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Classified information [COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS)] The International Union

 
 

 

Classified information

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“Top Secret” redirects here. For other uses, see Top Secret (disambiguation).
“State secret” redirects here. For the 1950 British film, see State Secret.
This article is about information restricted by law or regulation. For the music album, see Unclassified (album). For the evidentiary rule, see State secrets privilege.

A typical classified document. Page 13 of a U.S. National Security Agency report[1] on the USS Liberty incident, partially declassified and released to the public in July 2004. The original overall classification of the page, “top secret”, and the Special Intelligence code word “umbra,” are shown at top and bottom. The classification of individual paragraphs and reference titles is shown in parentheses – there are six different levels on this page alone. Notations with leader lines at top and bottom cite statutory authority for not declassifying certain sections.

Classified information is a categorization applied to information that a government claims is sensitive information. Access is restricted by law or regulation to particular groups of persons. A formal security clearance is often required to handle classified documents or access classified data. The clearance process requires a satisfactory background investigation. There are typically several levels (classes) of sensitivity, with differing clearance requirements. This sort of hierarchical system of secrecy is used by virtually every national government. The act of assigning the level of sensitivity to data is called data classification. Although the root sense of the word “classified” is simply synonymous with “categorized“, it has developed a sense synonymous with “censored” in the context of classified information.

A distinction could be made between formal security classification and privacy markings such as “Commercial in confidence”.

Some corporations and non-government organizations also assign sensitive information to multiple levels of protection, either from a desire to protect trade secrets, or because of laws and regulations governing various matters such as personal privacy, sealed legal proceedings and the timing of financial information releases.

Contents

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[edit] Government classification

The purpose of classification is to protect information from being used to damage or endanger national security. Classification formalises what constitutes a “state secret” and accords different levels of protection based on the expected damage the information might cause in the wrong hands.

However, classified information is frequently ‘leaked’ to reporters by officials for political purposes. Several US presidents have leaked sensitive information to get their point across to the public.[2][3]

[edit] Classification levels

Although the classification systems vary from country to country, most have levels corresponding to the following British definitions (from the highest level to lowest)

[edit] Top Secret (TS)

The highest level of classification of material on a national level. Such material would cause “exceptionally grave damage” to national security if made publicly available.

[edit] Secret

“It is desired that no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse effect on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work field should be classified `secret’.”

April 17, 1947 Atomic Energy Commission memo from Colonel O.G. Haywood, Jr. to Dr. Fidler at the Oak Ridge Laboratory in Tennessee[4]

Such material would cause “serious damage” to national security if it were publicly available.

[edit] Confidential

Such material would cause “damage” or be “prejudicial” to national security if publicly available.

[edit] Restricted

Such material would cause “undesirable effects” if publicly available. Some countries do not have such a classification.

[edit] Unclassified

Technically not a classification level, but is used for government documents that do not have a classification listed above. Such documents can sometimes be viewed by those without security clearance.

There are a plethora of pseudo-classifications under this category. Please see the articles on Sensitive but unclassified and Controlled Unclassified Information for more information. Some government prosecutors have retro-actively changed unclassified information into classified information after charging someone with a crime; see the Thomas Andrews Drake case for example.

[edit] Clearance

Depending on the level of classification there are different rules controlling the level of clearance needed to view such information, and how it must be stored, transmitted, and destroyed. Additionally, access is restricted on a “need to know” basis. Simply possessing a clearance does not automatically authorize the individual to view all material classified at that level or below that level. The individual must present a legitimate “need to know” in addition to the proper level of clearance.

[edit] Compartmented information

In addition to the general risk-based classification levels above, often there are additional constraints on access, such as (in the U.S.) Special Intelligence (SI), which protects intelligence sources and methods, No Foreign dissemination (NOFORN), which restricts dissemination to U.S. nationals, and Originator Controlled dissemination (ORCON), which ensures that the originator can track possessors of the information. Documents in some compartments are marked with specific “code words” in addition to the classification level.

[edit] Nuclear information

See also: CNWDI

Government information about nuclear weapons such as nuclear warheads often has an additional marking to show it contains such information.

[edit] Sharing classified information between countries

When a government agency or group shares information between an agency or group of other country’s government they will generally employ a special classification scheme that both parties have previously agreed to honour.

For example the marking ATOMAL, is applied to U.S. RESTRICTED DATA or FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA and United Kingdom ATOMIC information that has been released to NATO. ATOMAL information is marked COSMIC TOP SECRET ATOMAL (CTSA), NATO SECRET ATOMAL (NSAT), or NATO CONFIDENTIAL ATOMAL (NCA).

In cases where a country wishes to share classified information bilaterally (or multilaterally) with a country that has a sharing agreement, the information is with the countries it can be shared with. Those countries would have to maintain the classification of the document at the level originally classified (TOP-SECRET, SECRET, etc.) with the appropriate caveat (USNZ, AUSGE, CANUK, etc.).

[edit] NATO classifications

For example, sensitive information shared amongst NATO allies has four levels of security classification; from most to least classified:

  1. COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS),
  2. NATO SECRET (NS),
  3. NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC), and
  4. NATO RESTRICTED (NR).

A special case exists with regard to NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NU) information. Documents with this marking is NATO property (copyright) and must not be made public without NATO permission. In general documents with this classification, aren’t cleared for internet-transmission either, unless clearly marked with RELEASABLE FOR INTERNET TRANSMISSION. Documents that can be made public however, should be clearly marked with NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

In addition to the above classification levels NATO operates with

  1. COSMIC TOP SECRET – A

This level is given to people who need to have access to the joined Atomic program of NATO. This level is never given permanently to anyone, regardless of jobtitle – e.g. President of the U.S.A. etc. It is only given for short periods of time, when needed.

[edit] International organisations

  • European Commission, has 5 levels, EU TOP SECRET, EU SECRET, EU CONFIDENTIAL, EU RESTRICTED, and EU COUNCIL / COMMISSION.[5] (Note that usually the French term is used)
  • OCCAR, a European defence organisation, has three levels of classification: OCCAR SECRET, OCCAR CONFIDENTIAL, OCCAR RESTRICTED.[6]

[edit] By country

Facsimile of the cover page from an East German operation manual for the M-125 Fialka cipher machine. The underlined classification markings can be translated as “Cryptologic material! Secret classified material” de:Verschlusssache.

Most countries employ some sort of classification system for certain government information. For example, in Canada, information that the U.S. would classify SBU (Sensitive but Unclassified) is called “protected” and further subcategorised into levels A, B, and C.

[edit] Australia

On 19 July 2011, the National Security (NS) classification marking scheme and the Non-National Security (NNS) classification marking scheme in Australia was unified into one structure.

The Australian Government Security Classification system now comprises TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and PROTECTED. A new dissemination limiting markers (DLMs) scheme was also introduced for information where disclosure may be limited or prohibited by legislation, or where it may otherwise require special handling. The DLM marking scheme comprises For Official Use Only (FOUO), Sensitive, Sensitive: Personal, Sensitive: Legal, and Sensitive Cabinet. [7]

Documents marked Sensitive Cabinet, relating to discussions in Federal Cabinet, are treated as PROTECTED at minimum due to its higher sensitivity.

Background checks for access to TOP SECRET material are carried out at either of two levels: at TOP SECRET NEGATIVE VETTING (TSNV), or at the more stringent and expensive TOP SECRET POSITIVE VETTING (TSPV) level, depending on the extent of required access to TOP SECRET material and on the potential damage to national security should such material be disclosed to unauthorised parties. Most background checks for access to TOP SECRET material are carried out at the TOP SECRET NEGATIVE VETTING level.

[edit] Brazil

In Brazil, a top secret (Ultrassecreto) government-issued document may be classified for a period of 25 years, which may be extended up to another 25 years. Thus, no document remains classified for more than 50 years. This is mandated by the 2011 Information Access Law (Lei de Acesso à Informação), a change from the previous rule, under which documents could have their classification time length renewed indefinitely, effectively shuttering state secrets from the public. The new law applies retroactively to existing documents.

[edit] Canada

Further information: Security Clearances in Canada
[edit] Background and hierarchy

There are 2 main type of sensitive information designation used by the Government of Canada: Classified and Designated. The access and protection of both types of information is governed by the Security of Information Act, effective December 24, 2001, replacing the Official Secrets Act 1981.[8] To access the information, a person must have the appropriate level of clearance and a Need to know.

[edit] Special operational information

SOI is not a classification of data per se. It is defined under the Security of Information Act, and unauthorised release of such information constitutes a higher breach of trust, with penalty of life imprisonment.

SOIs include:

  • military operations in respect of a potential, imminent or present armed conflict
  • the identity of confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada
  • tools used for information gathering or intelligence
  • the object of a covert investigation, or a covert collection of information or intelligence
  • the identity of any person who is under covert surveillance
  • encryption and cryptographic systems
  • information or intelligence to, or received from, a foreign entity or terrorist group
[edit] Classified information

Classified information can be designated Top Secret, Secret or Confidential. These classifications are only used on matters of national interest.

  • Top Secret: This applies when compromise might reasonably cause exceptionally grave injury to the national interest. The possible impact must be great, immediate and irreparable.
  • Secret: This applies when compromise might reasonably cause serious injury to the national interest.
  • Confidential: When disclosure might reasonably cause injury to the national interest.
[edit] Designated information

Designated information is not classified. Designated information pertains to any sensitive information that does not relate to national security and cannot be disclosed under the access and privacy legislation because of the possible injury to particular public or private interests.[9][10]

  • Protected C (Extremely Sensitive designated information): is used to protect extremely sensitive information if compromised, could reasonably be expected to cause extremely grave injury outside the national interest. Examples could include bankruptcy, identities of informants in criminal investigations, etc.
  • Protected B (Particularly Sensitive designated information): is used to protect information that could cause severe injury or damage to the people or group involved if it was released. Examples include medical records, annual personnel performance reviews, etc.
  • Protected A (Low-Sensitive designated information): is applied to low sensitivity information that should not be disclosed to the public without authorisation and could reasonably be expected to cause injury or embarrassment outside the national interest. Example of Protected A information could include employee number, pay deposit banking information, etc.

Federal Cabinet (Queen’s Privy Council for Canada) papers are either designated (i.e. overhead slides prepared to make presentations to Cabinet) or classified (draft legislations, certain memos).[11]

[edit] People’s Republic of China

A building in Wuhan housing provincial offices for dealing with foreign countries etc. The red slogan says, “Protection of national secrets is a duty of every citizen”

The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (which is not operative in the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao) makes it a crime to release a state secret. Regulation and enforcement is carried out by the National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets.

Under the 1989 “Law on Guarding State Secrets,”[12] state secrets are defined as those that concern:

  1. Major policy decisions on state affairs;
  2. The building of national defence and in the activities of the armed forces;
  3. Diplomatic activities and in activities related to foreign countries and those to be maintained as commitments to foreign countries;
  4. National economic and social development;
  5. Science and technology;
  6. Activities for preserving state security and the investigation of criminal offences; and
  7. Any other matters classified as “state secrets” by the national State Secrets Bureau.[13]

Secrets can be classified into one of three categories:

  • Top secret (绝密): Defined as “vital state secrets whose disclosure would cause extremely serious harm to state security and national interests”;
  • Highly secret (机密): Defined as “important state secrets whose disclosure would cause serious harm to state security and national interests”; and
  • Secret (秘密): Defined as “ordinary state secrets whose disclosure would cause harm to state security and national interests”.[13]

[edit] France

In France, classified information defined by article 413-9 of the Penal Code.[14] The three levels of military classification are

  • Confidentiel Défense (Confidential Defence): Information deemed potentially harmful to national defence, or that could lead to uncovering an information classified at a higher level of security.
  • Secret Défense (Secret Defence): Information deemed very harmful to national defence. Such information cannot be reproduced without authorisation from the emitting authority, except in exceptional emergencies.
  • Très Secret Défense (Very Secret Defence): Information deemed extremely harmful to national defence, and relative to governmental priorities in national defence. No service or organisation can elaborate, process, stock, transfer, display or destroy information or protected supports classified at this level without authorisation from the Prime Minister or the national secretary for National Defence. Partial or exhaustive reproduction is strictly forbidden.

Less sensitive information is “protected”. The levels are

  • Non Protégé (unprotected)
  • Diffusion restreinte administrateur (“administrative restricted information”)
  • Diffusion restreinte (“restricted information”)
  • Confidentiel personnels Sous-Officiers (“Confidential non-commissioned officers”)
  • Confidentiel personnels Officiers (“Confidential officers”)

A further mention, “spécial France” (reserved France) restricts the document to French citizens (in its entirety or by extracts). This is not a classification level.

Declassification of documents can be done by the Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale (CCSDN), an independent authority. Transfer of classified information is done with double envelopes, the outer layer being plastified and numbered, and the inner in strong paper. Reception of the document involves examination of the physical integrity of the container and registration of the document. In foreign countries, the document must be transferred through specialised military mail or diplomatic bag. Transport is done by an authorised convoyer or habilitated person for mail under 20 kg. The letter must bear a seal mentioning “PAR VALISE ACCOMPAGNEE-SACOCHE“. Once a year, ministers have an inventory of classified information and supports by competent authorities.

Once their usage period is expired, documents are transferred to archives, where they are either destroyed (by incineration, crushing or electrical overtension), or stored.

In case of unauthorized release of classified information, competent authorities are the Ministry of Interior, the Haut fonctionnaire de défense et de sécurité (“high civil servant for defence and security”) of the relevant ministry, and the General secretary for National Defence. Violation of such secrets is an offence punishable with 7 years of imprisonment and a 100 000 Euro fine; if the offence is committed by imprudence or negligence, the penalties are 3 years of imprisonment and a 45 000 Euro fine.

[edit] Hong Kong

The Security Bureau is responsible for developing policies in regards to the protection and handling of confidential government information. In general, the system used in Hong Kong is very similar to the UK system, developed from the Colonial Hong Kong era.

Four classifications exists in Hong Kong, from highest to lowest in sensitivity:[15]

  • Top Secret (高度機密)
  • Secret (機密)
  • Confidential (保密)
    • Temporary Confidential (臨時保密)
  • Restricted (限閱文件/內部文件)
    • Restricted (staff) (限閱文件(人事))
    • Restricted (tender) (限閱文件 (投標))
    • Restricted (administration) (限閱文件 (行政))

Restricted documents are not classified per se, but only those who have a need to know will have access to such information, in accordance with the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance.[16][dead link]

[edit] New Zealand

New Zealand uses the Restricted classification, which is lower than Confidential. People may be given access to Restricted information on the strength of an authorisation by their Head of Department, without being subjected to the background vetting associated with Confidential, Secret and Top Secret clearances. New Zealand’s security classifications and the national-harm requirements associated with their use are roughly similar to those of the United States.

In addition to national security classifications there are two additional security classifications, In Confidence and Sensitive, which are used to protect information of a policy and privacy nature. There are also a number of information markings used within ministries and departments of the government, to indicate, for example, that information should not be released outside the originating ministry.

Because of strict privacy requirements around personal information, personnel files are controlled in all parts of the public and private sectors. Information relating to the security vetting of an individual is usually classified at the In Confidence level.

[edit] Russian Federation

In the Russian Federation, a state secret (Государственная тайна) is information protected by the state on its military, foreign policy, economic, intelligence, counterintelligence, operational and investigative and other activities, dissemination of which could harm state security.

[edit] Sweden

The Swedish classification has been updated due to increased NATO/PfP co-operation. All classified defence documents will now have both a Swedish classification (Kvalificerat Hemlig or Hemlig), and an English classification (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential or Restricted).[citation needed]

[edit] United Kingdom

The United Kingdom currently uses five levels of classification — from lowest to highest, they are: PROTECT, RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET (formerly MOST SECRET). Those working with such material should have the relevant security clearance and often are required to sign to confirm their understanding and acceptance of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1989, although the Act applies in the same way regardless of signature. PROTECT is not in itself a security protective marking level (such as RESTRICTED or greater), but is used to indicate information which should not be disclosed because, for instance, the document contains tax, or national insurance or other personal information.

Government documents without a classification may be marked as UNCLASSIFIED or NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED.[17]

[edit] United States

The U.S. classification system is currently established under Executive Order 13292 and has three levels of classification — Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. The U.S. had a Restricted level during World War II but no longer does. U.S. regulations state that information received from other countries at the Restricted level should be handled as Confidential. A variety of markings are used for material that is not classified, but whose distribution is limited administratively or by other laws, e.g., For Official Use Only (FOUO), or Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides for the protection of information related to the design of nuclear weapons. The term “Restricted Data” is used to denote certain nuclear technology. Information about the storage, use or handling of nuclear material or weapons is marked “Formerly Restricted Data.” These designations are used in addition to level markings (Confidential, Secret and Top Secret). Information protected by the Atomic Energy Act is protected by law and information classified under the Executive Order is protected by Executive privilege.

[edit] Table of equivalent classification markings in various countries

(State) Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
Albania Teper Sekret Sekret Konfidencial I Kufizuar
Argentina Estrictamente Secreto y Confidencial Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Australia Top Secret Secret Confidential Protected
Austria Streng Geheim Geheim Vertraulich Eingeschränkt
Belgium (Dutch) Zeer Geheim Geheim Vertrouwelijk Beperkte Verspreiding
Belgium (French) Très Secret Secret Confidentiel Diffusion restreinte
Bolivia Supersecreto
or Muy Secreto
Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Bosnia Strogo Povjerljivo Tajno Konfidencialno Restiktirano
Brazil Ultra Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Bulgaria Строго секретно Секретно Поверително За служебно ползване
Cambodia Sam Ngat Bamphot Sam Ngat Roeung Art Kambang Ham Kom Psay
Canada Top Secret/Très secret Secret/Secret Confidential/Confidentiel Protected A, B or C / Protégé A, B ou C
Chile Secreto Secreto Reservado Reservado
China, People’s Republic of Juémì (绝密) Jīmì (机密) Mìmì (秘密) Nèibù (内部)
China, Republic of “Absolutely” Secret (絕對機密) “Extremely” Secret (極機密) Secret (機密) no direct equivalent
Colombia Ultrasecreto Secreto Confidencial Reserva del sumario
Costa Rica Alto Secreto Secreto Confidencial  
Croatia Vrlo tajno Tajno Povjerljivo Ograničeno
Czech Republic Přísně tajné Tajné Důvěrné Vyhrazené
Denmark Yderst Hemmeligt Hemmeligt Fortroligt Til Tjenestebrug
Foreign Service:
Fortroligt
(thin Black border)
Ecuador Secretisimo Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Egypt Sirriy lil-Ġāyah
سري للغاية
Sirriy Ǧiddan
سري جداً
Khāṣ
خاص
Maḥzūr
محظور
El Salvador Ultra Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Estonia Täiesti salajane Salajane Konfidentsiaalne Piiratud
Ethiopia Yemiaz Birtou Mistir Mistir Kilkil  
European Union (EU) TRES SECRET UE / EU TOP SECRET SECRET UE / EU SECRET CONFIDENTIEL UE / EU CONFIDENTIAL RESTREINT UE / EU RESTRICTED
European Union (Western) (WEU) FOCAL TOP SECRET WEU SECRET WEU CONFIDENTIAL WEU RESTRICTED
Euratom EURA TOP SECRET EURA SECRET EURA CONFIDENTIAL EURA RESTRICTED
Finland Erittäin salainen (TLL I) Salainen (TLL II) Luottamuksellinen (TLL III) Viranomaiskäyttö (TLL IV)
France Très secret défense Secret défense Confidentiel défense Diffusion restreinte
Germany Streng Geheim Geheim VS-Vertraulich VS-Nur für den Dienstgebrauch
Greece Άκρως Απόρρητον Απόρρητον Εμπιστευτικόν Περιορισμένης
Χρήσης
Guatemala Alto Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Haiti Top Secret Secret Confidential Reserve
Honduras Super Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Hong Kong Top Secret, 高度機密 Secret, 機密 Confidential, 保密 Restricted, 內部文件/限閱文件
Hungary Szigorúan Titkos Titkos Bizalmas Korlátozott Terjesztésű
India (Hindi) परम गुप्त (Param Gupt) गुप्त (Gupt) गोपनीय (Gopniya) प्रतिबंधित/सीमित (Pratibandhit/seemit)
India (English) Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
Indonesia Sangat Rahasia Rahasia Rahasia Dinas Terbatas
Iran Fararaz فَراراز Raz راز Sar-be-moher سـَر به مـُهر Sarbaste سَربسته
Iraq Sirriy lil-Ġāyah
سري للغاية
Sirriy
سري
Khāṣ
خاص
Maḥdūd
محدود
Iceland Algert Leyndarmál Leyndarmál Trúnaðarmál Þjónustuskjal
Ireland (Irish language) An-sicreideach Sicreideach Runda Srianta
Israel Sodi Beyoter
סודי ביותר
Sodi
סודי
Shamur
שמור
Mugbal
מוגבל
Italy Segretissimo Segreto Riservatissimo Riservato
Japan Kimitsu, 機密 Gokuhi, 極秘 Hi, 秘 Toriatsukaichuui, 取り扱い注意
Jordan Maktūm Ǧiddan
مكتوم جداً
Maktūm
مكتوم
Sirriy
سري
Maḥdūd
محدود
Korea, South I(Il)-Kup Bi Mil, 1급비밀 II(I)-Kup Bi Mil, 2급비밀 III(Sam)-Kup Bi Mil, 3급비밀 Dae Woi Bi, 대외비
Korea, North Unknown, 익명의 Unknown, 익명의 Unknown, 익명의 Unknown, 익명의
Laos Lup Sood Gnod Kuam Lup Kuam Lap Chum Kut Kon Arn
Latvia Sevišķi slepeni Slepeni Konfidenciāli Dienesta vajadzībām
Lebanon Tres Secret Secret Confidentiel  
Lithuania Visiškai Slaptai Slaptai Konfidencialiai Riboto Naudojimo
Malaysia Rahsia Besar Rahsia Sulit Terhad
Mexico Ultra Secreto Secreto Confidencial Restringido
Montenegro Strogo Tajno Tajno Povjerljivo Interno
Netherlands[18] STG. Zeer Geheim STG. Geheim STG. Confidentieel Departementaal Vertrouwelijk
New Zealand Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
Nicaragua Alto Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Norway STRENGT HEMMELIG HEMMELIG KONFIDENSIELT BEGRENSET
Pakistan (Urdu) Intahai Khufia Khufia Sigh-e-Raz Barai Mahdud Taqsim
Pakistan (English) Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
Paraguay Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Peru Estrictamente Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Philippines Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
Poland Ściśle tajne Tajne Poufne Zastrzeżone
Portugal Ultra Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Romania Strict Secret de Importanţă Deosebită Strict Secret Secret Secret de serviciu
Russia Особой важности
(вариант: Совершенно Секретно (Sovershenno Sekretno))
Совершенно секретно
(вариант: Секретно (Sekretno))
Секретно
(вариант: Не подлежит оглашению
(Конфиденциально) (Ne podlezhit oglasheniyu (Konfidentsial’no))
Для Служебного Пользования (ДСП)
(Dlya Sluzhebnogo Pol’zovaniya)
Saudi Arabia Saudi Top Secret Saudi Very Secret Saudi Secret Saudi Restricted
Serbia Latin: Državna tajna
Cyrillic: Државна тајна
Latin: Strogo poverljivo
Cyrillic: Строго поверљиво
Latin: Poverljivo
Cyrillic: Поверљивo
Latin: Interno
Cyrillic: Интерно
Singapore Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
Slovak Republic Prísne tajné Tajné Dôverné Vyhradené
Slovenija Strogo tajno Tajno Zaupno Interno
Spain Secreto Reservado Confidencial Difusión Limitada
Sweden Kvalificerat Hemlig (KH); Hemlig/Top Secret (H/TS) Hemlig (H); Hemlig/Secret H/S) Hemlig/Confidential (H/C) Hemlig/Restricted (H/R)
Switzerland   Geheim / Secret Vertraulich / Confidentiel Dienstlich / Interne au service
Tanzania (Swahili) SIRI KUU SIRI STIRI IMEZUILIWA
Thailand Lap thi sut (ลับที่สุด) Lap mak (ลับมาก) Lap (ลับ)
Turkey Çok Gizli Gizli Özel Hizmete Özel
South Africa (English) Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted
South Africa (Afrikaans) Uiters Geheim Geheim Vertroulik Beperk
Ukraine Особливої важливості Цілком таємно Таємно Для службового користування
United Kingdom TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED
United States Top Secret Secret Confidential For Official Use Only
Uruguay Ultra Secreto Secreto Confidencial Reservado
Vietnam Tuyệt Mật Tối Mật Mật Phổ Biến Hạn Chế

Original source: NISPOM Appendix B[19] ¹ In addition, Finland uses label Salassa pidettävä, “to be kept secret” for information that is not classified but must not be revealed on some other basis than national security. (E.g. privacy, trade secrets etc.)

[edit] Corporate classification

Private corporations often require written confidentiality agreements and conduct background checks on candidates for sensitive positions.[20] In the U.S. the Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibits private employers from requiring lie detector tests, but there are a few exceptions. Policies dictating methods for marking and safeguarding company-sensitive information (e.g. “IBM Confidential”) are common and some companies have more than one level. Such information is protected under trade secret laws. New product development teams are often sequestered and forbidden to share information about their efforts with un-cleared fellow employees, the original Apple Macintosh project being a famous example. Other activities, such as mergers and financial report preparation generally involve similar restrictions. However, corporate security generally lacks the elaborate hierarchical clearance and sensitivity structures and the harsh criminal sanctions that give government classification systems their particular tone.

[edit] Traffic Light Protocol

The Traffic Light Protocol[21][22] was developed by the G8 countries to enable the sharing of sensitive information between government agencies and corporations. This protocol has now been accepted as a model for trusted information exchange by over 30 other countries. The protocol provides for four “information sharing levels” for the handling of sensitive information.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/attack_sigint.pdf
  2. ^ Burn Before Reading, Stansfield Turner, 2006
  3. ^ Classified Information in Woodward’s “Obama’s Wars”, September 29, 2010, Jack Goldsmith, Lawfare, via stephenkim.org
  4. ^ Atomic Energy Commission’s Declassification Review of Reports on Human Experiments and the Public Relations and Legal Liability Consequences, presented as evidence during the 1994 ACHRE hearings.
  5. ^ http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/docs/guide_citoyen/en.pdf
  6. ^ http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/306652_CM6554.pdf
  7. ^ http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(689F2CCBD6DC263C912FB74B15BE8285)~Australian+Government+information+security+management+guidelines-+Australian+Government+Security+classification+system.pdf/$file/Australian+Government+information+security+management+guidelines-+Australian+Government+Security+classification+system.pdf
  8. ^ Security of Information Act[dead link]
  9. ^ Non-Insured Health Benefits Program Privacy Code[dead link]
  10. ^ Security Policy – Manager’s Handbook[dead link]
  11. ^ Confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada[dead link]
  12. ^ Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, “Law on Guarding State Secrets” (中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法), promulgated 1988 and effective 1989.
  13. ^ a b Translation per Human Rights in China, State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth, (2007).
  14. ^ Article 413-9, Legifrance
  15. ^ [1][dead link]
  16. ^ LCQ3: Equal Opportunities Commission[dead link]
  17. ^ “[ARCHIVED CONTENT] Understanding the Security Policy Framework & frequently asked questions”. Cabinetoffice.gov.uk. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/spf/faqs.aspx. Retrieved 2012-06-01. 
  18. ^ [2][dead link]
  19. ^ [3][dead link]
  20. ^ “Employment Background Checks: A Jobseeker’s Guide | Privacy Rights Clearinghouse”. Privacyrights.org. http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs16-bck.htm. Retrieved 2011-12-12. 
  21. ^ http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/10/40761118.pdf
  22. ^ “‘Re: OpenSSH security advisory: cbc.adv’ – MARC”. Marc.info. http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=122754275122010&w=2. Retrieved 2011-12-12. 

[edit] External links

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August 2, 2012 Posted by | Astronomy, Cosmic Top Secret. IAEA, Crimes against humanity, Deceiving the world, Department of Defense, Department of War, economics, Houston Space Center, IAEA, International Space Station, Johnson Space Center, Kolob, Militaries, Military, Monopoly, NATO, Outerspace, Scott Ritter, Space, Spaceflight, The Outer Space Treaty, UN, Universal declaration of human rights, War and Militarization, War crimes, War in heaven | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Causal theory of reference

Causal theory of reference

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A causal theory of reference is any of a family of views about how terms acquire specific referents. Such theories have been used to describe reference as regards all sorts of referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms. In the case of names, for example, a causal theory of reference will typically involve the following claims:

  • a name’s referent is fixed by an original act of naming (also called a “dubbing” or, by Saul Kripke, an “initial baptism”), whereupon the name becomes a rigid designator of that object.
  • later uses of the name succeed in referring to the referent by being linked to that original act via a causal chain.

Weaker versions of the position (perhaps not properly called “causal theories”), claim merely that, in many cases, events in the causal history of a speaker’s use of the term, including how s/he acquired it, must be taken into account to correctly assign references to his/her words.
Causal theories of names became popular during and after the 1970s, under the influence of work by Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan. Kripke and Hilary Putnam also defended an analogous causal account of natural kind terms, and work on causal theories has involved other areas of language as well.

Contents

[show]

[edit] Kripke’s causal account of names

In the lectures that were later published as Naming and Necessity, Kripke provided a rough outline of what a causal theory of reference for names would look like. Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory, he indicated that such an approach was far more promising than the then popular descriptive theory of names introduced by Russell, according to which names are in fact disguised definite descriptions. Kripke argued that in order to use a name successfully to refer to something , you do not have to be acquainted with a uniquely identifying description of that thing. Rather, your use of the name need only be caused (in an appropriate way) by the naming of that thing.
Such a causal process might proceed as follows: the parents of a newborn baby name it, pointing to the child and saying “we’ll call her ‘Jane’.” Henceforth everyone calls the little girl ‘Jane’. With that initial act, the parents give the girl her name. The assembled family and friends now know that ‘Jane’ is a name which refers to Jane. This is referred to as Jane’s dubbing, naming, or initial baptism.
However, not everyone who knows Jane and uses the name ‘Jane’ to refer to her was present at this naming. So how is it that when they use the name ‘Jane’, they are referring to Jane? The answer provided by causal theories is that there is a causal chain that passes from the original observers of Jane’s naming to everyone else who uses her name. For example, maybe Jill was not at the naming, but Jill learns about Jane, and learns that her name is ‘Jane’, from Jane’s mother, who was there. She then uses the name ‘Jane’ with the intention of referring to the child Jane’s mother referred to. Jill can now use the name, and her use of it can in turn transmit the ability to refer to Jane to other speakers.
Philosophers such as Gareth Evans have insisted that the th

eory’s account of the dubbing process needs to be broadened to include what are called ‘multiple groundings’. After her initial baptism, uses of ‘Jane’ in the presence of Jane may, under the right circumstances, be considered to further ground the name (‘Jane’) in its referent (Jane). That is, if I am in direct contact with Jane, the reference for my utterance of the name ‘Jane’ may be fixed not simply by a causal chain through people who had encountered her earlier (when she was first named); it may also be indexically fixed to Jane at the moment of my utterance. Thus our modern day use of a name such as ‘Christopher Columbus’ can be thought of as referring to Columbus through a causal chain that terminates not simply in one instance of his naming, but rather in a series of grounding uses of the name that occurred throughout his life. Under certain circumstances of confusion, this can lead to the alteration of a name’s referent (for one example of how this might happen, see Twin Earth thought experiment).

[edit] Motivation

Causal theories of reference were born partially in response to the widespread acceptance of Russellian descriptive theories. Russell found that certain logical contradictions could be avoided if names were considered disguised definite descriptions (a very similar view is often attributed to Frege, mostly on the strength of a footnoted comment in ‘On Sense and Reference’, although many Frege scholars consider this attribution misguided). On such an account, the name ‘Aristotle’ might be seen as meaning ‘the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great’. Later description theorists expanded upon this by suggesting that a name expressed not one particular description, but a great number of them (perhaps constituting all of ones essential knowledge of the individual named), or a weighted average of these descriptions.
Kripke found this account to be deeply flawed, for a number of reasons. Notably:

  • We can refer successfully to individuals about whom we know no uniquely identifying description. (For example, a speaker can talk about Phillie Sophik even if one only knows him as ‘some poet’.)
  • We can refer successfully to individuals about whom the only identifying descriptions we are acquainted with fail to refer as we believe them to. (Many speakers have no identifying beliefs about Christopher Columbus other than ‘the first European in North America’ or ‘the first person to believe that the earth was round’. Both of these beliefs are incorrect. Nevertheless, when such a person says ‘Christopher Columbus’, we acknowledge that they are referring to Christopher Columbus, not to whatever individual satisfies one of those descriptions.)
  • We use names to speak hypothetically about what could have happened to a person. A name functions as a rigid designator, while a definite description does not. (One could say ‘If Aristotle had died young, he would never have taught Alexander the Great.’ But if ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’ were a component of the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ then this would be nonsense.)

A causal theory avoids these difficulties. A name refers rigidly to the bearer to which it is causally connected, regardless of any particular facts about the bearer, and in all possible worlds.
The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms as well. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that ‘water’ refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call ‘water’, to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance with which we have no causal connection. These considerations represent some of the motivations for semantic externalism. Because speakers interact with a natural kind such as water regularly, and because there is generally no naming ceremony through which their names are formalized, the multiple groundings described above are even more essential to a causal account of natural kind terms. A speaker whose environment changes may thus have the referents of his terms shift, as described in the Twin Earth and Swamp man thought experiments.

[edit] Criticisms of the theory

  • Gareth Evans has argued that the causal theory, or at least certain common and over-simple variants of it, have the consequence that, however remote or obscure the causal connection between someone’s use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, they still refer to that object when they use the name. (Imagine a name briefly overheard in a train or café.) The theory effectively ignores context and makes reference into some magic trick. Evans describes it as a “photograph” theory of reference.
  • The links between different users of the name are particularly obscure. Each user must somehow pass the name on to the next, and must somehow “mean” the right individual as they do so (suppose “Socrates” is the name of a pet aardvark). Kripke himself notes the difficulty, John Searle makes much of it.
  • Mark Sainsbury has recently argued (Departing from Frege, Essay XII) for a causal theory similar to Kripke’s, except the baptised object is eliminated. A “baptism” may be a baptism of nothing, he argues: a name can be intelligibly introduced even if it names nothing (p. 212). The causal chain we associate with the use of proper names may begin merely with a “journalistic” source (p. 165).
  • The causal theory has a difficult time explaining the phenomenon of reference change. Gareth Evans cites the example of when Marco Polo unknowingly referred to the African Island as “Madagascar” when the natives actually used the term to refer to a part of the mainland. Evans claims that Polo clearly intended to use the term as the natives do, but somehow changed the meaning of the term “Madagascar” to refer to the island as it is known today. Michael Devitt claims that repeated groundings in an object can account for reference change. However, such

    a response leaves open the problem of cognitive significance that originally intrigued Bertrand Russell and Frege.

  • Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (2004) have studied the intuitions about reference used by Kripke to support the causal theory of reference. They have shown that East-Asians are more likely than Americans to have intuitions about reference in line with descriptivist theories of reference.

[edit] References

  • Donnellan, Keith. (1972) “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions.”
  • Evans, G. (1985) “The Causal Theory of Names”. in Martinich, A. P. ed. The Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
  • Evans, G. The Varieties of Reference, Oxford 1982
  • Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
  • Kripke, S. “A Puzzle about Belief”, 1979, in Martinich (ed) 1996, pp 382–409.
  • McDowell, John. (1977) “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name.”
  • Salmon, Nathan. (1981) Reference and Essence, Prometheus Books.
  • Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. P. 2004. Semantics, Cross-cultural Style. Cognition, 92, 3, B1-B12.
  • Sainsbury, R.M. “Sense without Reference” from Building on Frege, Newen, A., Nortmann,U., Stuhlmann Laisz, R., (eds.), Stanford 2001?
Categories: Names | Theories of language

January 10, 2012 Posted by | C, Deceivers of the world, Deceiving the world, info, ref, Uncategorized | , | Leave a comment

HIV AIDS History 1981

HIV AIDS History 1981

IV= 4

An alleged disease targeting undesirables.

Main article: Origin of AIDS

AIDS was first reported June 5, 1981, when the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recorded a cluster of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (now still classified as PCP but known to be caused by Pneumocystis jirovecii) in five homosexual men in Los Angeles.[156] In the beginning, the CDC did not have an official name for the disease, often referring to it by way of the diseases that were associated with it, for example, lymphadenopathy, the disease after which the discoverers of HIV originally named the virus. They also used Kaposi’s Sarcoma and Opportunistic Infections, the name by which a task force had been set up in 1981.[157]

In the general press, the term GRID, which stood for Gay-related immune deficiency, had been coined.[158] The CDC, in search of a name, and looking at the infected communities coined “the 4H disease,” as it seemed to single out Haitians, homosexuals, hemophiliacs, and heroin users.[159] However, after determining that AIDS was not isolated to the homosexual community,[157] the term GRID became misleading and AIDS was introduced at a meeting in July 1982.[160] By September 1982 the CDC started using the name AIDS, and properly defined the illness.[161]

The earliest known positive identification of the HIV virus comes from the Congo in 1959 and 1960 though genetic studies indicate that it passed into the human population from chimpanzees around fifty years earlier.[9] A recent study states that HIV probably moved from Africa to Haiti
and then entered the United States around 1969.

A more controversial theory known as the OPV AIDS hypothesis suggests that the AIDS epidemic was inadvertently started in the late 1950s in the Belgian Congo by Hilary Koprowski‘s research into a poliomyelitis
vaccine.[163][164] According to scientific consensus, this scenario is not supported by the available evidence.

 

 

September 12, 2010 Posted by | 1981, B, Bible, C, Cosmic Top Secret. IAEA, Crimes against humanity, Crimes against humanity, Deceiving the world, Symbols of Five, Symbols of six | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment