U.S.’s state of undeclared war vis-à-vis Iran.[24]
Ritter published “Target Iran: The Truth About the White House’s Plans for Regime Change” in 2006.[25] One editorial review stated: “This book offers Ritter’s “national intelligence assessment” of the Iranian imbroglio. He examines the Bush administration’s regime-change policy and the potential of Iran to threaten U.S. national security interests.”
In his book Ritter claimed that Israel was pushing the Bush administration into war with Iran.[26] He also accused the U.S. pro-Israel lobby of dual loyalty and outright espionage.[27]
[edit] Documentary
According to the Washington Times, Ritter’s 2000 documentary In Shifting Sands was partially financed by Iraqi American businessman Shakir al Khafaji.[28] Al-Khafaji pled guilty to multiple felony charges in 2004 for his relationship with U.N. Oil-for-Food scandal.[29] Ritter denied any quid pro quo with Al-Khafaji, according to Laurie Mylroie, writing in the Financial Times. When Ritter was asked “how he would characterize anyone suggesting that Mr Khafaji was offering allocations in [his] name”, Mr Ritter replied: “I’d say that person’s a fucking liar…and tell him to come over here so I can kick his ass.”[30]
[edit] Arrests
Ritter was arrested in April 2001[31] and again in June 2001[32][33] in connection with police stings in which officers posed as under-aged girls to arrange meetings of a sexual nature. The first incident did not lead to any charges.[31] He was charged with a misdemeanor crime of “attempted endangerment of the welfare of a child” after the second, but charges were dropped and the record was sealed on condition that he avoid further trouble for a period of time.[31][34] News of the arrests became public after sealed court records were anonymously provided to the press. Ritter claimed that the timing of the leak was a politically motivated effort to distract attention from his statements about Iraq.[32][33][35]
Ritter was arrested again in November 2009[36] over communications with a police decoy he met on an Internet chat site. Police claim that he showed himself masturbating via a web camera after the officer said she was a 15-year-old girl; Ritter claims he was not made aware of the ostensible age of his correspondent before the act. The next month, Ritter waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was released on a $25,000 unsecured bail. Charges included “unlawful contact with a minor, criminal use of a communications facility, corruption of minors, indecent exposure, possessing instruments of crime, criminal attempt and criminal solicitation”.[37] Ritter is scheduled to face trial on these charges in September 2010.[38]
Powers and Principalities 