Causal theory of reference

Causal theory of reference

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A causal theory of reference is any of a family of views about how terms acquire specific referents. Such theories have been used to describe reference as regards all sorts of referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms. In the case of names, for example, a causal theory of reference will typically involve the following claims:

• a name’s referent is fixed by an original act of naming (also called a “dubbing” or, by Saul Kripke, an “initial baptism”), whereupon the name becomes a rigid designator of that object.
• later uses of the name succeed in referring to the referent by being linked to that original act via a causal chain.

Weaker versions of the position (perhaps not properly called “causal theories”), claim merely that, in many cases, events in the causal history of a speaker’s use of the term, including how s/he acquired it, must be taken into account to correctly assign references to his/her words.
Causal theories of names became popular during and after the 1970s, under the influence of work by Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan. Kripke and Hilary Putnam also defended an analogous causal account of natural kind terms, and work on causal theories has involved other areas of language as well.

Contents [show] 1 Kripke’s causal account of names 2 Motivation 3 Criticisms of the theory 4 References

[edit] Kripke’s causal account of names

In the lectures that were later published as Naming and Necessity, Kripke provided a rough outline of what a causal theory of reference for names would look like. Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory, he indicated that such an approach was far more promising than the then popular descriptive theory of names introduced by Russell, according to which names are in fact disguised definite descriptions. Kripke argued that in order to use a name successfully to refer to something , you do not have to be acquainted with a uniquely identifying description of that thing. Rather, your use of the name need only be caused (in an appropriate way) by the naming of that thing.
Such a causal process might proceed as follows: the parents of a newborn baby name it, pointing to the child and saying “we’ll call her ‘Jane’.” Henceforth everyone calls the little girl ‘Jane’. With that initial act, the parents give the girl her name. The assembled family and friends now know that ‘Jane’ is a name which refers to Jane. This is referred to as Jane’s dubbing, naming, or initial baptism.
However, not everyone who knows Jane and uses the name ‘Jane’ to refer to her was present at this naming. So how is it that when they use the name ‘Jane’, they are referring to Jane? The answer provided by causal theories is that there is a causal chain that passes from the original observers of Jane’s naming to everyone else who uses her name. For example, maybe Jill was not at the naming, but Jill learns about Jane, and learns that her name is ‘Jane’, from Jane’s mother, who was there. She then uses the name ‘Jane’ with the intention of referring to the child Jane’s mother referred to. Jill can now use the name, and her use of it can in turn transmit the ability to refer to Jane to other speakers.
Philosophers such as Gareth Evans have insisted that the th

eory’s account of the dubbing process needs to be broadened to include what are called ‘multiple groundings’. After her initial baptism, uses of ‘Jane’ in the presence of Jane may, under the right circumstances, be considered to further ground the name (‘Jane’) in its referent (Jane). That is, if I am in direct contact with Jane, the reference for my utterance of the name ‘Jane’ may be fixed not simply by a causal chain through people who had encountered her earlier (when she was first named); it may also be indexically fixed to Jane at the moment of my utterance. Thus our modern day use of a name such as ‘Christopher Columbus’ can be thought of as referring to Columbus through a causal chain that terminates not simply in one instance of his naming, but rather in a series of grounding uses of the name that occurred throughout his life. Under certain circumstances of confusion, this can lead to the alteration of a name’s referent (for one example of how this might happen, see Twin Earth thought experiment).

[edit] Motivation

Causal theories of reference were born partially in response to the widespread acceptance of Russellian descriptive theories. Russell found that certain logical contradictions could be avoided if names were considered disguised definite descriptions (a very similar view is often attributed to Frege, mostly on the strength of a footnoted comment in ‘On Sense and Reference’, although many Frege scholars consider this attribution misguided). On such an account, the name ‘Aristotle’ might be seen as meaning ‘the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great’. Later description theorists expanded upon this by suggesting that a name expressed not one particular description, but a great number of them (perhaps constituting all of ones essential knowledge of the individual named), or a weighted average of these descriptions.
Kripke found this account to be deeply flawed, for a number of reasons. Notably:

• We can refer successfully to individuals about whom we know no uniquely identifying description. (For example, a speaker can talk about Phillie Sophik even if one only knows him as ‘some poet’.)

• We can refer successfully to individuals about whom the only identifying descriptions we are acquainted with fail to refer as we believe them to. (Many speakers have no identifying beliefs about Christopher Columbus other than ‘the first European in North America’ or ‘the first person to believe that the earth was round’. Both of these beliefs are incorrect. Nevertheless, when such a person says ‘Christopher Columbus’, we acknowledge that they are referring to Christopher Columbus, not to whatever individual satisfies one of those descriptions.)

• We use names to speak hypothetically about what could have happened to a person. A name functions as a rigid designator, while a definite description does not. (One could say ‘If Aristotle had died young, he would never have taught Alexander the Great.’ But if ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’ were a component of the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ then this would be nonsense.)

A causal theory avoids these difficulties. A name refers rigidly to the bearer to which it is causally connected, regardless of any particular facts about the bearer, and in all possible worlds.
The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms as well. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that ‘water’ refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call ‘water’, to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance with which we have no causal connection. These considerations represent some of the motivations for semantic externalism. Because speakers interact with a natural kind such as water regularly, and because there is generally no naming ceremony through which their names are formalized, the multiple groundings described above are even more essential to a causal account of natural kind terms. A speaker whose environment changes may thus have the referents of his terms shift, as described in the Twin Earth and Swamp man thought experiments.

[edit] Criticisms of the theory

• Gareth Evans has argued that the causal theory, or at least certain common and over-simple variants of it, have the consequence that, however remote or obscure the causal connection between someone’s use of a proper name and the object it originally referred to, they still refer to that object when they use the name. (Imagine a name briefly overheard in a train or café.) The theory effectively ignores context and makes reference into some magic trick. Evans describes it as a “photograph” theory of reference.

• The links between different users of the name are particularly obscure. Each user must somehow pass the name on to the next, and must somehow “mean” the right individual as they do so (suppose “Socrates” is the name of a pet aardvark). Kripke himself notes the difficulty, John Searle makes much of it.

• Mark Sainsbury has recently argued (Departing from Frege, Essay XII) for a causal theory similar to Kripke’s, except the baptised object is eliminated. A “baptism” may be a baptism of nothing, he argues: a name can be intelligibly introduced even if it names nothing (p. 212). The causal chain we associate with the use of proper names may begin merely with a “journalistic” source (p. 165).

• The causal theory has a difficult time explaining the phenomenon of reference change. Gareth Evans cites the example of when Marco Polo unknowingly referred to the African Island as “Madagascar” when the natives actually used the term to refer to a part of the mainland. Evans claims that Polo clearly intended to use the term as the natives do, but somehow changed the meaning of the term “Madagascar” to refer to the island as it is known today. Michael Devitt claims that repeated groundings in an object can account for reference change. However, such

  a response leaves open the problem of cognitive significance that originally intrigued Bertrand Russell and Frege.

• Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (2004) have studied the intuitions about reference used by Kripke to support the causal theory of reference. They have shown that East-Asians are more likely than Americans to have intuitions about reference in line with descriptivist theories of reference.

[edit] References

• Donnellan, Keith. (1972) “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions.”
• Evans, G. (1985) “The Causal Theory of Names”. in Martinich, A. P. ed. The Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
• Evans, G. The Varieties of Reference, Oxford 1982
• Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Kripke, S. “A Puzzle about Belief”, 1979, in Martinich (ed) 1996, pp 382–409.
• McDowell, John. (1977) “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name.”
• Salmon, Nathan. (1981) Reference and Essence, Prometheus Books.
• Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. P. 2004. Semantics, Cross-cultural Style. Cognition, 92, 3, B1-B12.
• Sainsbury, R.M. “Sense without Reference” from Building on Frege, Newen, A., Nortmann,U., Stuhlmann Laisz, R., (eds.), Stanford 2001?

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Sharia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Not to be confused with Shahriyār.

This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. Its neutrality is disputed. Tagged since January 2010. Its neutrality or factuality may be compromised by weasel words. Tagged since April 2010. An editor has expressed concern that it is unbalanced. Tagged since April 2010. It may require general cleanup to meet Wikipedia’s quality standards. Tagged since May 2010.

Sharia (شريعة Šarīʿa; [ʃaˈriːʕa], “way” or “path”) is the sacred law of Islam. Muslims believe Sharia is derived from two primary sources, the divine revelations set forth in the Qur’an, and the sayings and example set by the Islamic Prophet Muhammad in the Sunnah. Fiqh, or “jurisprudence,” interprets and extends the application of Sharia to questions not directly addressed in the primary sources, by including secondary sources. These secondary sources usually include the consensus of the religious scholars embodied in ijma, and analogy from the Qur’an and Sunnah through qiyas. Shia jurists replace qiyas analogy with ‘aql, or “reason”.

All Muslims believe Sharia is God’s law, but they have differences among themselves as to exactly what it entails. Modernists, traditionalists and fundamentalists all hold different views of Sharia, as do adherents to different schools of Islamic thought and scholarship. Different countries and cultures have varying interpretations of Sharia as well.

Sharia deals with many topics addressed by secular law, including crime, politics and economics, as well as personal matters such as sexuality, hygiene, diet, prayer, and fasting. Where it enjoys official status, Sharia is applied by Islamic judges, or qadis. The imam has varying responsibilities depending on the interpretation of Sharia; while the term is commonly used to refer to the leader of communal prayers, the imam may also be a scholar, religious leader or political leader.

Introduction (or reintroduction) of Sharia is a longstanding goal for Islamist movements in Muslim countries. Some Muslim minorities in Asia (e.g. India) have attained institutional recognition of Sharia to adjudicate their personal and community affairs. In Western countries, where Muslim immigration is more recent, Muslim minorities have introduced Sharia family law, for use in their own disputes, with varying degrees of success (e.g. Britain’s Muslim Arbitration Tribunal). Attempts to impose Sharia have been accompanied by controversy, violence,
 and even warfare (cf. Second Sudanese Civil War).

Agent provocateur [Guantanamo Bay, Western, Islamic religion, radicalism, Heavens’s Gate cult]

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Agent provocateur

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

For other uses, see Agent provocateur (disambiguation).

Traditionally, an agent provocateur (plural: agents provocateurs, French for “inciting agent(s)”) is a person employed by the police or other entity to act undercover to entice or provoke another person to commit an illegal act. More generally, the term may refer to a person or group that seeks to discredit or harm another by provoking them to commit a wrong or rash action.
As a known tool to prevent infiltration by agents provocateurs,^[1] the organizers of large or controversial assemblies may deploy and coordinate demonstration marshals, also called stewards.^[2][3]

Contents [show] 1 Common usage 2 By country 2.1 United States 2.2 Europe 2.3 Middle East 2.4 Canada 3 See also 4 Notes 5 References

[edit] Common usage

An agent provocateur may be a police officer or a secret agent of police who encourages suspects to carry out a crime under conditions where evidence can be obtained; or who suggests the commission of a crime to another, in hopes they will go along with the suggestion and be convicted of the crime.
A political organization or government may use agents provocateurs against political opponents. The provocateurs try to incite the opponent to do counter-productive or ineffective acts to foster public disdain—or provide a pretext for aggression against the opponent (see Red-baiting).
Historically, labor spies, hired to infiltrate, monitor, disrupt, or subvert union activities, have used agent provocateur tactics.
Agent provocateur activities raise ethical and legal issues. In common law jurisdictions, the legal concept of entrapment may apply if the main impetus for the crime was the provocateur.

[edit] By country

[edit] United States

In the United States, the COINTELPRO program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had FBI agents pose as political radicals to disrupt the activities of radical political groups in the U.S., such as the Black Panthers, Ku Klux Klan, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.
New York City police officers were accused of acting as agents provocateurs during protests against the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City.^[4]
Denver police officers were also found to have used undercover detectives to instigate violence against police during the 2008 Democratic National Convention. This ultimately resulted in the accidental use of chemical agents against their own men.^[5]

[edit] Europe

Notorious were the activities of agents provocateurs against revolutionaries in Imperial Russia. Yevno Azef and Father Gapon are examples of such provocateurs.
Sir John Retcliffe was an agent provocateur for the Prussian secret police.
At the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, police and security services infiltrated black blocs with agents provocateurs. Allegations first surfaced after video footage in which “men in black were seen getting out of police vans near protest marches” ^[6][7]
Francesco Cossiga, former head of secret services and Head of state of Italy, advised the 2008 minister in charge of the police, on how to deal with the protests from teachers and students:^[8]

He should do what I did when I was Minister of the Interior. […] infiltrate the movement with agents provocateurs inclined to do anything […] And after that, with the strength of the gained population consent, […] beat them for blood and beat for blood also those teachers that incite them. Especially the teachers. Not the elderly, of course, but the girl teachers yes.

It is alleged by British Liberal Democrat MP Tom Brake that the Metropolitan Police made use of agents provocateurs during the G20 Protests in London.^[9]

[edit] Middle East

In 1956 the Mitla Pass incident took place: the officer on the field asked the HQ for permission to attack the pass several times, but his requests were denied. So he sent a small scout force, which was met with heavy fire, and used as motivation for the attack.
In 1982 the Sabra and Shatila massacre took place. Debate continues today regarding Israeli responsibility for the massacre. An independent commission chaired by Sean MacBride concluded that the Israeli authorities or forces were, directly or indirectly, responsible.^[10]

[edit] Canada

On August 20, 2007, three protesters in Montebello, Canada during meetings of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America were accused of being police provocateurs by Dave Coles, president of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The three masked protesters, one of whom was armed with a large rock, were asked to leave by protest organizers. After the three protesters breached the police line, they were brought to the ground, handcuffed, and taken away. The evidence that the arrested people were police provocateurs was circumstantial, including the fact that the protesters were wearing similar boots.
Although after the protest, the police force admitted that three of their officers disguised themselves as demonstrators, they denied provoking the crowd and instigate violence. The police released a news release in French where they stated “At no time did the police of the Sûreté du Québec act as instigators or commit criminal acts,” “It is not in the police force’s policies, nor in its strategies, to act in that manner.” “At all times, they responded within their mandate to keep order and security.” ^[11][12]

[edit] See also

Look up provocateur in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

• Entrapment
• Sting operation
• Informant
• Grant Bristow
• False flag terrorist actions
• Security culture
• Black Bloc
• COINTELPRO

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Stratfor (2004)
2. ^ Belyaeva et al. (2007), § 7-8, 156-162
3. ^ Bryan, Dominic The Anthropology of Ritual: Monitoring and Stewarding Demonstrations in Northern Ireland, Anthropology in Action, Volume 13, Numbers 1-2, January 2006, pp.22-31(10)
4. ^ Dwyer, Jim (December 22, 2005). “New York Police Covertly Join In at Protest Rallies”. The New York Times: p. A1. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60F14F83F540C718EDDAB0994DD404482. Retrieved 2006-09-22.
5. ^ Cardona, Felisa (November 7, 2008). “ACLU wants probe into police-staged DNC protest”. The Denver Post: p. A1. http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_10920817. Retrieved 2008-11-07.
6. ^ Rory Carroll, John Vidal, John Hooper, David Pallister and Owen Bowcott. Men in black behind chaos: Hardliners plan ‘actions’ away from main protesters. The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jul/23/globalisation.davidpallister Monday 23 July 2001.
7. ^ FAIR. Media Advisory: Media Missing New Evidence About Genoa Violence. http://www.fair.org/activism/genoa-update.html
8. ^ Francesco Cossiga interviewed by Andrea Cangini, Quotidiano Nazionale, 23/10/2008 Italian quote:
   

   “Maroni dovrebbe fare quel che feci io quand’ero ministro dell’Interno. In primo luogo, lasciare perdere gli studenti dei licei, perché pensi a cosa succederebbe se un ragazzino di dodici anni rimanesse ucciso o gravemente ferito. Gli universitari invece lasciarli fare. Ritirare le forze di polizia dalle strade e dalle università, infiltrare il movimento con agenti provocatori pronti a tutto, e lasciare che per una decina di giorni i manifestanti devastino i negozi, diano fuoco alle macchine e mettano a ferro e fuoco le città. Dopo di che, forti del consenso popolare, il suono delle sirene delle ambulanze dovrà sovrastare quello delle auto di polizia e carabinieri. Nel senso che le forze dell’ordine dovrebbero massacrare i manifestanti senza pietà e mandarli tutti in ospedale. Non arrestarli, che tanto poi i magistrati li rimetterebbero subito in libertà, ma picchiarli a sangue e picchiare a sangue anche quei docenti che li fomentano. Soprattutto i docenti. Non quelli anziani, certo, ma le maestre ragazzine sì.”

9. ^ Doward, Jamie; Townsend, Mark (May 10, 2009). “G20 police ‘used undercover men to incite crowds'”. The Guardian (London). http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/10/g20-policing-agent-provacateurs. Retrieved 2009-05-10.
10. ^ MacBride, Seán; A. K. Asmal, B. Bercusson, R. A. Falk, G. de la Pradelle, S. Wild (1983). Israel in Lebanon: The Report of International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. London: Ithaca Press. pp. 191–2. ISBN 0-903729-96-2.
11. ^ “Quebec police admit they went undercover at Montebello protest”. CBC News. August 23, 2007. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/08/23/police-montebello.html.
12. ^ “Police accused of using provocateurs at summit”. The Star (Toronto). August 21, 2007. http://www.thestar.com/News/article/248608. Retrieved April 23, 2010.

[edit] References

• Belyaeva et al. (2007) Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, published by OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Alternative version

Agent provocateurs [Guantanamo Bay, Western, Islamic religion, radicalism, Heavens’s Gate cult]

Agent provocateur

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

For other uses, see Agent provocateur (disambiguation).

Traditionally, an agent provocateur (plural: agents provocateurs, French for “inciting agent(s)”) is a person employed by the police or other entity to act undercover to entice or provoke another person to commit an illegal act. More generally, the term may refer to a person or group that seeks to discredit or harm another by provoking them to commit a wrong or rash action.
As a known tool to prevent infiltration by agents provocateurs,^[1] the organizers of large or controversial assemblies may deploy and coordinate demonstration marshals, also called stewards.^[2][3]

Contents [show] 1 Common usage 2 By country3 See also 2.1 United States 2.2 Europe 2.3 Middle East 2.4 Canada 4 Notes 5 References

[edit] Common usage

An agent provocateur may be a police officer or a secret agent of police who encourages suspects to carry out a crime under conditions where evidence can be obtained; or who suggests the commission of a crime to another, in hopes they will go along with the suggestion and be convicted of the crime.
A political organization or government may use agents provocateurs against political opponents. The provocateurs try to incite the opponent to do counter-productive or ineffective acts to foster public disdain—or provide a pretext for aggression against the opponent (see Red-baiting).
Historically, labor spies, hired to infiltrate, monitor, disrupt, or subvert union activities, have used agent provocateur tactics.
Agent provocateur activities raise ethical and legal issues. In common law jurisdictions, the legal concept of entrapment may apply if the main impetus for the crime was the provocateur.

[edit] By country

[edit] United States

In the United States, the COINTELPRO program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had FBI agents pose as political radicals to disrupt the activities of radical political groups in the U.S., such as the Black Panthers, Ku Klux Klan, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.
New York City police officers were accused of acting as agents provocateurs during protests against the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City.^[4]
Denver police officers were also found to have used undercover detectives to instigate violence against police during the 2008 Democratic National Convention. This ultimately resulted in the accidental use of chemical agents against their own men.^[5]

[edit] Europe

Notorious were the activities of agents provocateurs against revolutionaries in Imperial Russia. Yevno Azef and Father Gapon are examples of such provocateurs.
Sir John Retcliffe was an agent provocateur for the Prussian secret police.
At the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, police and security services infiltrated black blocs with agents provocateurs. Allegations first surfaced after video footage in which “men in black were seen getting out of police vans near protest marches” ^[6][7]
Francesco Cossiga, former head of secret services and Head of state of Italy, advised the 2008 minister in charge of the police, on how to deal with the protests from teachers and students:^[8]

He should do what I did when I was Minister of the Interior. […] infiltrate the movement with agents provocateurs inclined to do anything […] And after that, with the strength of the gained population consent, […] beat them for blood and beat for blood also those teachers that incite them. Especially the teachers. Not the elderly, of course, but the girl teachers yes.

It is alleged by British Liberal Democrat MP Tom Brake that the Metropolitan Police made use of agents provocateurs during the G20 Protests in London.^[9]

[edit] Middle East

In 1956 the Mitla Pass incident took place: the officer on the field asked the HQ for permission to attack the pass several times, but his requests were denied. So he sent a small scout force, which was met with heavy fire, and used as motivation for the attack.
In 1982 the Sabra and Shatila massacre took place. Debate continues today regarding Israeli responsibility for the massacre. An independent commission chaired by Sean MacBride concluded that the Israeli authorities or forces were, directly or indirectly, responsible.^[10]

[edit] Canada

On August 20, 2007, three protesters in Montebello, Canada during meetings of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America were accused of being police provocateurs by Dave Coles, president of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The three masked protesters, one of whom was armed with a large rock, were asked to leave by protest organizers. After the three protesters breached the police line, they were brought to the ground, handcuffed, and taken away. The evidence that the arrested people were police provocateurs was circumstantial, including the fact that the protesters were wearing similar boots.
Although after the protest, the police force admitted that three of their officers disguised themselves as demonstrators, they denied provoking the crowd and instigate violence. The police released a news release in French where they stated “At no time did the police of the Sûreté du Québec act as instigators or commit criminal acts,” “It is not in the police force’s policies, nor in its strategies, to act in that manner.” “At all times, they responded within their mandate to keep order and security.” ^[11][12]

[edit] See also

Look up provocateur in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

• Entrapment
• Sting operation
• Informant
• Grant Bristow
• False flag terrorist actions
• Security culture
• Black Bloc
• COINTELPRO

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Stratfor (2004)
2. ^ Belyaeva et al. (2007), § 7-8, 156-162
3. ^ Bryan, Dominic The Anthropology of Ritual: Monitoring and Stewarding Demonstrations in Northern Ireland, Anthropology in Action, Volume 13, Numbers 1-2, January 2006, pp.22-31(10)
4. ^ Dwyer, Jim (December 22, 2005). “New York Police Covertly Join In at Protest Rallies”. The New York Times: p. A1. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60F14F83F540C718EDDAB0994DD404482. Retrieved 2006-09-22.
5. ^ Cardona, Felisa (November 7, 2008). “ACLU wants probe into police-staged DNC protest”. The Denver Post: p. A1. http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_10920817. Retrieved 2008-11-07.
6. ^ Rory Carroll, John Vidal, John Hooper, David Pallister and Owen Bowcott. Men in black behind chaos: Hardliners plan ‘actions’ away from main protesters. The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jul/23/globalisation.davidpallister Monday 23 July 2001.
7. ^ FAIR. Media Advisory: Media Missing New Evidence About Genoa Violence. http://www.fair.org/activism/genoa-update.html
8. ^ Francesco Cossiga interviewed by Andrea Cangini, Quotidiano Nazionale, 23/10/2008 Italian quote:
   

   “Maroni dovrebbe fare quel che feci io quand’ero ministro dell’Interno. In primo luogo, lasciare perdere gli studenti dei licei, perché pensi a cosa succederebbe se un ragazzino di dodici anni rimanesse ucciso o gravemente ferito. Gli universitari invece lasciarli fare. Ritirare le forze di polizia dalle strade e dalle università, infiltrare il movimento con agenti provocatori pronti a tutto, e lasciare che per una decina di giorni i manifestanti devastino i negozi, diano fuoco alle macchine e mettano a ferro e fuoco le città. Dopo di che, forti del consenso popolare, il suono delle sirene delle ambulanze dovrà sovrastare quello delle auto di polizia e carabinieri. Nel senso che le forze dell’ordine dovrebbero massacrare i manifestanti senza pietà e mandarli tutti in ospedale. Non arrestarli, che tanto poi i magistrati li rimetterebbero subito in libertà, ma picchiarli a sangue e picchiare a sangue anche quei docenti che li fomentano. Soprattutto i docenti. Non quelli anziani, certo, ma le maestre ragazzine sì.”

9. ^ Doward, Jamie; Townsend, Mark (May 10, 2009). “G20 police ‘used undercover men to incite crowds'”. The Guardian (London). http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/may/10/g20-policing-agent-provacateurs. Retrieved 2009-05-10.
10. ^ MacBride, Seán; A. K. Asmal, B. Bercusson, R. A. Falk, G. de la Pradelle, S. Wild (1983). Israel in Lebanon: The Report of International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. London: Ithaca Press. pp. 191–2. ISBN 0-903729-96-2.
11. ^ “Quebec police admit they went undercover at Montebello protest”. CBC News. August 23, 2007. http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/08/23/police-montebello.html.
12. ^ “Police accused of using provocateurs at summit”. The Star (Toronto). August 21, 2007. http://www.thestar.com/News/article/248608. Retrieved April 23, 2010.

[edit] References

• Belyaeva et al. (2007) Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, published by OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Alternative version

False flag

False flag

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“False colors” redirects here. For the imaging technique, see False-color.

False flag operations are covert operations designed to deceive the public in such a way that the operations appear as though they are being carried out by other entities. The name is derived from the military concept of flying false colors; that is, flying the flag of a country other than one’s own. False flag operations are not limited to war and counter-insurgency operations, and can be used in peace-time.

Contents [show] 1 Naval warfare 2 Air warfare 3 Land warfare 4 As pretexts for war 5 Pseudo-operations 6 Espionage 7 Civilian usage 7.1 Businesses 7.2 Political campaigning 7.3 Ideological 8 Terrorism 9 Dirty War 10 See also 11 Notes

[edit] Naval warfare

This practice was considered acceptable in naval warfare, provided the false flag was lowered and the national flag raised before engaging in battle. Auxiliary cruisers operated in such a fashion in both World Wars, as did Q-ships, while merchant vessels were encouraged to use false flags for protection. One of the most notable examples was in World War II when the German commerce raider Kormoran, disguised as a Dutch merchant ship, surprised and sank the Australian light cruiser HMAS Sydney in 1941, causing the greatest recorded loss of life on an Australian warship. The Kormoran was also fatally crippled in that encounter and its crew was captured, but it was a considerable psychological victory for the Germans.^[1]
The British used a Kriegsmarine Ensign in the St Nazaire Raid and captured a German Morse code book. The old destroyer Campbeltown, which the British planned to sacrifice in the operation, was provided with cosmetic modifications, cutting the ship’s funnels and chamfering the edges to resemble a German Möwe-class destroyer. The British were able to get within two miles of the harbour before the defences responded, where the explosive-rigged Campbeltown and commandos successfully disabled or destroyed the key dock structures of the port.^[2][3]

[edit] Air warfare

“	It was obvious that if the case were to be kept going a faked act of sabotage would have to be committed	”
— MI5 file on Mutt and Jeff[4]

In December 1922-February 1923, Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, drafted by a commission of jurists at the Hague regulates:
Art. 3. A military aircraft must carry an exterior mark indicating its nationality and its military character.
Art. 19. The use of false exterior marks is forbidden.
British intelligence officials in World War II allowed double agents to fire-bomb a power station and a food dump in the UK to protect their cover, according to declassified documents. The documents stated the agents took precautions to ensure they did not cause serious damage. One of the documents released also stated: “It should be recognised that friends as well as enemies must be completely deceived.”^[4]

[edit] Land warfare

In land warfare, the use of a false flag is similar to that of naval warfare. The most widespread assumption is that this practice was first established under international humanitarian law at the trial in 1947 of the planner and commander of Operation Greif, Otto Skorzeny, by the military court at the Dachau Trials. In this trial, the court did not find Skorzeny guilty of a crime by ordering his men into action in American uniforms. He had passed on to his men the warning of German legal experts, that if they fought in American uniforms, they would be breaking the laws of war, but they probably were not doing so just by wearing the uniform. During the trial, a number of arguments were advanced to substantiate this position and the German and U.S. military seem to have been in agreement on it. In the transcript of the trial^[5] it is mentioned that Paragraph 43 of the Field Manual published by the War Department, United States Army, on October 1, 1940, under the title “Rules of Land Warfare”, says:

“National flags, insignias and uniforms as a ruse – in practice it has been authorized to make use of these as a ruse. The foregoing rule (Article 23 of the Annex of the IVth Hague Convention), does not prohibit such use, but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to make use of them during a combat. Before opening fire upon the enemy, they must be discarded”.

Also The American Soldiers’ Handbook, was quoted by Defense Counsel and says:

“The use of the enemy flag, insignia, and uniform is permitted under some circumstances. They are not to be used during actual fighting, and if used in order to approach the enemy without drawing fire, should be thrown away or removed as soon as fighting begins”.

The outcome of the trial has been codified in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I):
Article 37.-Prohibition of perfidy

1. It is prohibited to kill, injure, or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy:

(a) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;

(b) The feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;

(c) The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and

(d) The feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.

2. Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.

Article 38.-Recognized emblems

1. It is prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other emblems, signs or signals provided for by the Conventions or by this Protocol. It is also prohibited to misuse deliberately in an armed conflict other internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals, including the flag of truce, and the protective emblem of cultural property.

2. It is prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as authorized by that Organization.

Article 39.-Emblems of nationality

1. It is prohibited to make use in an armed conflict of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.

2. It is prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations.

3. Nothing in this Article or in Article 37, paragraph 1 ( d ), shall affect the existing generally recognized rules of international law applicable to espionage or to the use of flags in the conduct of armed conflict at sea.

[edit] As pretexts for war

In the 1931 Mukden incident
, Japanese officers fabricated a pretext for annexing Manchuria by blowing up a section of railway. Six years later they falsely claimed the kidnapping of one of their soldiers in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as an excuse to invade China proper.
In the Gleiwitz incident in August 1939, Reinhard Heydrich made use of fabricated evidence of a Polish attack against Germany to mobilize German public opinion and to fabricate a false justification for a war with Poland. This, along with other false flag operations in Operation Himmler, would be used to mobilize support from the German population for the start of World War II in Europe.
On November 26, 1939, the Soviet Union shelled the Russian village of Mainila near the Finnish border. The Soviet Union attacked Finland four days afterwards, claiming the shelling to have been a Finnish military action. Russia subsequently agreed that the attack was initiated by the Soviets.^[6] Also, the nearest Finnish artillery pieces were well out of range of Mainila.^[7]
In 1953, the U.S. and British-orchestrated Operation Ajax used “false-flag” and propaganda operations against the formerly democratically elected leader of Iran, Mohammed Mosaddeq. Information regarding the CIA-sponsored coup d’etat has been largely declassified and is available in the CIA archives.^[8]
In 1954, the Military Intelligence Directorate of Israel launched a series of bombings against targets in Cairo which had British and American financial interests, in the hopes of alienating the U.S. and Britain from Egypt.^[9] Codenamed Operation Suzannah, it was later dubbed the Lavon Affair, after Israeli Defense Minister Pinchas Lavon. Lavon and Israeli Military Intelligence head Binyamin Gibli had planned and carried out the operation in secret, and without telling Prime Minister Moshe Sharett in advance. Lavon and Gibli both lost their jobs as a result. Israel (where it is known as “The Unfortunate Affair”) finally admitted responsibility in 2005.^[10]
The planned, but never executed, 1962 Operation Northwoods plot by the U.S. Department of Defense for a war with Cuba involved scenarios such as hijacking or shooting down passenger and military planes, sinking a U.S. ship in the vicinity of Cuba, burning crops, sinking a boat filled with Cuban refugees, attacks by alleged Cuban infiltrators inside the United States, and harassment of U.S. aircraft and shipping and the destruction of aerial drones by aircraft disguised as Cuban MiGs. These actions would be blamed on Cuba, and would be a pretext for an invasion of Cuba and the overthrow of Fidel Castro‘s communist government. It was authored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nixed by John F. Kennedy, came to light through the Freedom of Information Act and was publicized by James Bamford.
Former GRU officer Aleksey Galkin,^[11] former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko^[12] and others have stated that the 1999 Russian apartment bombings that precipitated the Second Chechen War were false flag operations perpetrated by the FSB. Galkin has since recanted his accusation, which was made while prisoner of Chechen rebels.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Pseudo-operations

Pseudo-operations are those in which forces of one power disguise themselves as enemy forces. For example, a state power may disguise teams of operatives as insurgents and, with the aid of defectors, infiltrate insurgent areas.^[13] The aim of such pseudo-operations may be to gather short or long-term intelligence or to engage in active operations, in particular assassinations of important enemies. However, they usually involve both, as the risks of exposure rapidly increase with time and intelligence gathering eventually leads to violent confrontation. Pseudo-operations may be directed by military or police forces, or both. Police forces are usually best suited to intelligence tasks; however, military provide the structure needed to back up such pseudo-ops with military response forces. According to US military expert Lawrence Cline (2005), “the teams typically have been controlled by police services, but this largely was due to the weaknesses in the respective military intelligence systems.”
The State Political Directorate (OGPU) of the Soviet Union set up such an operation from 1921 to 1926. During Operation Trust, they used loose networks of White Army supporters and extended them, creating the pseudo-“Monarchist Union of Central Russia” (MUCR) in order to help the OGPU identify real monarchists and anti-Bolsheviks. An example of a successful assassination was United States Marine Sergeant Herman H. Hanneken leading a patrol of his Haitian Gendarmerie disguised as enemy guerrillas in 1919. The Patrol successfully passed several enemy checkpoints in order to assassinate the guerilla leader Charlemagne Péralte near Grand-Rivière du Nord. Hanneken was awarded the Medal of Honor and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant for his deed.
During the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s, captured Mau Mau members who switched sides and specially trained British troops initiated the pseudo-gang concept to successfully counter Mau Mau terrorists. In 1960 Frank Kitson, (who was later involved in the Northern Irish conflict and is now a retired British General), published Gangs and Counter-gangs, an account of his experiences with the technique in Kenya; information included how to counter gangs and measures of deception, including the use of defectors, which brought the issue a wider audience.
Another example of combined police and military oversight of pseudo-operations include the Selous Scouts in former country Rhodesia (current Zimbabwe), governed by white minority rule until 1980. The Selous Scouts were formed at the beginning of Operation Hurricane, in November 1973, by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Ronald Reid-Daly. As all Special Forces in Rhodesia, by 1977 they were controlled by COMOPS (Commander, Combined Operations) Commander Lieutenant General Peter Walls. The Selous Scouts were originally composed of 120 members, with all officers being white and the highest rank initially available for Africans being colour sergeant. They succeeded in turning approximately 800 insurgents who were then paid by Special Branch, ultimately reaching the number of 1,500 members. Engaging mainly in long-range reconnaissance and surveillance missions, they increasingly turned to offensive actions, including the attempted assassination of ZIPRA leader Joshua Nkomo in Zambia. This mission was finally aborted by the Selous Scouts, and attempted again, unsuccessfully, by the Rhodesian Special Air Service.^[14]
Some offensive operations attracted international condemnation, in particular the Selous Scouts’ raid on a ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe, Mozambique in August 1976. ZANLA was then led by Josiah Tongogara. Using Rhodesian trucks and armored cars disguised as Mozambique military vehicles, 84 scouts killed 1,284 terrorists in the camp, the camp was registered as a refugee camp by the United Nations (UN). Even according to Reid-Daly, most of those killed were unarmed guerrillas standing in formation for a parade. The camp hospital was also set ablaze by the rounds fired by the Scouts, killing all patients.^[15] According to David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, who visited the camp shortly before the raid, it was only a refugee camp which did not host any guerrillas. Which was staged for UN approval.^[16]
According to a 1978 study by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, 68% of all insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia could be attributed to the Selous Scouts, who were disbanded in 1980.^[17]
If the action is a police action, then these tactics would fall within the laws of the state initiating the pseudo, but if such actions are taken in a civil war or during a belligerent military occupation then those who participate in such actions would not be privileged belligerents. The principle of plausible deniability is usually applied for pseudo-teams. (See the above section Laws of war). Some false flag operations have been described by Lawrence E. Cline, a retired US Army intelligence officer, as pseudo-operations, or “the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled areas.”
Pseudo Operations should be distinguished, notes Cline, from the more common police or intelligence infiltration of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In the latter case, infiltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo teams, on the other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually military or paramilitary. The use of pseudo teams has been a hallmark of a number of foreign counterinsurgency campaigns.”^[13]

[edit] Espionage

See false flag penetrator.

In espionage the term “false flag” describes the recruiting of agents by operatives posing as representatives of a cause the prospective agents are sympathetic to, or even the agents’ own government. For example, during the Cold War, several female West German civil servants were tricked into stealing classified documents by agents of the East German Stasi intelligence service, pretending to be members of West German peace advocacy groups (the Stasi agents were also described as “Romeos,” indicating that they also used their sex appeal to manipulate their targets, making this operation a combination of the false flag and “honey trap” techniques).^[18]
The technique can also be used to expose enemy agents in one’s own service, by having someone approach the suspect and pose as an agent of the enemy. Earl Edwin Pitts, a 13-year veteran of the FBI and an attorney, was caught when he was approached by FBI agents posing as Russian agents.
Frederick Forsyth described the technique in his novel The Fourth Protocol, in which a fiercely anti-communist British civil servant passes military secrets to a South African diplomat who is in fact a Russian agent.
“False Flag” is also the title of a first season episode of the TV series Burn Notice. In that episode, a female assassin (Lucy Lawless) tricks Michael Westen (Jeffrey Donovan) into leading her to her target, by posing as the man’s innocent and abused ex-wife, trying to reclaim her kidnapped son.

[edit] Civilian usage

While false flag operations originate in warfare and government, they also can occur in civilian settings among certain factions, such as businesses, special interest groups, religions, political ideologies and campaigns for office.

[edit] Businesses

In business and marketing, similar operations are being employed in some public relations campaigns (see Astroturfing). Telemarketing firms practice false flag type behavior when they pretend to be a market research firm (referr
ed to as “sugging“). In some rare cases, members of an unsuccessful business will destroy some of their own property to conceal an unrelated crime (e.g. safety violations, embezzlement, etc.) but make it appear as though the destruction was done by a rival company.

[edit] Political campaigning

Political campaigning has a long history of this tactic in various forms, including in person, print media and electronically in recent years. This can involve when supporters of one candidate pose as supporters of another, or act as “straw men” for their preferred candidate to debate against. This can happen with or without the candidate’s knowledge. The Canuck letter is an example of one candidate creating a false document and attributing it as coming from another candidate in order to discredit that candidate.
In 2006, individuals practicing false flag behavior were discovered and “outed” in New Hampshire^[19][20] and New Jersey^[21] after blog comments claiming to be from supporters of a political candidate were traced to the IP address of paid staffers for that candidate’s opponent.

[edit] Ideological

Political or religious ideologies will sometimes use false flag tactics. This can be done to discredit or implicate rival groups, create the appearance of enemies when none exist, or create the illusion of organized and directed opposition when in truth, the ideology is simply unpopular with society.

A bomb threat forged by Scientology operatives

In retaliation for writing The Scandal of Scientology, the Church of Scientology stole stationery from author Paulette Cooper‘s home and then used that stationery to forge bomb threats and have them mailed to a Scientology office. The Guardian’s Office also had a plan for further operations to discredit Cooper known as Operation Freakout, but several Scientology operatives were arrested in a separate investigation and the plan failed.^[22]

[edit] Terrorism

False flag tactics were also employed during the Algerian civil war, starting in the mid-1994. Death squads composed of DRS (Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité) security forces disguised themselves as Islamist terrorists and committed false flag terror attacks. Such groups included the OJAL (Organisation of Young Free Algerians) or the OSSRA (Secret Organisation for the safeguard of the Algerian Republic)^[23] According to Roger Faligot and Pascal Kropp (1999), the OJAL reminded of “the Organization of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counter-terrorists created in December 1956 by the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate) whose mission was to carry out terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise.” ^[24]
On the night of February 27, 1933, the Reichstag building was set on fire. At the urging of Hitler, Hindenburg responded the next day by issuing an emergency decree “for the Protection of the people and the State,” which stated: “Restrictions on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press; on the rights of assembly and association; and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications and warrants for house searches, orders for confiscations as well as restrictions on property, are also permissible beyond the legal limits otherwise prescribed.” The question of who actually started the Reichstag fire is still unknown and occasionally debated.
The Russian apartment bombings in the Russian cities of Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September 1999 which killed nearly 300 people, is described by Yury Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, David Satter, Boris Kagarlitsky, Vladimir Pribylovsky, Anna Politkovskaya, filmmaker Andrei Nekrasov, investigator Mikhail Trepashkin, as well as the secessionist Chechen authorities and former popular Russian politician Alexander Lebed as a false flag attack coordinated by the Federal Security Service, the main domestic security agency of the Russian Federation.^{[25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35]}

[edit] Dirty War

Main article: Dirty War

During a 1981 interview whose contents were revealed by documents declassified by the CIA in 2000, former CIA and DINA agent Michael Townley explained that Ignacio Novo Sampol, member of CORU, an anti-Castro organization, had agreed to commit the Cuban Nationalist Movement in the kidnapping, in Buenos Aires, of a president of a Dutch bank. The abduction, organized by civilian SIDE agents, the Argentine intelligence agency, was to obtain a ransom. Townley said that Novo Sampol had provided six thousand dollars from the Cuban Nationalist Movement, forwarded to the civilian SIDE agents to pay for the preparation expenses of the kidnapping. After returning to the US, Novo Sampol sent Townley a stock of paper, used to print pamphlets in the name of “Grupo Rojo” (Red Group), an imaginary Argentine Marxist terrorist organization, which was to claim credit for the kidnapping of the Dutch banker. Townley declared that the pamphlets were distributed in Mendoza and Córdoba in relation with false flag bombings perpetrated by SIDE agents, which had as their aim to accredit the existence of the fake Grupo Rojo. However, the SIDE agents procrastinated too much, and the kidnapping ultimately was not carried out.[36

Espionage [including space and religion]

Espionage

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“Spy” and “Secret agent” redirect here. For other uses, see Spy (disambiguation) and Secret agent (disambiguation).

For other uses, see Espionage (disambiguation).

Espionage or spying involves an individual obtaining information that is considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information. Espionage is inherently clandestine, lest the legitimate holder of the information change plans or take other countermeasures once it is known that the information is in unauthorized hands.
Espionage is usually part of an institutional effort by a government or corporation, and the term is most readily associated with state spying on potential or actual enemies, primarily for military purposes. Spying involving corporations is known as industrial espionage. Government surveillance of civil society groups, social movements, and individuals involved in political activism, such as COINTELPRO conducted by the FBI, is not covered by the present article.
See clandestine HUMINT for the basic concepts of such information collection, and subordinate articles such as clandestine HUMINT operational techniques and clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting for discussions of the “tradecraft” used to collect this information.

Contents [show] 1 History 2 Targets of espionage 3 Methods and terminology 3.1 Organization 3.2 Industrial espionage 4 Agents in Espionage 5 Risks 6 Spies in various conflicts 6.1 Espionage under Elizabeth I of England 6.2 Espionage in the American Revolution 6.3 Espionage in the Napoleonic Wars 6.4 Espionage in the American Civil War 6.5 Espionage in the Second Boer War 6.6 Espionage in World War I 6.7 Espionage in World War II 6.8 Espionage post World War II 7 Espionage technology and techniques 8 Spy fiction 9 See also 10 Further reading 10.1 Surveys 10.2 World War I 10.3 World War II: 1931–1945 10.4 Cold War era: 1945–1991 10.5 Post Cold War era: 1992–present day 11 References 12 External links

[edit] History

Incidents of espionage are well documented throughout history. The ancient writings of Chinese and Indian military strategists such as Sun-Tzu and Chanakya contain information on deception and subversion. Chanakya’s student Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Maurya Empire in India, made use of assassinations, spies and secret agents, which are described in Chanakya’s Arthasastra. The ancient Egyptians had a thoroughly developed system for the acquisition of intelligence, and the Hebrews used spies as well, as in the story of Rahab. Spies were also prevalent in the Greek and Roman empires.^[1] During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongols relied heavily on espionage in their conquests in Asia and Europe. Feudal Japan often used ninja to gather intelligence. More recently, spies played a significant part in Elizabethan England (see Francis Walsingham). Many modern espionage methods were well established even then.^[2]
The Cold War involved intense espionage activity between the United States of America and its allies and the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and their allies, particularly related to nuclear weapons secrets. Recently, espionage agencies have targeted the illegal drug trade and those considered to be terrorists.
Different intelligence services value certain intelligence collection techniques over others. The former Soviet Union, for example, preferred human sources over research in open sources, while the United States has tended to emphasize technological methods such as SIGINT and IMINT. Both Soviet political (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU^[3]) officers were judged by the number of agents they recruited.

[edit] Targets of espionage

Espionage agents are usually trained expertsin a specific targeted field. This allows them to differentiate mundane information from a target which has intrinsic value to own organisational development. Correct identification of the target at its execution is the sole purpose of the espionage operation.

The broad areas of espionage targeting expertise are:

• Natural resource strategic production identification and assessment (food, energy, materials)

Agents are usually found among bureaucrats that administer these resources in own countries

• Popular sentiment towards domestic and foreign policies (popular, middle class, elites)

Agents often recruited from field journalistic crews, exchange postgraduate students and sociology researchers

• Strategic economic strengths (production, research, manufacture, infrastructure)

Agents recruited from science and technology academia, commercial enterprises, and more rarely from military technologists

• Military capability intelligence (offensive, defensive, manoeuvre, naval, air, space)

Agents are trained by special military espionage education facilities, and posted to area of operation with covert identities to prevent prosecution

[edit] Methods and terminology

While news media may speak of “spy satellites” and the like, espionage is not a synonym for all intelligence functions. It is a specific form of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Codebreaking (cryptanalysis or COMINT), aircraft or satellite photography (IMINT) and research in open publications (OSINT) are all intelligence gathering disciplines, but none of them are espionage. Many HUMINT activities, such as prisoner interrogation, reports from military reconnaissance patrols and from diplomats, etc., are not espionage.
Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored, or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people to whom he was selling information.
The US defines espionage towards itself as “The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Black’s Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: “…gathering, transmitting, or losing…information related to the national defense“. Espionage is a violation of United States law, 18 U.S.C. § 792–798 and Article 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice“.^[4] The United States, like most nations, conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. Britain’s espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence Service.

[edit] Organization

A spy is a person employed to obtain such secrets. Within the United States Intelligence Community, “asset” is a more common usage. A case officer, who may have diplomatic status (i.e., official cover or non-official cover) supports and directs the human collector. Cutouts are couriers who do not know the agent or case officer, but transfer messages. A safe house is a refuge for spies.
In larger networks the organization can be complex with many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine cell systems. Often the players have never met. Case officers are stationed in foreign countries to recruit and to supervise intelligence agents, who in turn spy on targets in their countries where they are assigned. A spy need not be a citizen of the target country. While the more common practice is to recruit a person already trusted with access to sensitive information, sometimes a person with a well-prepared synthetic identity, called a legend in tradecraft, may attempt to infiltrate a target organization.
These agents can be moles (who are recruited before they get access to secrets), defectors (who are recruited after they get access to secrets and leave their country) or defectors in place (who get access but do not leave).
Spies may also be used to spread disinformation in the organization in which they are planted, such as giving false reports about their country’s military movements, or about a competing company’s ability to bring a product to market. Spies may be given other roles that also require infiltration, such as sabotage.
Many governments routinely spy on their allies as well as their enemies, although they typciall maintain a policy of not commenting on this. Governments also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk and others.

[edit] Industrial espionage

Canada is losing $12 billion a year due to industrial espionage.^[5] It is estimated that German companies were losing about €50 billion ($87 billion) and 30,000 jobs to industrial espionage every year.^[6]

[edit] Agents in Espionage

“An Agent is someone that has been authorized to function on behalf of another.”^[7] A “covert human intelligence source.”^[8]

• Double agent, “is a person who engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one or about each to the other, and who wittingly withholds significant information from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant facts are withheld from the adversary. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are not double agents because they are not agents. The fact that doubles have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from penetrations, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff or officer capacity.”^[9]
  • Re-doubled agent, an agent who gets caught as a double agent and is forced to mislead the foreign intelligence service.
    • Unwitting double agent, an agent who offers or is forced to recruit as a double or re-doubled agent and in the process is recruited by either a third party intelligence service or his own government without the knowledge of the intended target intelligence service or the agent. This can be useful in capturing important information from an agent that is attempting to seek allegiance with another country. The double agent usually has knowledge of both intelligence services and can identify operational techniques of both, thus making third party recruitment difficult or impossible. The knowledge of operational techniques can also effect the relationship between the Operations Officer (or case officer) and the agent if the case is transferred by an Operational Targeting Officer to a new Operations Officer, leaving the new officer vulnerable to attack. This type of transfer may occur when an officer has completed his term of service or when his coveris blown.
      • Triple agent, an agent that is working for three intelligence services.

There are several types of agent in use today.^[10]

• Double agent, These agents always require special handling as they can become re-doubled if caught. Special handling may include debriefing with an Operations Officer whose cover has already been blown and verifying intelligence reports immediately in order to establish trust.
• Intelligence agent: Provides access to sensitive information through the use of special privileges. If used in corporate intelligence gathering, this may include gathering information of a corporate business venture, stock portfolio, or the creation of a new menu item at a restaurant. In economic intelligence, “Economic Analysts may use their specialized skills to analyze and interpret economic trends and developments, assess and track foreign financial activities, and develop new econometric and modeling methodologies.”^[11] This may also include information of trade or tariff.
• Access agent: Provides access to other potential agents by providing profiling information that can help lead to recruitment into an intelligence service.
• Agent of influence: Someone who may provide political influence in an area of interest or may even provide publications needed to further an intelligence service agenda. I.e. The use of the media to print a story to mislead a foreign service into action, exposing their operations while under surveillance.
• Agent provocateur: This type of agent will instigate trouble or may provide information to gather as many people as possible into one location for an arrest.
• Facilities agent: A facilities agent may provide access to buildings such as garages or offices used for staging operations, resupply, etc.
• Principle agent: This agent functions as a handler for an established network of agents usually Blue Chip.
• Confusion agent: May provide misleading information to an enemy intelligence service or attempt to discredit the operations of the target in an operation.
• Sleeper agent: A sleeper agent is a person who is recruited to an intelligence service to wake up and perform a specific set of tasks or functions while living under cover in an area of interest. This type of agent is not the same as a deep cover operative who is continually in contact with their case officer in order to file intelligence reports. A sleeper agent will not be in contact with anyone until activated.
• Illegal agent: This is a person who is living in another country under false credentials that does not report to a local station. A non official cover operative is a type of cover used by an intelligence operative and can be dubbed an “Illegal”^[12] when working in another country without diplomatic protection.

[edit] Risks

The risks of espionage vary. A spy breaking the host country’s laws may be deported, imprisoned, or even executed. A spy breaking his/her own country’s laws can be imprisoned for espionage or/and treason, or even executed, as the Rosenbergs were. For example, when Aldrich Ames handed a stack of dossiers of CIA agents in the Eastern Bloc to his KGB-officer “handler”, the KGB “rolled up” several networks, and at least ten people were secretly shot. When Ames was arrested by the FBI, he faced life
in prison; his contact, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and taken to the airport. Ames’s wife was threatened with life imprisonment if her husband did not cooperate; he did, and she was given a five-year sentence. Hugh Francis Redmond, a CIA officer in China, spent nineteen years in a Chinese prison for espionage—and died there—as he was operating without diplomatic cover and immunity.
Many organizations, both national and non-national, conduct espionage operations. It should not be assumed that espionage is always directed at the most secret operations of a target country. National and terrorist organizations and other groups are also targets.
Communications both are necessary to espionage and clandestine operations, and also a great vulnerability when the adversary has sophisticated SIGINT detection and interception capability. Agents must also transfer money securely.
See espionage organizations for national and non-national groups that conduct clandestine human operations, for reasons that may include: assessment of national capabilities at the strategic level, warning of the movements of security and military organizations; financial systems; protective measures around targets.

Espionage [applicable to space (heaven) and religion]

Espionage

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“Spy” and “Secret agent” redirect here. For other uses, see Spy (disambiguation) and Secret agent (disambiguation).

For other uses, see Espionage (disambiguation).

Espionage or spying involves an individual obtaining information that is considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information. Espionage is inherently clandestine, lest the legitimate holder of the information change plans or take other countermeasures once it is known that the information is in unauthorized hands.
Espionage is usually part of an institutional effort by a government or corporation, and the term is most readily associated with state spying on potential or actual enemies, primarily for military purposes. Spying involving corporations is known as industrial espionage. Government surveillance of civil society groups, social movements, and individuals involved in political activism, such as COINTELPRO conducted by the FBI, is not covered by the present article.
See clandestine HUMINT for the basic concepts of such information collection, and subordinate articles such as clandestine HUMINT operational techniques and clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting for discussions of the “tradecraft” used to collect this information.

Contents [show] 1 History 2 Targets of espionage 3 Methods and terminology 3.1 Organization 3.2 Industrial espionage 4 Agents in Espionage 5 Risks 6 Spies in various conflicts 6.1 Espionage under Elizabeth I of England 6.2 Espionage in the American Revolution 6.3 Espionage in the Napoleonic Wars 6.4 Espionage in the American Civil War 6.5 Espionage in the Second Boer War 6.6 Espionage in World War I 6.7 Espionage in World War II 6.8 Espionage post World War II 7 Espionage technology and techniques 8 Spy fiction 9 See also 10 Further reading 10.1 Surveys 10.2 World War I 10.3 World War II: 1931–1945 10.4 Cold War era: 1945–1991 10.5 Post Cold War era: 1992–present day 11 References 12 External links

[edit] History

Incidents of espionage are well documented throughout history. The ancient writings of Chinese and Indian military strategists such as Sun-Tzu and Chanakya contain information on deception and subversion. Chanakya’s student Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Maurya Empire in India, made use of assassinations, spies and secret agents, which are described in Chanakya’s Arthasastra. The ancient Egyptians had a thoroughly developed system for the acquisition of intelligence, and the Hebrews used spies as well, as in the story of Rahab. Spies were also prevalent in the Greek and Roman empires.^[1] During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongols relied heavily on espionage in their conquests in Asia and Europe. Feudal Japan often used ninja to gather intelligence. More recently, spies played a significant part in Elizabethan England (see Francis Walsingham). Many modern espionage methods were well established even then.^[2]
The Cold War involved intense espionage activity between the United States of America and its allies and the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and their allies, particularly related to nuclear weapons secrets. Recently, espionage agencies have targeted the illegal drug trade and those considered to be terrorists.
Different intelligence services value certain intelligence collection techniques over others. The former Soviet Union, for example, preferred human sources over research in open sources, while the United States has tended to emphasize technological methods such as SIGINT and IMINT. Both Soviet political (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU^[3]) officers were judged by the number of agents they recruited.

[edit] Targets of espionage

Espionage agents are usually trained expertsin a specific targeted field. This allows them to differentiate mundane information from a target which has intrinsic value to own organisational development. Correct identification of the target at its execution is the sole purpose of the espionage operation.

The broad areas of espionage targeting expertise are:

• Natural resource strategic production identification and assessment (food, energy, materials)

Agents are usually found among bureaucrats that administer these resources in own countries

• Popular sentiment towards domestic and foreign policies (popular, middle class, elites)

Agents often recruited from field journalistic crews, exchange postgraduate students and sociology researchers

• Strategic economic strengths (production, research, manufacture, infrastructure)

Agents recruited from science and technology academia, commercial enterprises, and more rarely from military technologists

• Military capability intelligence (offensive, defensive, manoeuvre, naval, air, space)

Agents are trained by special military espionage education facilities, and posted to area of operation with covert identities to prevent prosecution

[edit] Methods and terminology

While news media may speak of “spy satellites” and the like, espionage is not a synonym for all intelligence functions. It is a specific form of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Codebreaking (cryptanalysis or COMINT), aircraft or satellite photography (IMINT) and research in open publications (OSINT) are all intelligence gathering disciplines, but none of them are espionage. Many HUMINT activities, such as prisoner interrogation, reports from military reconnaissance patrols and from diplomats, etc., are not espionage.
Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored, or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people to whom he was selling information.
The US defines espionage towards itself as “The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Black’s Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: “…gathering, transmitting, or losing…information related to the national defense“. Espionage is a violation of United States law, 18 U.S.C. § 792–798 and Article 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice“.^[4] The United States, like most nations, conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. Britain’s espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence Service.

[edit] Organization

A spy is a person employed to obtain such secrets. Within the United States Intelligence Community, “asset” is a more common usage. A case officer, who may have diplomatic status (i.e., official cover or non-official cover) supports and directs the human collector. Cutouts are couriers who do not know the agent or case officer, but transfer messages. A safe house is a refuge for spies.
In larger networks the organization can be complex with many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine cell systems. Often the players have never met. Case officers are stationed in foreign countries to recruit and to supervise intelligence agents, who in turn spy on targets in their countries where they are assigned. A spy need not be a citizen of the target country. While the more common practice is to recruit a person already trusted with access to sensitive information, sometimes a person with a well-prepared synthetic identity, called a legend in tradecraft, may attempt to infiltrate a target organization.
These agents can be moles (who are recruited before they get access to secrets), defectors (who are recruited after they get access to secrets and leave their country) or defectors in place (who get access but do not leave).
Spies may also be used to spread disinformation in the organization in which they are planted, such as giving false reports about their country’s military movements, or about a competing company’s ability to bring a product to market. Spies may be given other roles that also require infiltration, such as sabotage.
Many governments routinely spy on their allies as well as their enemies, although they typciall maintain a policy of not commenting on this. Governments also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk and others.

[edit] Industrial espionage

Canada is losing $12 billion a year due to industrial espionage.^[5] It is estimated that German companies were losing about €50 billion ($87 billion) and 30,000 jobs to industrial espionage every year.^[6]

[edit] Agents in Espionage

“An Agent is someone that has been authorized to function on behalf of another.”^[7] A “covert human intelligence source.”^[8]

• Double agent, “is a person who engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one or about each to the other, and who wittingly withholds significant information from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant facts are withheld from the adversary. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are not double agents because they are not agents. The fact that doubles have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from penetrations, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff or officer capacity.”^[9]
  • Re-doubled agent, an agent who gets caught as a double agent and is forced to mislead the foreign intelligence service.
    • Unwitting double agent, an agent who offers or is forced to recruit as a double or re-doubled agent and in the process is recruited by either a third party intelligence service or his own government without the knowledge of the intended target intelligence service or the agent. This can be useful in capturing important information from an agent that is attempting to seek allegiance with another country. The double agent usually has knowledge of both intelligence services and can identify operational techniques of both, thus making third party recruitment difficult or impossible. The knowledge of operational techniques can also effect the relationship between the Operations Officer (or case officer) and the agent if the case is transferred by an Operational Targeting Officer to a new Operations Officer, leaving the new officer vulnerable to attack. This type of transfer may occur when an officer has completed his term of service or when his coveris blown.
      • Triple agent, an agent that is working for three intelligence services.

There are several types of agent in use today.^[10]

• Double agent, These agents always require special handling as they can become re-doubled if caught. Special handling may include debriefing with an Operations Officer whose cover has already been blown and verifying intelligence reports immediately in order to establish trust.
• Intelligence agent: Provides access to sensitive information through the use of special privileges. If used in corporate intelligence gathering, this may include gathering information of a corporate business venture, stock portfolio, or the creation of a new menu item at a restaurant. In economic intelligence, “Economic Analysts may use their specialized skills to analyze and interpret economic trends and developments, assess and track foreign financial activities, and develop new econometric and modeling methodologies.”^[11] This may also include information of trade or tariff.
• Access agent: Provides access to other potential agents by providing profiling information that can help lead to recruitment into an intelligence service.
• Agent of influence: Someone who may provide political influence in an area of interest or may even provide publications needed to further an intelligence service agenda. I.e. The use of the media to print a story to mislead a foreign service into action, exposing their operations while under surveillance.
• Agent provocateur: This type of agent will instigate trouble or may provide information to gather as many people as possible into one location for an arrest.
• Facilities agent: A facilities agent may provide access to buildings such as garages or offices used for staging operations, resupply, etc.
• Principle agent: This agent functions as a handler for an established network of agents usually Blue Chip.
• Confusion agent: May provide misleading information to an enemy intelligence service or attempt to discredit the operations of the target in an operation.
• Sleeper agent: A sleeper agent is a person who is recruited to an intelligence service to wake up and perform a specific set of tasks or functions while living under cover in an area of interest. This type of agent is not the same as a deep cover operative who is continually in contact with their case officer in order to file intelligence reports. A sleeper agent will not be in contact with anyone until activated.
• Illegal agent: This is a person who is living in another country under false credentials that does not report to a local station. A non official cover operative is a type of cover used by an intelligence operative and can be dubbed an “Illegal”^[12] when working in another country without diplomatic protection.

[edit] Risks

The risks of espionage vary. A spy breaking the host country’s laws may be deported, imprisoned, or even executed. A spy breaking his/her own country’s laws can be imprisoned for espionage or/and treason, or even executed, as the Rosenbergs were. For example, when Aldrich Ames handed a stack of dossiers of CIA agents in the Eastern Bloc to his KGB-officer “handler”, the KGB “rolled up” several networks, and at least ten people were secretly shot. When Ames was arrested by the FBI, he faced life
in prison; his contact, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and taken to the airport. Ames’s wife was threatened with life imprisonment if her husband did not cooperate; he did, and she was given a five-year sentence. Hugh Francis Redmond, a CIA officer in China, spent nineteen years in a Chinese prison for espionage—and died there—as he was operating without diplomatic cover and immunity.
Many organizations, both national and non-national, conduct espionage operations. It should not be assumed that espionage is always directed at the most secret operations of a target country. National and terrorist organizations and other groups are also targets.
Communications both are necessary to espionage and clandestine operations, and also a great vulnerability when the adversary has sophisticated SIGINT detection and interception capability. Agents must also transfer money securely.
See espionage organizations for national and non-national groups that conduct clandestine human operations, for reasons that may include: assessment of national capabilities at the strategic level, warning of the movements of security and military organizations; financial systems; protective measures around targets.

Category:English male given names from Hebrew

 

Category:English male given names from Hebrew

Definition from Wiktionary, the free dictionary

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Pages in category “English male given names from Hebrew”

The following 185 pages are in this category, out of 185 total.

A Aaron Abdon Abel Abner Abraham Abram Absalom Achaz Adam Adlai Ahab Aharon Amos Ananias Ariah Arie Ariel Aron Arron Asa Asher Avraham B Barak Barnabas Barnaby Bartholomew Benjamin Boaz C Cain Caleb Canaan Chaim D Dan Daniel David Dror E Ebenezer Eleazar Eli Elias Eliel Eliezer Elijah Eliot Elisha Elkanah Elliot Elliott Emanuel Emmanuel Enoch Enos Ethan Ezekiel Ezra G Gabriel Gad Gideon Gilead H Habakkuk Hans Hezekiah

H cont. Hiram I Immanuel Ira Isaac Isaiah Ishmael Isiah Israel Issachar J Jacob Jadon Jair James Jan Japheth Jared Jedidiah Jehoshaphat Jenkin Jeremiah Jeremias Jeremy Jesse Jessie Jethro Joachim Job Joel Johannes John Johnathan Jonah Jonas Jonathan Jonathon Jordan Jordyn Joseph Joshua Josiah Josias Judah Judas Judd Jude K Kaleb L Laban Lazarus Lemuel Levi Lot M Mahlon Malachi Mathew Mattathias Matthew Matthias Micah Michael Micheal Moses Moshe

N Nahum Naphtali Nathan Nathanael Nathaniel Nehemiah Noah O Obadiah Obed Oren P Peleg Phineas Phinehas R Ran Raphael Reuel Reuven Ron Ruben Rubin S Sampson Samson Samuel Saul Seth Shadrach Sheba Shem Shimon Shimshon Shlomo Simeon Simon Solomon T Tal Terah Thomas Tobiah Tobias Toby Togarmah U Uri Uriah Urias Uzziel Y Yair Yehuda Yehudi Yitzchak Z Zachariah Zacharias Zachary Zackary Zebadiah Zebedee Zebul Zebulun Zechariah Zelophehad Zephaniah Zion

Retrieved from “http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Category:English_male_given_names_from_Hebrew“

Categories: English male given names | Hebrew derivations

Inside job

Inside job

For other uses, see Inside job (disambiguation).

The term inside job colloquially refers to a crime, usually larceny, robbery or embezzlement, committed by a person with a position of trust who is authorized to access a location or procedure with little or no supervision, e.g., a key employee or manager. The perpetrator can also be a former employee who still has specialized knowledge necessary to ensure the optimum result of committing the crime.

Distortion of Fact

Distortion of Fact

A representor may make a statement which prima facie is technically true; however this may tell only half the story. If a statement of fact is made but the representor fails to include information which would significantly alter the interpretation of this fact, then a misrepresentation may have occurred.